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Abstract
The thesis assesses the impact of international factors on relations between Greek
and Turkish Cypriots during and after the Cold War. Through an analysis of the Cyprus
problem it explores both why external actors intervene in communal conflicts and how
they influence relations between ethnic groups in plural societies. The analytical
framework employed throughout the study draws on contributions of International
Relations theorists and students of ethnic conflict.
The thesis argues that, as in the global political system, relations between ethnic
groups in unranked communal systems are anarchic; that is, actors within the system do
not recognize a sovereign political authority. In bipolar communal systems dominated by
two relatively equal groups, the struggle for security and power often leads to appeals for
assistance from external actors. The framework notes that neighboring states and Great
Powers may heed calls for assistance, or intervene without a prior request, if it is in their
interest to do so. The convergence of regional and global interests in communal affairs
exacerbates ethnic conflicts and precludes the development of effective political
institutions. The impact of external intervention in ethnic conflicts has the potential to
alter the basis of communal relations.
The Cyprus problem is examined both during and after the Cold War in order to
gauge how global and regional actors and the structure of their respective systems have
affected relations between ethnic groups in Cyprus. The thesis argues that Cyprus's
descent into civil war in 1963 was due in part to the entrenchment of external interests in
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the Republic's constitution. The study also notes that power politics involving the
United States, Soviet Union, Greece and Turkey continued to affect the development of
communal relations throughout the 1960s, 70s, and, 80s. External intervention
culminated in July and August 1974, after a Greek sponsored coup was answered by
Turkey's invasion and partition of Cyprus. The forced expulsion of Greek Cypriots from
the island's northern territories led to the establishment of ethnically homogeneous
zones, thus altering the context of communal relations dramatically.
The study also examines the role of the United Nations in Cyprus, noting that its
failure to settle the dispute was due in large part to a lack of cooperation from Turkey,
and the United States' and Soviet Union's acceptance of the status quo following the
1974 invasion and partition of the island. The thesis argues that the deterioration of
Greek-Turkish relations in the post-Cold War era has made a solution to the dispute
unlikely for the time being. Barring any dramatic changes in relations between
communal and regional antagonists, relations between Greek and Turkish Cypriots will
continue to develop along the lines established in July/August 1974.
The thesis concludes by affirming the validity of its core hypotheses through a
brief survey of recent works touching on international politics and ethnic conflict.
Questions requiring further research are noted as are elements of the study that require
further refinement.
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Introduction
Understanding the Cyprus Problem: Three Levels of Inquiry
The Cyprus problem, like most other ethnic conflicts, has a variety of causes.
These causes extend beyond the community itself and include the influence of other
countries as well as pressures created by the international system. The rivalry between
Greek and Turkish Cypriots has developed in response to relations between Greece and
Turkey, threats to NATO cohesion, and the strategic interests of foreign powers.
International as well as domestic political considerations have been crucial to its
development.
Scholars are beginning to emphasize the role of international politics in ethnic
conflicts. 1 Many have noted that the end of the Cold War has led to a proliferation of
conflicts based on ethnicity. In the words ofRobert Cooper and Mats Berdal, "the
system of bipolarity contained elements of order whose disappearance has not only
altered the context within which military intervention is considered, but also increased
the potential for violent ethnic conflict within the system as a whole.,,2 Samuel P.
Huntington has stated that the ideological divisions of the Cold War have been replaced
1 Recent work on the subject of ethnic conflict has emphasized the role of international factors. See Michael
E. Brown, ed., Ethnic Conflict and International Security, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University
Press, 1993); Ted Robert Gurr and Barbara Hartl: Ethnic Conflict in World Politics, (Boulder, Colorado:
Westview Press, 1994); Donald L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, (Berkely: University of California
Press, 1985); Stephen Ryan, Ethnic Conflict and International Relations, (Brookfield, 1990).
2 Robert Cooper and Mats Berdal, "Outside Intervention in Ethnic Conflicts," Survival 1 (Spring 1993): p.
119.
by Cllltllral ones. According to Huntington, "...the principal conflicts of global politics
will occur between nations and groups of different civilizations.,,3 While there can be no
contesting the fact that ethnic conflicts have been affected by the end of international
bipolarity, little has been said about ethnic conflicts during that era. There is an acute
deficiency in our understanding of how the bipolar international system affected ethnic
relations in plural states. This study aims at addressing the aforementioned problem by
analyzing ethnic conflict in Cyprus both during and after the Cold War.
The thesis has two objectives: i) to identify international factors that have
exacerbated cOlnmunal tensions between Greek and Turkish Cypriots; and, ii) to explore
how the end of the Cold War has affected the conflict. Meeting these objectives will
require an examination of the communal, regional, and global dimensions of the
problem. 4 The thesis will argue that communal relations have been adversely influenced
by British colonial policies, poor relations between Greece and Turkey, and Great Power
politics in the Eastern Mediterranean. The thesis will also argue that the end of the Cold
War has not improved the odds of solving the problem. Changes in the international
system may actually hinder attempts to reconcile Greek and Turkish Cypriots.
3 Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?" Foreign Affairs 3 (Summer 1993): p. 22.
4 This approach owes much to the work of other scholars. See Adamantia Pollis, "International Factors and
the Failure ofPolitical Integration in Cyprus," in, Stephanie G. Neuman, ed., Small States and Segmented
Societies: National Political Integration in a Global Environment, (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1976): pp.
44-78; Van Coufoudakis, "The Dynamics ofPolitical Partition and Division in Multiethnic and
Multireligious Societies-The Case of Cyprus," in Van Coufoudakis, ed., Essays on the Cyprus Conflict,
(New York: Pella Publishing Co., 1976): pp. 27-51; Kyriacos C. Markides, The Rise and Fall of the Cyprus
Republic, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977); The Michael A. Attalides, Cyprus: Nationalism and
International Politics, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1979); Joseph S. Joseph, Cyprus: Ethnic Conflict and
International Concern, (New York: Peter Lang Publishing, 1985).
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The defense of these arguments will entail the review of a large body of literature.
The works under consideration fall into four broad categories: a) the vast array of books,
articles, and government publications devoted specifically to the Cyprus problem; b)
studies of the foreign and security policies of Greece and Turkey; c) works touching on
the global implications of the Cyprus problem, in terms ofNATO and UN involvement;
d) recent efforts aimed at providing a clearer understanding of ethnic conflict in the
context of international relations.
Invariably, one must ask whether the world needs another study on Cyprus. Does
Cyprus merit such attention? Several factors point to a positive answer. As Charles W.
McCaskill has stated, both the humanitarian and strategic dimensions of the problem
demand scholarly attention. 5 The proliferation of ethnic conflicts throughout the world
also points to the need for more work on the subject. Contrary to the predictions of
modernization theorists6, ethnic identity has not succumbed to the pressures associated
with greater economic interaction and the growth of mass communication. In the words
ofRita Jalali and Seymour Martin Lipset:
It is now clearly established that the assimilationist assumptions are not valid.
Most parts of the globe have been touched by ethnic conflict. While the
postcolonial countries continue to experience the effects of ethnic
polarization, ethnic passions have now engulfed regions of the world that
until recently were thought to have solved the 'nationality' problem.?
5Charles W. McCaskill, "Cyprus Twenty-Five Years Later: An American Diplomat Looks Back," Journal of
Modern Greek Studies 1(May 1991): p. 39.
6 See C.E. Welch Jf., ed. Political Modernization, (Belmont, California: Duxbury Press, 1971).
7 Rita Jalali and Seymour Martin Lipset, "Racial and Ethnic Conflicts: A Global Perspective," Political
Science Quarterly 4 (November 1992/93): p. 585.
3
Cypriots have endured most of the hardships associated with ethnic conflict; they
have witnessed foreign invasion, partition, forced exchange of populations, and all
manner of human rights abuses. 8 Thus, the history of the Cyprus problem provides ample
data for testing new theories of ethnic conflict. A better understanding of the Cyprus
problem may allow scholars and policymakers to deal with current and future ethnic
conflicts with greater expertise. Finally, the increasingly hostile nature of Greek-Turkish
relations has made the settlement of the Cyprus problem an international priority.9
Conversely, there has been relatively little research done on the state of the Cyprus
problem in the post-Cold War era. This study aims at providing some insight into the
way in which current international conditions have influenced developments in Cyprus,
Greece, and Turkey.
The thesis is divided into four chapters which follow a brief summary of the origins
of ethnic conflict in Cyprus. Chapter One, Cyprus: The Role ofEthnic, Regional, and
International Bipolarity, provides an analysis of the communal, regional, and global
dimensions of the Cyprus problem. Bipolarity will be employed as a unifying concept.
Bipolarity refers to the domination of a system by two, roughly equal powers. The
chapter will review several theories of bipolarity and assess their worth in terms of
understanding the Cyprus problem. The interaction of all three elements of the problem
8 See Human Rights--Turkey's Violations ofHuman Rights in Cyprus: Findings of the European
Commission ofHuman Rights and Continuing Violations by Turkey, (Nicosia, Cyprus: Cyprus Bar
Association, 1989); and They Make a Desert and They Call It Peace: Cyprus After the Turkish Invasion,
(Nicosia: Union of the Municipalities of Cyprus, 1991).
9 See Van Coufoudakis, "Greece, Turkey, Cyprus and the United States in the Changing International
Order," in Harry 1. Psomiades and Stavros B. Thomadakis, Greece, the New Europe, and the Changing
International Order, (New York: Pella Publishing, 1993): pp. 391-404.
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has contributed to its durability. Understanding this interaction is a key element of this
chapter and the thesis. Chapter Two, International Politics and the Evolution o.fthe
Cyprus Problem: 1964-1990, traces the development of the Cyprus problem with
reference to international politics. The chapter examines the effects of global bipolarity
on the Cyprus problem to 1990, through an analysis of the policies of the Soviet Union,
the United States, Greece, and Turkey. The chapter also reviews the UN's role in Cyprus
during the era of international bipolarity. Chapter Three, The Cyprus Problem in the
Emerging International System, considers the Cyprus problem in the post-Cold War
period. This chapter examines trends in Cypriot domestic politics, Greek-Turkish
relations, the role of the European Union, and recent UN negotiations in an effort to
reach some understanding of how the Cyprus problem has evolved in the emerging
international system. The continuing relevance of regional and communal bipolarity is
emphasized throughout the discussion. The concluding chapter, Ethnic Conflicts and
International Order: The Case o/Cyprus, provides a summary of the work's main
arguments and concludes with a set of hypotheses based on the preceding analysis. The
chapter will emphasize the importance of international factors in ethnic conflicts, thus
linking the thesis to current scholarship in the field.
Background: The Roots of Ethnic Rivalry in Cyprus
Cyprus is located in the northeast comer of the Mediterranean, approximately 80
kilometers off the south coast of Turkey. The island covers an area of 9251 square
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kilometers, and has a population of710,200. 10 The Cypriot population is divided by
ethnicity, language, and religion: 80% Greek-Christian~ 18% Turkish-Moslem~ and, 2%
Armenian and Maronite Christian. 11 Cyprus straddles three major inter-sea routes: that
joining the Black Sea to the eastern Mediterranean, via the Dardanelles and the Aegean~
that connecting the Atlantic and the western Mediterranean with the Indian Ocean, via
the Suez Canal~ and the overland connection of the Mediterranean with the Persian Gulf,
via the Tigris and Euphrates valley. 12
Colonization by Mycenean Greeks at the beginning of the first millennium BC
introduced Greek language, art, and religion to the island. Greek influence on Cyprus
during the Hellenistic and Byzantine periods was profound. According to Kyriakos C.
Markides, "During more than eight centuries ofByzantine rule, the culture ofByzantium
penetrated every fiber of Cypriot life, perhaps more so than in any other part of the Greek
world.,,13 Byzantine rule ended in 1191, when Richard Coeur de Lion captured the island
and sold it to the Latin house ofLusignan. 14 Latin rule, administered by the Franks, the
Venetians, and the Genoese, was marked by the establishment of a feudal system and the
10 Statesman's Year-Book: Statistical and Historical Annual of the States of the World for the Year 1993-
1994, (London: Macmillan, 1994): p. 473.
llMonteagle Steams, Entangled Allies: U.S. Policy Toward Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus, (New York:
Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1992), p. 107. As Laurence Stern has noted, "Though the Turks
comprised only 18 percent of the island's population, it was the Greek Cypriots who constituted the true
minority in their corner of the Mediterranean." See The Wrong Horse: The Politics of Intervention and
the Failure of American Diplomacy., (New York: Times Books, 1977): p. 80.
12Cyprus' strategic location has contributed to a long history of foreign intervention. See Robert McDonald,
The Problem of Cyprus, Adelphi Papers 234 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, Winter
1988-89), p. 7.
13 Kyriacos C. Markides, The Rise and Fall of the Cyprus Republic, (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1977): p. 2.
14 Keith Kyle, Cyprus, (London: Minority Rights Group, 1984): p. 4.
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suppression of the Greek Orthodox Church. 15 The Ottoman conquest of Cyprus in 1570-
71 drastically altered the island's demography. The original Turkish Cypriot settlers
were Ottoman soldiers, 30,000 of whom were given fiefs by Sultan Selim 11. 16 These
settlers, or sipahis, were the immediate ancestors of the present Turkish Cypriot
community.17 Turkish settlers differed from the native Greeks in terms of culture, ethnic
origin, language, and religion. 18 This, however, did not lead to immediate confrontation.
While the two groups possessed traits which contributed to differing identities,19 they
lived in relative harmony. According to Paschalis Kitromilides and Theodore A.
Couloumbis, Ottoman rule in Cyprus was marked by the peaceful coexistence of
Moslems and Christians. 20
The empire was administered through the millet system. Populations were grouped
into millets which were constituted on the basis of religious confession, rather than ethnic
origin. 21 After obliterating all vestiges of European feudalism, the Ottomans restored the
prestige of the Greek Orthodox Church. The Autocephalous Archbishop of Cyprus, as
15 Markides, p. 3.
16 Halil Ibrahim Salih, Cyprus: The Impact ofDiverse Nationalism on a State, (Alabama: University of
Alabama Press, 1978), p. 3.
14 Paschalis M. Kitromilides and Theodore A. Couloumbis, "Ethnic Conflict in a Strategic Area: The Case of
Cyprus," in Abdul Said and Luiz R. Simmons, eds., Ethnicity in an International Context, (New
Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Books, 1976): p. 168.
18 Coufoudakis, Essays, p. 30.
19 According to Anthony D. Smith, an ethnic community is, " ... a named human population with a myth of a
common ancestry, shared memories, and cultural elements; a link with a historic territory or homeland;
and a measure of solidarity." Anthony D. Smith, "Ethnic Sources ofNationalism," in Brown, Ethnic
Conflict, pp. 28-29.
20 For an excellent discussion of this phenomenon, see Adamantia Pollis "International Factors and the
Failure ofPolitical Integration in Cyprus," in Neumann, Small States, especially, pp. 51-53.
21 Richard Clogg, A Concise History of Greece, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992): p. 10.
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Ethnarch, was granted ecclesiastical and lay jurisdiction over the island's Christian
Orthodox population:22
The political functions of the Ottoman rulers vis-a-vis their subjects were
limited and, in tum, little was expected in the way of loyalty or relatedness to
the state. For the most part, the subjects remained autonomous and governed
their own affairs. 23
The millet system was designed to ensure the orderly collection of state taxes in a
vast, multiethnic empire. The Ethnarch's role in the system ensured a substantial degree
of prestige and honor for the Church, "As long as the Turks occupied Cyprus, the Church
remained the central institutional sphere around which the political, intellectual, and
cultural life of Greek Cypriots revolved. ,,24
In his seminal work, Cyprus Constitutionalism and Crisis Government, Stanley
Kyriakides states that the development of Greek Cypriot nationalism can be attributed to
cultural ties between Greeks and Greek Cypriots. Kyriakides emphasizes the role of the
Cypriot Orthodox Church during the Ottoman occupation:
This feeling of 'Greekness' by the Greek Cypriots can thus be explained in
terms of their devotion to their ancient Greek heritage, and to their
attachment to Byzantium and Eastern Orthodox Christianity.25
In contrast to this position, Adamantia Pollis has argued that group differences exhibited
during the Ottoman occupation did not preclude the development of a Cypriot national
22 Coufoudakis, Essays, p. 31.
23 Adamantia Pollis, "Intergroup Conflict and British Colonial Policy," Comparative Politics 5 (July 1973):
p.583.
24 Markides, p. 5.
25 Kyriakides, p. 8.
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identity.26 Pollis cites examples of intermarriage, Moslem and Orthodox populations
joining together in opposition to increased tax burdens, and the development of a unique
Cypriot dialect, spoken by both groups, to defend her hypothesis. 27 According to Pollis,
the origin of intergroup rivalry lay in the imposition ofBritish colonial rule:
Granting a divide -and-rule policy, the British did not exploit existing
psychologically relevant differences but redefined those differences within a
British conceptual framework. Thus the meaning of religious differences and
the millet system in Cyprus was comprehended by the British in nationalist
terms. Hence, the British took apolitical differences in Cyprus between
Moslems and Eastern Orthodox and through indirect rule politicized them
and transformed them into nationality groups. The generally shared culture
and values were ignored, as were the common bonds among members of the
same socioeconomic strata, irrespective of religion.28
Pollis states that British reforms in the fields of education and government led to
the emergence of rival Greek and Turkish Cypriot identities. As part of their literacy
campaign, the British expanded the number of schools in Cyprus. They also encouraged
the importation of teachers from Greece and Turkey.29 Greek and Turkish boards of
education were established and texts for the Greek schools were to be approved by the
Ministry ofEducation in Greece. 30 Thus:
...the school systems became the major structure for the dissemination of
nationalist doctrines, a task admittedly facilitated by the centrality of
Orthodoxy in the concept of Greek nationality.... Children of the island
learned languages alien to them and were socialized into believing, as their
26 Pollis, p. 587.
27 Ibid., p. 585-87
28 Pollis, Small States, p. 54.
29 Pollis, p. 589.
30 Ibid. For a detailed discussion see Barbara Hodge and G.L. Lewis, Cyprus School History Textbooks: A
Study in Education for International Misunderstanding, (Parliamentary Group for World Government,
1966).
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parents had not, that they were Greeks and Turks.... Hence, they were
. 31
enemies.
The introduction of the Legislative Council under the Constitution of 1882
exacerbated communal competition. The Council contained twelve elected members and
six members appointed by the British High Commissioner.32 Of the elected members,
three were Moslem, and nine were Orthodox Christian. The High Commissioner acted as
the presiding officer of the Council, and as such, possessed the deciding vote. Greek
Cypriots quickly objected to the Council's character, "the six official members together
with the Turkish members could offset the nine Greek members. ,,33 The concept of
majority rule was clearly abrogated. As well, no policies or programs were introduced to
develop a loyalty broader than that of Greek and Turk. 34 According to Pollis:
The British thus strengthened identification within each community,
sharpened cleavages between them, and drew the communities into political
relationships perhaps relevant for a modern nation-state, but irrelevant to the
previously existing communal social order and to the premises which
. d' 35sustalne It.
British reforms in education and representative government ensured the ascent of
Greek and Turkish nationalism among Christian and Moslem Cypriots. 36 The
abandonment of the millet system placed greater emphasis on ethnic identity as opposed
31 Pollis, p. 589-90.
32 Cyprus: Country Study, p. 21.
33Kyriakides, p. 14.
34 Pollis, Small States, p. 56.
35 Pollis, p. 591.
36 As Donald L. Horowitz has noted, nurturing rival nationalisms fascilitated colonial domination: "Building
colonial administration on a substructure of ethnic government helped insure that the disparities would be
interpreted through the lens of ethnicity and made it easy to see who the participants were." Donald L.
Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1985): p. 150.
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to religion. The Cypriot Orthodox Church, threatened by secular British rule, becalne a
vocal advocate of Greek nationalism. 37 British policies formalized ethnic divisions and
encouraged communal politicization:
... the horizontal bonds that had developed between the two communities
under the Ottoman Empire did not prove strong enough to resist either the
emerging nationalist aspirations of Greek Cypriots, or the deliberate
separatist British colonial policies...whereas the Cypriots existed within the
non-national Ottoman Empire for more than two and a half centuries, under
the British Empire each of the communities was given national
characteristics and was seen as a natural extension of Greece and the
Ottoman Turks respectively. 38
Nicholas Sambanis has noted that ascribing all blame for hostility between Greek
and Turkish Cypriots to the British ignores the fact that the beginning of the enosis
campaign can be traced to the Cypriot elite's espousal ofHellenic national ideals in the
early 1800s.39 Sambanis argues that political and social interaction between Cypriots has
been influenced by external sources and "ancient affections"-lessons of history, past
communal relations, stereotypes, prejudices, religious and other social factors. 4o In a
similar sense, Markides has stated that, "It was the interplay of cultural-ideological
factors with the structural strains of colonialism that gave birth to Enosis as a social
movemen1.,,41 Markides and Sambanis agree that the development of Greek and Turkish
37 See Kyriacos C. Markides, "Social Change and the Rise and Decline of Social Movement: The Case of
Cyprus," American Ethnologist 2 (May 1974).
38 Coufoudakis, Essays, pp. 33-34.
39 Nicholas Sambanis, "Ancient Affections: Standing in the Way of a Resolution in Cyprus?" SAIS Review 2
(Summer/Fall 1994): p. 131.
40 Ibid., p. 130.
41 Markides, p. 11.
11
nationalisln in Cyprus is due in part to over ninety years of struggle between Greece and
Turkey.
The Kingdom of Greece, established May 1832, initially contained less than a third
of the Greek population of the Ottoman Empire. This situation influenced the
development of the irredentist doctrine ofMegali Idea(Great Idea). Proponents of the
Megali Idea aimed to unite all areas of Greek settlement within a single state.42
Invariably, Greece's territorial expansion came at the expense of the Ottoman Empire. 43
In May 1919, Greek troops established a foothold on the coast of Asia Minor, in the city
of Smyrna. The Greek landing was accompanied by over 350 Turkish casualties. As
historian Richard Clogg has noted, the atrocities acted as a catalyst for the revival of
Turkish nationalism, under the leadership ofMustafa Kemal(Ataturk).44 After a failed
Greek offensive in March 1921, Turkish troops forced the Greek army to retreat and
evacuate Smyrna. Turkish troops occupied the city and massacred over 30,000 Greek
and Armenian Christians. 45 Approximately 900,000 were forced to flee under horrifying
conditions. In the words ofHenry Morgenthau, a League ofNations official:
... typhoid and smallpox swept through the ships. Lice infested
everyone...Men and women went insane. Some leapt overboard to end their
miseries in the sea. Those who survived were landed without shelter upon
the open beach, loaded with filth, racked by fever, without blankets or even
warm clothing, without food and without money. 46
42 See Clogg, pp. 46-99.
43 In the words ofDr. Peter Loizos, "Effectively, Greece fought her way out of the Ottoman Empire and
Turkey mistrusts Greece to this day." See Cyprus, (London: Minority Rights Group, 1976): p. 16.
44 Ibid., p. 94.
45 Ibid., p. 97.
46 Daniel Benjamin, "The Dangers ofUprooting," Time (August 26, 1991): p. 7.
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Dreams of a 'Greater Greece' perished in the fires of Smyrna along with over 2,500
years of Greek civilization in Asia Minor. Atrocities committed by both sides
contributed to the creation and perpetuation of "ancient affections". Cyprus was not
exempted from the violence. In 1821, at the beginning of the Greek rebellion,
Archbishop Kyprianos, several Bishops, and hundreds of priests and important laymen
were arrested and summarily hanged or decapitated by order of the Ottoman Governor. 47
The Treaty ofLausanne, ratified by Greece and Turkey in 1923, provided for the
compulsory exchange of populations on the basis of religion. Thus, the question of
minorities had been settled, albeit in a most inhumane manner. 48 Cyprus was an
important exception to this process. Under the Treaty ofLausanne, Turkey formally
renounced any claim to sovereignty over the island in favor ofBritain.49 For some Greek
Cypriots, enosis remained a tantalizing possibility. Turkish Cypriots, recalling excesses
committed by Greeks against Moslems in Thrace, Crete, and Smyrna, recoiled at any
suggestion of union with Greece. 50 British insensitivity to the political demands of
moderate Cypriots strengthened the hand of enosis advocates. 51 Taxation, poverty, and a
suffocating political system lent credibility to those who claimed that only enosis would
allow for an improvement in people's lives. Conversely, Turkish Cypriots linked their
47 Cyprus: A Country Study, p. 18.
48 For an authoratative discussion of the exchange of populations see Kalliopi K Koufa and Constantinos
Svolopoulos, "The Compulsory Exchange of Populations Between Greece and Turkey: The Settlement of
Minority Questions at the Conference ofLausanne, 1923, and its Impact on Greek-Turkish Relations," in
Paul Smith, ed., Ethnic Groups in International Relations: Comparative Studies on Governments and Non-
Dominant Ethnic Groups in Europe, 1850-1940, (New York: New York University Press, 1991): pp.
275-308.
49 Kyle, p. 5.
50 See Sir George Hill, A History of Cyprus Vol. IV, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1952).
51 Ibid., p. 538.
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survival to the maintenance ofBritish rule or the return of Cyprus to Turkey.52 This
difference in perceptions would have important consequences in the future.
Thus, the underlying causes of the Greek/Turkish rivalry in Cyprus were well
established prior to the outbreak of intercommunal violence in the late 1950s. The millet
administrative system ensured the division of Ottoman subjects on the basis of religion.
After 1878, the imposition of a secular order on religiously based communities facilitated
the emergence of rival nationalisms53. In response to the secular threat posed by
colonialism, the Greek Orthodox Church advocated the ascendancy of Greek-Christian
morality. The Church's espousal of enosis was related to its fear of modernity. 54
The establishment of the Kingdom of Greece in 1832 marked the beginning of over
ninety years of conflict between Greeks and Turks. Atrocities suffered by both sides
contributed to a legacy of mistrust and bitter memories. Fear and political segregation
divided Greek and Turkish Cypriots. Colonialism and the clash of Greek and Turkish
nationalism facilitated the development of mutually exclusive ethnic identities. The
absence ofbicommunal social and political institutions further contributed to the
alienation of the two groups.
52 Tozun Bahcheli, Greek-Turkish Relations Since 1950, (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1990): p. 24.
53 Loizos, p. 17.
54 Markides, p. 11.
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Chapter One
Anarchy, Bipolarity, and the Communal,
Regional, and Global Dimensions of the Cyprus
Problem
To this war ofevery man against every man this is also consequent; tliat nothing can be
UnJ·ust. The notions o.fRight and Wrong, Justice and Injustice have there no place.
Where there is no common Power, tliere is no Law: vvhere no Law, no InJ·ustice.
Thomas Hobbes: Leviathan
Introduction
The objective of this chapter is to link the communal, regional, and global
dimensions of the Cyprus problem to a single analytic framework. This framework seeks
to explain why and how international factors have exacerbated ethnic divisions in Cyprus
during and after the Cold War. The framework may also serve as a model for analyzing
the effects of international politics on ethnic conflicts generally.
The proposed model borrows heavily from the work of international relations
scholars. It is made IIp of two concepts which have served as important tools for
analyzing conflict between states: anarchy and bipolarity. It will be argued that anarchy
and bipolarity can be used to describe regional and communal political systems as well as
the global political system. Moreover, these systems are intimately linked. Anarchy and
bipolarity help explain behavior within each system and behavior which arises out of the
interaction of these systems.
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After defining regional and communal bipolar systems, the chapter shall discuss
their relation to each other and to the international system. The interaction of all three
systems shall be illustrated through an analysis of the Cyprus problem from the
establishment of the independent Republic of Cyprus in 1960 to the outbreak of
communal violence in 1963-4.
Anarchy and Bipolarity
Many scholars have concluded that the Cyprus problelTI is multidimensional.
That is, the comlTIunal, regional, and global aspects of the problem have contributed to its
durability. According to Ronald Meinardus:
... the Cyprus issue is an intercommunal problem where a Greek majority is
at odds with a Tllrkish minority(locallevel). Secondly the issue is a
problem of Greek-Turkish relations...This is the regional level. .. finally, the
Cyprus issue is an international problelTI, affecting not only the United
Nations, but also...NATO, the European Community and the United
States... l
Each dilTIension of the Cyprus problem may be regarded as comprising a distinct
political system. Political scientists have often differentiated between domestic and
international political systems. According to Kenneth Waltz:
The parts of domestic political systems stand in relations of super-and
subordination. Some are entitled to command~ others are required to obey.
1 Ronald Meindarus, "Third Party Involvement in Greek-Turkish Disputes," in The Greek-Turkish Conflict
in the 1990s: Domestic and External Influences, ed. Dimitri Contas, (London: Macmillan, 1991): p. 157.
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Domestic systems are centralized and hierarchic. The parts of international-
political systems stand in relations of coordination. Formally, each is the
equal of all the others. None is entitled to command~ none is required to
obey. International systems are decentralized and anarchic. 2
Anarchic political systems lack a sovereign power. They resemble Hobbes'
characterization of the State ofNature~ an unceasing conflict in which survival becomes
the principal motive for action. 3 As Barry R. Posen has pointed out, the key to security in
anarchic systelns is power. Actors in an anarchic system struggle to ensure their survival
and enhance their security.4 The quest for security often leads to instability and conflict:
In anarchy there is no automatic harmony...A state will use force to attain
its goals if, after assessing the prospects for success, it values those goals
more than it values the pleasure of peace. Because each state is the final
judge of its own cause, any state may at any time use force to implement its
policies. 5
The absence of a supreme authority charged with preventing and mediating disputes
leads to the constant possibility that conflicts will be settled by force. 6 In Waltz's words,
"Alnong men as among states, anarchy, or the absence of government, is associated with
the occurrence of violence.,,7 Self-protection is therefore a key elelnent in survival. This
2 Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics, (Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley Publishing
Company, 1979): p. 88.
3 Waltz elaborates on Hobbes' State ofNature by properly noting that " ...the state of nature is a state of
war. This is meant not in the sense that war constantly occurs but in the sense that, with each state
deciding for itselfwhether or not to use force, war may at any time break out." Waltz, Theory, p. 102.
4 Barry R. Posen, "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict," Survival 1 (Spring 1993): p. 28.
5 Kenneth N. Waltz, Man, the State, and War, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959): p. 160.
6 Ibid., p. 188.
7 Waltz, Theory, p. 102.
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in tum results in the what International Relations theorists refer to as the security
dilemlna, " ...what one does to enhance one's own security causes reactions that, in the
end, can make one less secure.,,8 Thus, cooperation in anarchic political systems is
tenuous. The absence of a universal authority results in a self-help system, with
individual actors responsible for their own defense. 9
The struggle for security and power is particularly acute in bipolar systems.
Bipolarity refers to the structure of a system: the number of actors within it and the
distribution of power among them. 10 A bipolar system contains two dominant actors
roughly equal in terms of their capabilities. Although anarchy and bipolarity are usually
associated with the international political systeln, they can also be used to describe
communal and regional political systems. 11 By identifying shared characteristics of these
systems we may gain a clearer understanding of how they interact.
Regional Systems
All states reside within the global political system. Hence, they are affected by
that system's structure. However, not all states are equal in terms of their capabilities.
8 Posen, p. 28. Also see, Robert Jervis, "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma," World Politics 2
(January 1978): pp. 167-213.
9 Waltz, Theory, p. 104.
10 See Glenn H. Snyder and Paul Diesing, Conflict Among Nations: Bargaining, Decision Making, and
System Structure in International Crisis, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1977): pp.
419-29; Morton A. Kaplan, "Balance ofPower, Bipolarity, and Other Models of International Systems,"
American Political Science Review 51 (September 1957): pp. 684-95.
11 Waltz notes that, "We easily lose sight of the fact that struggles to achieve and maintain power, to
establish order, and to contrive a kind ofjustice within states, may be bloodier than the wars among
them." Theory of International Politics, p. 103.
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Nikolaos Zahariadis has noted that global structure is not the only structural variable
affecting a small country'sI2 foreign policy:
Because they lack the resources for extensive international interaction, they
tend to concentrate on regional issues of immediate security. Consequently,
a regional component should be added to our framework: the regional
balance of power. Although it is affected by the global system, it also has
its own internal dynamics that influence a state's foreign policy. 13
According to Michael Brecher, a regional subsystem may be identified in terms of
three elements: i) its scope is delimited, with primary stress on a geographic region; ii)
there are at least two actors; iii) there is a relatively self-contained network of political
interactions between the members, involving such activities as goal attainment,
adaptation, pattern maintenance, and integration, and dealing with power relations and
military interactions. 14 Michael Haas cites two criteria for membership in a regional
subsystem: i) a member must interact more or less continuously in a manner relevant to
12 For a lucid discussion of the defining characteristics of small states, see Ronald P. Barston, "The External
Relations of Small States," in Small States in International Relations, August Schou and Arne Olav
Brundtland eds., (Stockholm,Sweden: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1971): pp. 40-43.
13 Nikolaos Zahariadis, "Nationalism and Small-State Foreign Policy: The Greek Response to the
Macedonian Issue," Political Science Quarterly, 4 (Fall 1994): p. 653.
14 See Michael Brecher, "International Relations and Asian Studies: The Subordinate State System of
Southeastern Asia," World Politics XV (January 1963): pp. 221-235., and Michael Haas, "International
Subsystems: Stability and Polarity," American Political Science Review 2 (March 1970): pp. 100-101.
While the inclusion of military force in Brecher and Haas's list of defining characteristics of regional
subsystems is apt in most cases, it should be noted that military interactions can be infrequent in some
regions; specifically those characterized by either very weak regional powers or by an absence of serious
rivalries or conflicts. Military interactions can be very important in traditionally volatile regions such as
the Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean.
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political-military goal attainment, adaptation, pattern maintenance, and integration; ii) a
member must possess military capability. 15
The Eastern Mediterranean may be regarded as a regional subsystetTI dominated
by Greece and Turkey. Relations between Greece and Turkey are conditioned by the
structure of the global system and circumstances within their regional subsystem. Thus,
Greece and Turkey petitioned to be admitted into the NATO alliance to allay their fear of
Soviet expansion. 16 Evanthis Hatzivassiliou has noted that the impetus for 'solving' the
Cyprus question through the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus in 1959-60 arose
from Britain, Greece and Turkey's desire to maintain the integrity of the NATO alliance.
Conversely, Matthew Evangelista has stated that as the perception of external threat
wanes, the degree of cohesion between states in regional subsystems diminishes and is
replaced by renewed struggle. 17 In other words, shifts in the global political system will
have a corresponding effect on relations between states in regional subsystems.
Communal Systems
R.S. Milne has applied the concept of bipolarity to relations between ethnic
groups within a state. According to Milne, an ethnically bipolar state contains two
dominant ethnic groups of roughly equal size, which together constitute eighty percent or
15 Haas, pp. 101-102.
16 See Evanthis Hatzivassiliou, "Security and the European Option: Greek Foreign Policy, 1952-62," Journal
of Contemporary History, Vol. 30 (1995): pp. 190-91; and, David R. Stone, "The Balkan Pact and
American Policy," East European Quarterly, 3 (September 1994): p. 399.
17 Matthew Evangelista, "Greece, Turkey and the Improvement of U.S.-Soviet Relations," in The Greek-
Turkish Conflict in the 1990s: Domestic and External Influences, Dimitri Constas, ed., (London:
Macmillan, 1991): p. 141.
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more of the population. 18 Milne notes that, "In the bipolar case the vital point is that the
approximate equality in numbers, plus the existence of only two main groups, produces
not balance but competition and confrontation.,,19
Despite its not satisfying Milne's definition in terms of equal populations, Cyprus
may be regarded as an ethnically bipolar state. While Greek Cypriots constitute a
commanding majority of the island's population, they are a minority in the eastern
Mediterranean. Turkey's influence on Cypriot politics has enabled Turkish Cypriots to
maintain that they are a separate and equal community. In the words of Gowher Rizvi:
One of the key considerations informing discussions on Cyprus's
constitutions was that it was a bicommunal nation, and that the logic of
arithmetic was inapplicable...Turkey's support gave the Turkish Cypriots
added muscle. They argued that Cyprus, an off-shore island of Turkey,
should be treated as a part of Turkey, in which the Greek Cypriots
themselves became a small minority in the population of Turkey as a
whole. 20
Thus, Cyprus' domestic structure is both bipolar and unranked. According to Donald L
Horowitz, an unranked ethnic system lacks clearly understood conceptions of
superordinate and subordinate status.21 Turkey's support has given Turkish Cypriots the
ability to reject the establishment of a sovereign political entity on the island. This in
18 R.S. Milne, Politics In Ethnically Bipolar States: Guyana, Malaysia, Fiji, Vancouver: University ofBritish
Columbia Press, 1981): p. 1.
19 Ibid., p. 8.
20 Gowher Rizvi, "Ethnic Conflict and Political Accommodation in Plural Societies: Cyprus and Other
Cases," The Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, 1 (March 1993): p. 73.
21 Horowitz, p. 22.
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turn has led to an anarchic system marked by an intense struggle for power and security.
Horowitz has noted that such systems are particularly prone to bitter conflict:
unranked ethnic systems resemble the international system. The fear of
ethnic domination and suppression is a motivating force for the acquisition
of power as an end...Conflicts over needs and interests are subordinated to
conflicts over group status and over the rules to govern conflict.
Constitutional consensus is elusive, and the symbolic sector of politics
looms large. 22
In an anarchic system the quest for power becomes all encompassing. It ensures survival
at a .minimum and domination at an extreme. Thus, ethnic groups resemble states in an
anarchic international system.23 Politics in ethnically bipolar states is aimed at securing
security and advantage at the expense of the rival group. Conversely, a gain by one side
is deemed a loss by the other. There is little room for accommodation and compromise
in such a system; "Misunderstandings and misperceptions abound. As there is less
generalized domination, so there is also less generalized collaboration. ,,24
Synthesis
The link between global and regional systems has been noted in the preceding
discussion, as has the concept of an anarchic, bipolar communal system. The final step
22 Ibid., p. 187.
23 According to Horowitz, "The analogy to the international system is suggestive, not only with respect to
alliance formation and negotiation along group lines, but also with respect to conflict and warfare." See
Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, p. 31.
24 Ibid., p. 28.
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in constructing the proposed framework lies translating these concepts into a set of
working hypotheses. 25 At this point it is important to note some particular features of the
Cyprus problem: i) the ethnic communities in Cyprus identify with the two dominant
powers in the regional system; ii) the two regional powers are allied to the United States,
a global Superpower; iii) control of Cyprus is in the interests of communal, regional and
global actors; iv) the struggle for power is particularly intense because all three systems
lack a sovereign.
The failure of civil society26 in Cyprus is due to more than the absence of a
common national identity. It is also due to the absence of a sovereign political authority
and the multiplicity of interests and actors in Cypriot politics. The interests of regional
and global actors have deepened divisions within Cyprus by contributing to the anarchic
nature of the domestic political system. 27 Thus, foreign influence is much more subtle
25 The proposed framework subscribes to Morton A. Kaplan's criteria and description of illustrative models.
According to Kaplan: "Social science models of the type required in the study of international politics
abstract from reality. These models are of the 'if then' type and give rise to reliable predictions only when
a large number of parameters are held constant. In the real world, the parameters may vary greatly and
sometimes wildly. At best the conclusions of our models are tendency statements that mayor may not
apply to particular cases. They are not descriptive accounts of the efficient causes ofevents or of the
concrete chain of events that produces a particular result. If, however, they serve to elucidate an
important aspect of events, to distinguish between different periods, to explain observed differences--even
if not with exactitude and infallibility--and to help predict other aspects of situations that might not have
been expected or might not have been related to those investigated, they serve a useful purpose." Morton
A. Kaplan, "Intervention in Internal War," in James N. Rosenau, ed., International Aspects of Civil Strife,
(Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1964): p. 94
26 E. Shils defines civil society in terms of three major components: "The first is a part of society comprising
a complex of autonomous institutions--economic, religious, intellectual and political--distinguishable from
the family, clan, the locality and the state. The second is a part of society possessing a particular complex
of relationships between itself and the state and a distinctive set of institutions which safeguard the
separation of the state and civil society and maintain effective ties between them. The third is a
widespread pattern of refined or civil manners." E. Shils, "The Virtues of Civil Society," Government and
Opposition 26 (Winter 1991): p. 4.
27 David Welsh notes that Switzerland's neutrality has ensured that its different linguistic groups have not
sought to make common cause with German, French, or Italian colinguals in European conflicts.
Conversely, these countries have had little influence in Swiss domestic politics. David Welsh, "Domestic
Politics and Ethnic Conflict," in Brown., ed. Ethnic Conflict, p. 54.
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than some observers have noted. In Cyprus, communal, regional, and global systems are
inextricably tangled. Relations between Greek and Turkish Cypriots have developed in
response to political conditions locally, regionally, and internationally.
These characteristics may be translated into a set of conditions which fonn a
general fralne\vork for the analysis of ethnic conflicts. In unranked communal systems,
each group will do all it can to compete successfully with rival groups. Overtures to
outside parties with interests in the dispute will be common. If the dispute impacts on
the stability of the global system, olltside influence will extend beyond regional actors
and include global powers. The influence of international actors extends beyond
instances of overt intervention. The quest for security and power in the global and
regional systems influences political life within the unranked communal system.
Bipolarity exacerbates competition within each system, leading to each side to regard
politics as a zero-sum game. Incidence of violence is likely to increase at times of
transition, when either of the three systems is subject to profound change. Thus, ethnic
conflict will coincide with transitions in regional and global politics, especially in
unranked systems. A brief analysis of the Cyprus problem from the establishment of the
independent Cypriot Republic to the outbreak of intercommunal violence in 1963-4
should illustrate the validity of these hypotheses.
Enosis, Takism and the End of British Rule
The independent Republic of Cyprus came into existence on the 16 August, 1960.
The establishment of the Republic came after five years of negotiations between Greece,
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Turkey, and Britain which culminated in the signing of the Zurich and London
agreements in February 1959.28 Greek and Turkish Cypriot leaders were also signatories
to the agreement, though they had little inflllence on its formulation. The period leading
up to independence was marked by the armed rebellion of Greek Cypriots against British
rule. The Greek Cypriots sought the right to self-determination, which translated into
union with Greece. Britain adamantly opposed the enosis struggle, citing its strategic
interests in the region. As Kyriakides has noted, the British withdrawal from Palestine in
1948 and Suez in 1954 increased Cyprus' strategic value. 29 Britain's interests in Cyprus
were clearly enunciated by Sir Anthony Eden in 1955:
Our duty if called on,... is to safeguard the strategic needs of our country and
of our ally (Tllrkey). Neither the NATO obligations...nor the Baghdad Pact,
nor any agreement in the Middle Eastern Area or the Persian Gulf, or
anything else, none of these can be speedily and effectively carried out
today unless we have the assured and unfettered use of bases and use of
facilities in Cyprus.... The welfare and indeed lives of our people depends
on Cyprus as a protective guard and staging post to take care of those
interests, above all oil. This is not imperialism. It should be the plain duty
of our Government and we intend to discharge it. 30
British policy included granting legitimacy to Turkey's claim to CypruS. 31 Britain
countered the Greek Cypriots' request for self-detertnination by arguing that, given
28 Kyle, p. 7., Kyriakides, p. 52. For a detailed account of the events leading to the establishment of the
Republic of Cyprus, see, Stephen Xydis, Cyprus: Conflict and Conciliation, 1954-1958, (Columbus, Ohio:
State University Press, 1967) and, Cyprus: Reluctant Republic, (The Hague: Mouton, 1973).
29 Kyriakides, pp. 138-9.
30 Attalides, p. 6.
31 In a speech to the UN General Assembly in December 1954, Selim Sarper, Turkey's UN Representative
stated that: "Turks of Anatolia had settled in Cyprus...They remained closely linked to the mother country,
by race, custom and collective social sentiment. ..From the geographical, racial, historical, and economic
aspects...Turkey must be primarily affected by the status of the island." United Nations, General
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British policy included granting legitimacy to Turkey's claim to Cyprus. 31 Britain
countered the Greek Cypriots' request for self-determination by arguing that, given
Turkey's strategic and cultural interests in Cyprus, the island should be partitioned in the
event of a British withdrawal. British policy resulted in unintended conflict between
Greece and Turkey. As Attalides has observed:
As a Maneuver by Britain to maintain Cyprus, the official involvement of
Turkey proved a failure. It had an important unintended consequence in
making the application of the principle of self-determination to Cyprus
impossible, because it would have resulted in union with Greece. The
Turkish Prime Minister had stated his country's readiness to go to war as
early as May 1956 in order to prevent this.
The stage had been set for the entrenchment of foreign interests in Cyprus. 32 The
Tripartite Conference on the Eastern Mediterranean and Cyprus, held in London in
August 1955 formally recognized the legitimacy of Turkey's claims on Cyprus, thereby
nullifying the status quo established by the Treaty ofLausanne. 33 The talks ended in
failure, with Greece and Turkey nowhere near an agreement.
Communal relations between 1955-1959 were marked by violence and further
division. The Greek Cypriots' struggle for enosis was spearheaded by EOKA (Ethniki
31 In a speech to the UN General Assembly in December 1954, Selim Sarper, Turkey's UN Representative
stated that: "Turks of Anatolia had settled in Cyprus...They remained closely linked to the mother country,
by race, custom and collective social sentiment. ..From the geographical, racial, historical, and economic
aspects...Turkey must be primarily affected by the status of the island." United Nations, General
Assembly, Official Records Ninth Session, First Committee, 750th Meeting, (14 December, 1954): pp.
551-553.
32 Attalides, p. 137.
33 Coufoudakis, Essays, p. 35. The Conference coincided with anti-Greek riots in Izmir and Istanbul. The
rioters destroyed Greek property and Orthodox Churches. Many scholars agree that the riots were stage
managed by the Turkish government, although they did not count on the ensuing devastation. According
to Kyle, "The message was clearly meant to be that Turkish forbearance was not to be too much counted
on." ..Kyle, p. 7.
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Organosis Kyprion Agoniston--National Organization of Cypriot Fighters). EOKA was
led by General George Grivas, a former officer of the Greek Army and leader of an
extreme right-wing guerrilla group during the Axis occupation34. EOKA enjoyed the
support of Cyprus' Archbishop Makarios and the mainland Greek government. In
response to the enosis struggle, militant Turkish Cypriots advocated the partition of the
island--takism. By 1957-58 Turkish Cypriots had formed their own paramilitary
organization, TMT (Turk Murkavemet Teskilati--Turkish Defense Organization).35
British authorities exacerbated communal divisions by enlisting Turkish Cypriots into
their security forces, thereby making them targets for EOKA violence. Order broke down
in June 1958, following a bomb explosion outside the Turkish press office in Nicosia.
Turkish Cypriots led by TMT retaliated against Greek Cypriots. EOKA reciprocated by
lifting all restrictions on killing Turks, "At the end of an eight-week period of horror, 127
people had lost their lives and more than 300 had been injured. ,,36
The United States grew increasingly alarmed as events in Cyprus deteriorated.
American pressure and the costs of maintaining its position in Cyprus contributed to shift
in British policy.37 In the winter of 1958, the British decided that bases in Cyprus were
34 For a detailed treatment of General Grivas and EOKA, see Charles Foley, ed., The Memoirs of General
Grivas, (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964); D. Barker, Grivas: Portrait ofa Terrorist, (London: The
Cresset Press, 1959); W. Byford-Jones, Grivas and the Story ofEOKA, (London: Robert Hale, 1959).
35 According to Bahcheli, "It was during this period that Ankara increased its aid to enable the Turkish-
Cypriot leadership to replace the underground organization called VOLKAN(volcano) with the better-led
TMT(Turk Murkavemet Teskilati--Turkish Defense Organization). Bahcheli, Greek-Turkish Relations, p.
40. Christopher Hitchens notes that Turkish Cypriot paramilitary groups were treated with favor by the
British, "In a celebrated case in 1958, a Turk, Sergeant Tuna, was convicted of possessing bombs and
ammunition by a British court. The good sergeant, unlike his Greek counterparts, was allowed bail in his
own recognizance and left immediately for Turkey." Christopher Hitchens, Cyprus, (London: Quartet
Books, 1984): p. 46.
36 Markides, p. 25.
37 By this time there were over 30,000 British soldiers in Cyprus battling EOKA. As Attalides has noted,
"the strategic use of Cyprus was being vitiated by the effort to keep it." Attalides, p. 12.
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sufficient in tenns of maintaining their strategic interests. Britain's decision coincided
with Greek and Turkish concerns regarding the danger of further conflict. 38 It was at this
point that the imperatives of regional and global actors converged, "It became evident
that Greece and Turkey had to search for a 'solution' to safeguard their own interests in
Cyprus, to secure British strategic interests, and to stabilize their respective roles within
the Western alliance. ,,39 Independence became the vehicle for securing the interests of
outside parties. The Greek Cypriot leadership had little choice but to go along with the
proceedings; the possibility of having Cyprus partitioned did not constitute a palatable
option. The British gave their blessing to bilateral talks between Greece and Turkey over
the future of the Cyprus. The Zurich Agreement grew out of these bilateral discussions.
The independent Republic of Cyprus was a compromise intended to diffuse the
confrontation between Greece and Turkey, maintain British strategic interests, and
bolster NATO's southern flank. 40 The difficulty in terms of the communal conflict lay in
establishing the basis for effective government. As many scholars have pointed out, the
political system which grew out of the Zurich-London Agreements failed in this regard.
The argument advanced by this study is that the entrenchment of global and regional
interests prevented the development of a mutually accepted sovereign political power on
38 Bahcheli, p. 43.
39 Kyriakides, p. 141.
40 "NATO's southern flank covers approximately 470,000 square miles and includes the central and eastern
Mediterranean along with the three peninsular member countries of Italy, Greece, and Turkey...NATO's
southern flank is integrally related to the Middle East and western Europe on one hand and Africa on the
other." Yorgos A. Kourvetaris, "The Southern Flank ofNATO: Political Dimensions of the Greco-
Turkish Conflict Since 1974," East European Quarterly 4 (January 1988): p. 431. See, Elias Vlanton and
Diane Alicia, "The 1959 Cyprus Agreement: Oracle ofDisaster," Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora 4
(Winter 1984): pp. 5-31. This article includes the State Department report in its entirety.
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the island. In other words, the domestic political system in Cyprus failed to satisfy either
ethnic groups' desire for security and effective government. The domestic political
system was anarchic, as were the regional and global systems which enveloped it. The
interaction of all three systems exacerbated ethnic friction, which reached crisis
proportions in 1963.
The Zuric-h-London Agreements
The Cypriot Republic's Constitution is actually an amalgamation of four
documents: The Treaty of Guarantee, the Treaty of Alliance, the Treaty ofEstablishment,
and the Basic Structure. The constitution formalized the bicommunal nature of Cypriot
society and entrenched foreign interests in Cyprus' future. 41
The Basic Structure established the character of the Republic's political system.
As was noted in an American State Department intelligence report:
The most striking feature of the Basic Structure is its emphasis on giving
the two ethnic groups on the island a proportionate voice in all affairs and
on working out arrangements to avoid domination of one group by the
other. 42
41 In the words ofAdamantia Pollis, "Cypriot independence was circumscribed, sovereignty was severely
curtailed by the constitutional and treaty rights given to the three foreign countries, the constituent power
of its people was prescribed constitutionally and by international treaty while its legislative power was
severely restricted." in Neumann., ed., Small States, p. 63.
42 See Elias Vlanton and Diane Alicia, "The 1959 Cyprus Agreement: Oracle ofDisaster," Journal of the
Hellenic Diaspora 4 (Winter 1984): pp. 5-31. This article includes the State Department report in its
entirety.
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Article 1 established the State of Cyprus as a Republic with a presidential regime, "the
President being Greek and the Vice-President Turkish elected by universal suffrage by
the Greek and Turkish communities of the island respectively.,,43 Executive authority
resided with the President and Vice-President. The two executives appointed seven
Greeks and three Turks as members of the Council ofMinisters. While decisions made
by the Council of Ministers were based on an absolute majority, both the President and
Vice-President were given the power to veto any decision concerning foreign affairs,
d .c. . 44elense, or security.
The Executive's veto power extended to decisions rendered by the Republic's
legislative branch, the House of Representatives. Strict adherence to ethnic
proportionality also marked the legislative branch of government. Members would be
elected for a five year term, "by universal suffrage of each community separately in the
proportion of 70 per cent. for the Greek comlTIunity and 30 per cent. for the Turkish
community. ,,45 The ethnic division of Cypriot society was reflected in the functions of
the legislative branch. A qualified majority was required to change electoral law and to
enact any law relating to municipalities, duties or taxes. 46 Representatives from both
communities had to reach separate majorities in order to pass legislation in these areas.
Matters of religion, education, culture, and personal status (questions concerning
marriage, divorce, inheritance, guardianship and parent-child relationships) were the
43 Conference on Cyprus: Documents Signed and Initialed at Lancaster House on February 19, 1959.
(London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1959): p. 5.
44 Conference, p. 5-6.
45 Ibid., p. 5.
46 Vlanton and Alicia, p. 19.
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exclusive domain of the Communal Chambers. The Communal Chambers had
jurisdiction in those areas where some overlap between the two communities may have
occurred. In essence, the cOlnmunal chambers were an outgrowth of the millet system.
They ensured the division of the two communities culturally and politically.
In short, every dimension of Cypriot politics and society was formally divided
along ethnic lines. The judicial system was headed by the Supreme Constitutional Court
and the High COllrt of Justice, each consisting of Greek and Turkish judges and a neutral
president who was neither Greek, Turkish, or British.47 The public service was to be
composed of 70% Greeks and 30% Turks. This despite the fact that the Turks made up
only 18% of the general population and were not as well educated as their Greek
counterparts.48 The proportional system also applied to the Republic's Armed Forces,
with 60% of its members recruited from the Greek community and 40% from the
Tllrkish. Article 20 provided for the establishment of separate municipalities by the
Turkish inhabitants in Cyprus' five largest towns. 49
The Basic Structure perpetuated communal divisions in Cypriot society. The
three additional treaties ensured the active participation of foreign powers. The Treaty of
Guarantee established an international obligation on the part of the governments of
Cyprus, Britain, Greece, and Turkey to abide by the provisions of the Basic Structure and
to prevent enosis or partition of the island. In effect, the treaty disavowed self-
determination for either community. While this would appear to be a laudable objective,
47 Kyle, p. 8.
48 Vlanton and Alicia, p. 17.
49 Ibid., p. 23.
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it opened the door to differing interpretations by the guarantors. 50 As was noted in the
State Department's report, "The effectiveness of the treaty with regard to common as
well as llnilateral actions is questionable should serious rifts develop among the
Guarantors. ,,51
According to Article 1 of the Treaty of Alliance, "The Republic of Cyprus,
Greece and Turkey shall co-operate for their common defense and undertake this Treaty
to consult together on the problems raised by this defense." All three parties pledged to
resist any threat to the independence and territorial integrity of the Republic. The treaty
allowed for the establishment of a tripartite headquarters and the stationing of 950 Greek
and 650 Turkish soldiers on the island. Thus, a direct military presence by both regional
powers was mandated by the constitution. Aside from the obvious implications of
stationing foreign troops on Cypriot soil, the Treaty of Alliance did little to enhance the
authority of the Republic's government. The new government clearly did not enjoy a
monopoly on the legitimate use of force.
Even more damaging in terms of the new state's sovereignty was the Treaty of
Establishment. Under the conditions of the Treaty, Britain retained full sovereignty over
two enclaves in Cypriot territory. Thus, ninety-nine square miles of Cypriot territory was
devoted to Britain's strategic needs. Christopher Hitchen's has noted that, "To this day,
the Cypriot government has no jurisdiction over these bases or the uses to which they are
50 This point is summarized nicely by Kyriakides, "The effect of this provision within the constitutional
framework of the Republic of Cyprus is negative because it links British, Greek, and Turkish interests to
the constitutional developments of the Republic of Cyprus." See p. 55.
51 Ibid., p. 27.
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put. No other democratic country has ever imposed or accepted conditions of that
kind.,,52 Apparently, the British felt no need to negotiate an agreement for bases with
Cyprus. The British granted independence only after their military interests were
guaranteed in perpetuity. This bizarre arrangement symbolized the entrenchment of
foreign interests in Cyprus.
From Independence to Civil War: 1960-63
The Zurich-London Agreements formalized the division of Cypriot society along
ethnic lines. All of the island's political and civil institutions were divided according to
rigid communal criteria. Rather than fostering the emergence of a unified civil society,
the agreements hardened existing divisions and granted them formal standing in the
constitution:
The constitutionalized interference in the affairs of Cyprus resulted in
continuous friction, therby preventing Cypriots, Greek and Turkish alike,
from developing their own political consciousness. The two communities
tended to look to their respective 'mother' countries for support in solving
Cypriot domestic problems. 53
It should be noted that neither community encouraged the development of a Cypriot
identity. The few who attempted to do so were treated harshly by nationalist elements
within their community. 54
52 Hitchens, p. 50.
53 Kyriakides, p. 143.
54 See, Hitchens, pp. 53-54.
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Independence did not assuage the mistrust each community harbored. The
leaders of the Greek and Turkish communities, Archbishop Makarios and Dr. Fazil
Kuchuk, saw themselves as guardians of their respective group's interests, "This
approach, as well as the absence of a consensus on how to cope with the major aspects of
government, led to constitutional disputes within less than one year. ,,55
The two communities had very different interpretations of the constitution.
Neither position lent itself to compromise:
On the one hand, the Greek Cypriots felt that the Constitution established a
'privileged position' for the Turkish Cypriot community. On the other
hand, the Turkish Cypriots viewed the Constitution as securing absolutely
minimum guarantees for their effective participation in Government. 56
The two communities confronted each other on several key issues, including the ethnic
composition of military units, the passage of tax legislation, the establishment of separate
municipalities, and the implementation of the 70:30 ratio in the composition of the civil
service. 57 Each of these issues was driven by mutual mistrust and fear of the other
community's intentions. Thus, political disagreements went beyond differences over
ideology or policy; every issue was considered crucial in terms of security and relative
power. The divided nature of the Government's authority made effective handling of
these issues difficult. The leadership of both sides used their constitutional powers to
55 Bahcheli, p. 53.
56 Kyriakides, p. 75.
57 Kitromilides and Couloumbis, p. 173.
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further their ethnic group's agenda. 58 Turkish Cypriots were adamant in their demands
for representation in the civil service, separate lTIunicipalities and segregated military
units. Their position was bolstered by the fact that the power of the majority community
was 'checked' by Turkey. Conversely, Greek Cypriots resented what they felt was an
unfair share of power, "although they had set aside their cherished aspiration for Enosis,
the final settlement gave them less than what the hard facts of their contribution to the
economy would warrant. ,,59
As the political climate deteriorated, both communities formed clandestine
organizations with connections to Greece and Turkey.60 By the end of 1961, the Turkish
language press was calling for the intervention of Turkey, Greece, and Britain and the
resignation of Archbishop Makarios. 61 The political system established by the Zurich-
London Agreements proved to be ineffective~ the notion of an independent Cypriot
government existed only on paper.
It is erroneous to suggest, as some have, that Cyprus' descent into civil war was
due solely to bitter memories of the past.62 This argument ignores the fact that the
political system established by the Zurich-London Agreements aimed at satisfying
foreign interests at expense of effective government in Cyprus. Both sides could afford
58 Bahcheli, p. 54.
59 Kitromilides and Coufoudakis, p. 174.
60 Richard A. Patrick, Political Geography and the Cyprus Conflict: 1963-1971, (Waterloo: Department of
Geography Publications Series, No.4, 1976): pp. 20, 37.
61 Kyle, p. 9.
62 Rizvi, p. 69.
62 Hitchens, p. 55.
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to flout the government's authority because it was inherently weak. The unranked
domestic system which prevailed during periods of Ottoman and British rule was
formally recognized in the Republic's constitution. Its maintenance was guaranteed
through binding treaties with foreign powers. It is therefore no wonder that President
Makarios' presentation of thirteen points, which aimed at establishing effective
government in Cyprus, were rejected by Turkey before the Vice-President Kuchuk could
respond. As Hitchens has noted:
The thirteen points would have decided the allocation ofjobs and the
weight of parliamentary votes in stricter proportion to the population. As
compensation, Dr. Kuchuk's Vice Presidential position would have been
enhanced. But in essence, the minority veto would have been broken--and
the Turks were not willing to surrender that privilege.63
Th.e division of sovereign authority among foreign states and ethnic groups in
Cyprus resulted in political deadlock which, in tum, encouraged further polarization:
In the Inidst of the Republic's difficulties, the extremist groups were able to
thrive. Within each community 'secret armies' were organized...The
Turkish Cypriots were determined to prevent any Greek Cypriot attempts to
bring about extraconstitutional solutions to the deadlocks. The Greek
Cypriots were preparing t·o forestall partitioning of the island and eventual
.. bTk 64InterventIon y ur ey.
63 Ibid.
64 Kyriakides, p. 111.
36
The rejection ofMakarios' proposals ignited these extremist elements. Despite
the President and Vice-President's appeals for calm, Cyprus erupted. The violence
revealed the scale of lawlessness which had infected Cypriot society in the preceding
years. Former EOKA thugs, led by Nicos Sampson, attacked Turkish Cypriot civilians
indiscriminately.65 Turkish military forces expelled Greek Cypriot civilians from their
homes, as they fought to establish a Turkish enclave around the island's northern coast.66
Between December 21 and 25, hundreds of people were killed, wounded, taken as
hostage, and evicted from their homes.67 The violence threatened to engulf Greece and
Turkey after Turkish jets overflow Nicosia on Christmas Day 1963. By the end of
December, British troops had established a neutral zone in Nicosia. Greek and Turkish
Cypriots were fonnally divided by the infamous "Green Line".
Ironically, the political systetTI which was designed to ensure amity between
Greece and Turkey and the maintenance ofBritish and NATO interests had the opposite
affect. The convergence of global and regional interests in Cyprus exacerbated previous
divisions in Cypriot society. This led to the complete breakdown of order and the
beginnings of physical separation. This interaction of anarchic political systems would
continue to shape Cypriot politics in the future.
65 Bahcheli, p. 60.
66 Hitchens, p. 56.
67 Bahcheli, p. 60.
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Chapter Two
International Politics and the Evolution of the
Cyprus Problem: 1964-1990
WlIO shall account.for this portioning, by what law comes this allotment of
pain, grief and despair?
Aeschylus: Seven Against Thebes
Introduction
This chapter will examine the impact of international actors on the development
of Cypriot communal relations between 1964-1990. It shall analyze the policies of global
and regional powers from a systemic perspective, noting that both the Superpowers--the
United States and the Soviet Union--and Greece and Turkey based their policies on
considerations of power dictated by shifts within the international system. Thus, during
the period of acute Superpower confrontation between 1964-1967, the United States
pllrsued an active policy in the Eastern Mediterranean in order to preclude a
confrontation between NATO allies Greece and Turkey. Conversely, Superpower
detente led to greater fluidity at the regional level, allowing Turkey to improve its
relations with the USSR. As the chapter shall point out, the absence of a credible
deterrent allowed Tllrkey to improve its standing regionally by intervening in Cyprus in
July-August 1974.
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The Turkish invasion dramatically altered relations between Greek and Turkish
Cypriots. While the separation of the two communities into ethnically homogeneous
zones and the stationing of approximately 35,000 Turkish troops on the island preserved
the anarchic character of communal relations, it also ensured that the Greek Cypriots
would have to make important concessions in order to secure a political settlement.
However, the hardening of the cotTImunal systems' bipolar structure and the growing
antagonism between Greece and Turkey had a negative impact on negotiations.
Moreover, intercommunal talks sponsored by the good offices of the United Nations
Secretary General were hampered by Superpower indifference to the fate of the Cypriots.
The United States and the Soviet Union lost interest in the Cyprus problem because it no
longer threatened the global balance of power; the partition of the island provided a
brutal but effective solution to over a decade of instability. The United Nations was left
with the unenviable task of guarding against violence on the ground while simultaneously
urging the two communities to reunite at the political level. Its failure to broker a
settlement was as much due to the character of international politics as it was to the
intransigence of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot interlocutors.
The Era of Uncertainty: 1964-1967
The breakdown of communal relations in 1963-64 resulted in the direct
involvement of Greece and Turkey in the Cyprus conflict. Greek and Turkish troops
stationed on the island joined their Cypriot compatriots in the intercommunal fighting.
This marked the first time in NATO's history that troops frotTI two member states were
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fighting one another. 1 The threat of a Greco-Turkish war drew the immediate attention
ofBritain and the United States2. The British and Americans proposed that a NATO
peacekeeping force be dispatched to Cyprus. The proposal, acceptable to Greece, Turkey
and the Turkish Cypriots, was rejected by President Makarios. 3 According to Bahcheli,
"The Greek-Cypriot leader feared that Turkey had a larger influence within the Western
alliance than Greece and that a NATO solution would be Inore favorable to Tllrkey than
to Greek-Cypriots and Greece.,,4 Makarios preferred that the matter be taken up by the
UN, in order to take advantage of the support of countries opposed to NATO
involvement. 5 The Greek Cypriot's rejection of the NATO forces deepened American
concern. As a result, President Lyndon B. Johnson dispatched Under-Secretary of State
George W. Ball to Nicosia to persuade Makarios to accept a modified version of the
NATO peacekeeping plan. Ball was rebuffed by Makarios, whose position was now
supported by the Soviet Union.6 In June 1964, a military confrontation between Greece
and Turkey was narrowly avoided after President Johnson sent a strongly worded letter to
Turkish Prime Minister Ismet Inonu, warning hitn of the consequences of a Turkish
invasion. Johnson threatened to suspend America's obligation to protect Turkey against
possible Soviet retaliation:
1 Joseph, p. 171.
2 The threat was real. During the crisis the Turkish fleet left the strategic Straits and sailed to the ports of
Iskenderum and Mersin, opposite Cyprus. The Greek fleet stood between the islands of Rhodes and
Crete, some 250 miles west of Cyprus. Both countries mobilized their forces along the Thracian border.
See Joseph, p. 172.
3 H.W. Brands, Jr. "America Enters the Cyprus Tangle, 1964," Middle Eastern Studies 3 (July 1987):p. 352.
4 Bahcheli, p. 61.
5 Ibid.
6 Kyriakides, p. 149.
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I hope yo·u will consider that your NATO allies have not had a chance to consider
whether they have an obligation to protect Turkey against the Soviet Union if
Turkey takes a step which results in Soviet intervention without the full consent
and understanding of its NATO allies. 7
It should be noted that while the letter was regarded as an insult by the Turkish
government, it did stop the planned intervention. This was because the threat of Soviet
retaliation was credible. Krushchev had warned that, "If a foreign armed intervention
takes place in Cyprus the Soviet Union will help Cyprus to defend its freedom and
independence... ,,8 The Soviets' pledge was followed by a promise to supply the Greek
Cypriots with conventional arms, torpedo boats and anti-aircraft artillery. By October
1965, the Cypriot government had recieved over 70 million dollars worth of Soviet
military aid. 9
Both the United States and the Soviet Union defined the Cyprus problem in terms
of strategic interests. Given the United States' position as the status quo power in the
Eastern Mediterranean, its involvement in Cypriot affairs was easier to discern.
According to Coufoudakis:
American policy was determined by considerations reflecting the concerns
of the Western regional alliances; the changing strategic balance among the
superpowers in the region; the effects of the Arab-Israeli crisis in the region
7 For the full text of the Johnson letter See Stearns, Entangled Allies, pp. 156-59.
8 See Attalides, p. 141.
9 Ibid.
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and on superpower relations; and the concern of American officials over the
neutralist tendencies and the political base of the Makarios regime. 10
The United States initially rejected mediation by the UN in order to limit the Soviet
Union's influence in Cyprus. As H.W. Brands Jr. has noted, "since the enunciation of the
Truman Doctrine, the fundamental goal of American policy in the eastern Mediterranean
had been to keep the Russians out. To the Johnson administration, allowing Soviet
participation even in debate on the Cyprus issue seemed the height of Western folly"Il
The American solution to the Cyprus problem was presented by former Secretary
of State Dean Acheson in 1964. The plan included three key points: i)most of Cyprus
was to be united with Greece in a partial consummation of enosis; ii) an area of the
northern coast was to be awarded to Turkey as a military base and a political canton--
other Turkish cantons were to be autonomous within the Greek area; iii) The island of
Kastellorizon, off the north coast, was to be ceded to Turkey. 12 In Acheson's opinion
the plan would satisfy Greek, Turkish and American interests: the Greek dream of enosis
would be fllifilled, Turkish security interests would be protected, Makarios would be
removed, and Cyprus would be firmly in NATO's sphere of influence. Since the Soviet
Union feared the establishment ofNATO bases in Cyprus, Moscow's support for
Makarios' rejection of the plan was not surprising. 13 According to Nancy Crawshaw:
10 Coufoudakis, Essays, p. 42. Makarios was supported by the Greek Cypriot Communist party AKEL
(Anorthotikon Komma Ergazomenou Laou--Progressive Party of the Working People). The Communists
appreciated Makarios' non-aligned foreign policy. For a study of AKEL see, Thomas W. Adams, AKEL:
The Communist Party of Cyprus, (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, Stanford University, 1971).
11 Brands, Jr., pp. 349-50.
12 Hitchens, p. 57.
13 See Augustus Richard Norton, "The Soviet Union and Cyprus," in Cyprus: A Regional Conflict and Its
Resolution, Norm Salem, ed., (New York: S1. Martin's Press, 1992): pp. 100-114. Norton notes that,
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The Soviet Union had a vested interest in his survival, which was a
safeguard against enosis and the extension ofNATO influence. His
adamant refllsal to give way to the Turks helped to perpetuate a dispute
which was damaging to the Western alliance. 14
On March 4, 1964, the Security Council adopted Resolution 186 which
authorized the forlnation ofUNFICYP (United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus). 15
The force of6369 troops became operational on March 27,1964. Its mission was "to
prevent a recurrence of fighting and, as necessary, to contribute to the maintenance and
restoration of law and order and a return to normal conditions. ,,16 The Resolution also
recommended the appointment of a Inediator responsible to the Secretary General. 17
From its inception the peacekeeping force was hampered by divergent views regarding its
function:
To the Greek Cypriots and Greece, the United Nation's presence in Cyprus
was regarded as a means of ending the Turkish Cypriot 'rebellion' and of
helping the Government of Cyprus defend itself against Turkish invasion.
To the Turkish Cypriots and Turkey, the United Nations Peace Force was a
means of protecting the Turkish Cypriot community from threats of
domination by the Greek Cypriots and Greece. 18
"Moscow described the 1964 crisis as a NATO plot. ..Nikita Krushchev in identical notes to England,
France, the US, Turkey and Greece, charged that the NATO peace plan was motivated by a desire to
occupy the island."
14 Nancy Crawshaw, The Cyprus Revolt: An Account of the Struggle for Union with Greece, (London:
George Allen and Unwin, 1978): p. 386.
15 James H. Wolfe, "The United Nations and the Cyprus Question," in Salem, ed., Cyprus: A Regional
Problem, p. 229. Also see Karl Th. Birgisson, "United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus," in
William 1. Durch, ed., The Evolution ofUN Peacekeeping, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993): pp.
219-236; and George Stergiou Kaloudis, The Role of the UN in Cyprus From 1964 to 1979, (New York:
Peter Lang, 1991).
16 United Nations Document S/5575, March 4, 1964.
17 Kyriakides, p. 151.
18 Ibid., p. 152-53.
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By all accounts, UNFICYP did diffuse many tense situations. However, the presence of
paramilitary groups, often aided by Greek and Turkish troops, hindered the
peacekeepers' efforts.
By June 1964, the Greek government had installed General Grivas as leader of the
Cypriot National Guard, which was manned exclusively by Greek Cypriots. 19 The Greek
government also infiltrated over 10,000 military personnel into Cyprus in defiance of the
Treaty of Alliance. This was done to deter a Turkish invasion and to discourage
Makarios frotTI pursuing an overly independent, neutralist policy.20 Intercommunal
violence had forced over 25,000 Turkish Cypriots to retreat into a number of enclaves
which were administered by the "Provisional Turkish Cypriot Administration." The
Greek Cypriots, who by now had sole control of the official government apparatus,
institllted an economic blockade of the enclaves. They argued that Turkey was
encouraging the refugees to remain in armed camps, protected by Turkish Cypriot forces,
to preserve the position that partition or federation were the only possible solutions to the
crisis. 21 Turkey's support of the Turkish Cypriots, economically and militarily, gave
these arguments some justification.22 It also allowed the Turkish Cypriots to abstain
from any formal political interaction with their Greek counterparts. As the UN Secretary
General noted in his report of 11 March, 1965:
19 Grivas had indicated that he would accept a modified form ofenosis in line with the Acheson Plan. His
return to Cyprus was therefore supported by the Johnson administration. See Hitchens, pp. 58-59.
20 Kyriakides, p. 158.
21 Thomas Erlich, Cyprus 1958-1967: International Crises and the Role of Law, (New York and London:
Oxford University Press, 1974): p. 62.
22 Kyle notes that Turkish Cypriot paramilitary units were organized and led by Turkish officers, "Military
command was exercised by a Turkish general, Kemal Coskun...All told there were about 5000 fighters.
There was therefore the apparatus of a 'state within a state' . Kyle, p. 11.
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The Turkish Cypriot policy of self-isolation has led the community in the
opposite direction from normality. The Community leadership discourages
the Turkish Cypriot population from engaging in personal, commercial or
other contacts with their Greek compatriots, from applying to Government
offices in administrative matters, or from resettling in their home villages if
they are refugees. 23
In August 1964, Grivas attacked the Turkish enclave at Kokkina in an effort to
block the entry of Turkish arms and soldiers. Turkey retaliated by launching an air
assault against Greek Cypriot troops. Makarios appealed to Greece and the Soviet Union
and threatened to attack all Turkish Cypriot settlements. The Soviets, in contrast to their
previous position, declined to take a firm stand against Turkey. According to Attalides,
the Soviets decided to take advantage of Turkey's objections to American policy, most
notably the Johnson letter.24 Thus, "the Soviet Union not only did not come to the aid of
Cyprus but appealed to Makarios to use his 'influence to prevent further bloodshed. ",25
The changing nature of Turkish-Soviet relations26, coupled with the inability of Greece to
react quickly to Turkish incursions exposed the vulnerability of Cyprus to Turkish
military action.
23 Attalides, p. 92.
24 Ibid., p. 142.
25 Kyriakides, p. 159.
26 Turkey sought improved relations with the Soviet Union in order to gain a greater degree of freedom in
foreign affairs. According to Sakir Alemdar, "The Johnson letter was a turning point in US-Turkish
relations. The US attempt to prevent Turkey from acting upon an issue considered vital to her national
interests raised serious questions about Turkey' s pro-Western foreign policy. From then on there would
be moves by Turkey to open up relations with the Soviets and Third World countries in order to increase
room for maneuver for the country in international affairs." See Sakir Alemdar, "International Aspects of
the Cyprus Problem," in C.H. Dodd, ed., The Political, Social, and Economic Development ofNorthern
Cyprus, (Huntingdon, England: The Eothen Press, 1993): p. 81.
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The direct intervention of Greece and Turkey in Cypriot affairs hampered the
work of the UN and exacerbated communal divisions. As a result, neither commllnity
displayed a desire for political reconciliation. President Makarios made no real effort to
reintegrate the Turkish Cypriots into the political system. 27 Conversely, the Turkish
Cypriot leadership did not lobby for reintegration and seemed to prefer the separation of
the two communities.28 Indeed, the Turkish Cypriot proposal presented by former Vice-
President Kuchuk to the UN in 1965 endorsed this position. According to Attalides:
The Turkish Cypriots would be concentrated in one geographical area and
the Greek Cypriots in another. The area 'given' to the Turkish Cypriots
would be 38% of the island(... )It was suggested that twenty or twenty-five
thousand families would have to 'move' for this plan to be realized.29
Given their numbers and relative strength, the Turkish Cypriots were in no position to
make such a demand without the support of Turkey. That their bargaining position
reflected Turkey's strategic interests is worth noting. 30
27 See Minority Rights Groups, Cyprus, (London, 1976): p. 19. According to Bahcheli, "With the Turkish-
Cypriots surrounded in their impoverished enclaves, the Makarios government proceeded to isolate and
pressure them to accept Greek-Cypriot rule without the special community rights provided by the Zurich-
London arrangements. By offering the Turkish-Cypriots nothing better than terms of surrender, Makarios
unwittingly drove them closer to Ankara." See Bahcheli, p. 71.
28 This point is summarized nicely by Markides, "The Turkish Cypriots were able to sustain themselves
economically thanks to the support they received from Turkey. The Presence of the Turkish military
contingent on the island and the repeated demonstrations of support from the Turkish governlnent
reinforced the belief among Turkish Cypriots that that eventually Mother Turkey would intervene."
Markides, The Rise and Fall, p. 144.
29 Attalides, p. 85.
30 See Alemdar, p. 83. Also see Reed Coughlan, "Stalemate in Cyprus: Negotiations Between the Greek and
Turkish Cypriot Leadership," in K.M. de Silva and S.W.R. de A. Samarasinghe, eds., Peace Accords and
Ethnic Conflict, (London and New York: Pinter Publishers, 1993): p. 33.
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Turkey's influence was further manifested by its rejection of UN mediator Galo
Plaza's report, submitted in March 1965. Plaza advocated the maintenance of a unitary
Cypriot state which recognized and protected minority rights. The report rejected the
implementation of a federal system, as it would "require the cOlnpulsory movement of
the people concemed--many thousands on both sides--contrary to the enlightened
principles of the present time... ,,31 It also noted that the powers accorded to the Turkish
Cypriots under the Zurich-London Agreements were excessive, "It will need not be
forgotten that the Turkish Cypriot community obtained from the Zurich and London
Agreements a series of rights greatly superior to those which can realistically be
contemplated for it in the future.,,32 Turkey rejected Galo Plaza's report and successfully
engineered his ouster. Turkey argued that, "Mr. Galo Plaza's report contains sections
which exceed his terms of reference~ therefore there can be no further usefulness in the
continuation of Mr. Plaza in his function.,,33
The 1967 Crisis
The two communities avoided serious fighting between 1965-67. Despite the
relative calm, relations between Greek and Turkish Cypriots did not improve. The two
communities continued to advocate irreconcilable positions regarding Cyprus's political
future. The political situation in Cyprus deteriorated markedly after 1967. On April 21,
31 United Nations, Security Council, Report of the United Nations Mediator on Cyprus to the Secretary
General, Note by the Secretary General, S/6253, 26 March 1965, pp. 58-59.
32 Ibid., p. 61.
33 United Nations, Security Council, Report by the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operations on
Cyprus (For the Period 6 December 1966 to 12 June 1967), S/7969, 13 June 1967, p. 68. According to
Kyle, "Later UN contributions towards peace in Cyprus have had to be couched in much more tentative
and circuitous language." Cyprus, p. 11.
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a group of Greek colonels led by George Papadopoulos toppled the Greek government
and established a military dictatorship.34 The junta's leaders had served with Greek
forces in Cyprus and were familiar with the Cyprus issue. They hoped to resolve the
Cyprus problem in order to improve Greek-Turkish relations and NATO's capabilities in
the eastern Mediterranean.35 With this objective in mind, Papadopoulos met with
Turkish Prime Minister Demirel in September 1967. According to Hitchens:
The meeting was intended to consummate a secret Paris meeting between
Greek Admiral Toumbas and the Turkish minister Ishan Caglayangil. It
would have proclaimed enosis conceding the basis for partition, and would
have made the junta appear 'statesman-like'. 36
The meeting ended in failure after Demirel requested the withdrawal of Greek troops and
an area large enough to accommodate most of the Turkish Cypriot community. It is
important to note that neither Greece nor Turkey consulted with the legally recognized
government of Cyprus. 37 The Greek Cypriots had rejected the option of 'double enosis'
in 1964 and continued to oppose concessions to Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots.
Relations between Makarios and the Greek government deteriorated rapidly. The
colonels, devout adherents of anticommunism, were uncomfortable with Makarios' non-
aligned foreign policy. They were also eager to settle their differences with Turkey, in
order to strengthen NATO solidarity. Makarios, in tum, was wary of the junta's desire to
34 For a detailed analysis of the coup and junta see, C.M. Woodhouse, The Rise and Fall of the Greek
Colonels, (London: Granada, 1985).
35 See Constantine Danopoulos, "The Greek Military Regime (1967-1974) and the Cyprus Question--Origins
and Goals," Journal of Political and Military Sociology, 2 (Fall 1982): pp. 257-273.
36 Hitchens, p. 65.
37 The United Nations General Assembly had reaffirmed the sovereignty of Cyprus and the legitimacy of the
Makarios government through Resolution 2077 (XX).
48
'solve' the Cyprus problem without his consent. The Greek dictatorship took steps to
undermine Makarios' s political authority. This was manifested in their support of secret
paramilitary organizations and of General Grivas. 38 Grivas's control of the National
Guard threatened Makarios' s authority and hampered his relations with the Turkish
C . 39yprlots.
On November 15, 1967 Grivas, with the consent of Athens, ordered a National
Guard patrol to inspect two Turkish Cypriot villages, Kophinou and Ayios Theodoros.
Makarios was not informed of the operation and was therefore slow to react to the
unfolding situation. The 'inspection' resulted in the deaths of twenty-eight Turkish
Cypriots and damage to homes and property.40 The Turkish response was swift. Ankara
sent jets on warning flights over Cyprus and mobilized military forces. An impending
invasion was averted through strenuous diplomatic activity initiated by the United States.
President Johnson sent special envoy Cyrus Vance to Athens and Ankara to reconcile the
two NATO allies. 41 An agreement was reached on November 30. The deal called for the
withdrawal of over 10,000 Greek troops and the recall of General Grivas.42
The 1967 crisis had ilnportant repercussions in terms of communal relations.
Makarios was by now aware of the fact that Turkey's interests in Cyprus could not be
denied. Once more, the withdrawal of Greek troops left Cyprus vulnerable to any future
38 Markides, p. 83.
39 Kyle, p. 13.
40 Bahcheli, p. 72.
41 For a detailed study of the 1967 crisis, see Parker T. Hart, Two NATO Allies at the Threshold ofWar,
(Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1990).
42 Bahcheli, p. 73; Markides, p. 134.
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Tllrkish intervention. Thus, on 12 January 1968, he declared that enosis was no longer a
realistic objective.43 Most Greek Cypriots agreed that independence was the only viable
option for Cyprus. This was reflected in Makarios's landslide victory in the February
1968 presidential election, in which he carried over 95 percent of the vote while his
adversary, an enosis proponent, won only 3.7 percent. 44 Following the election, Makarios
began taking tentative steps towards a reconciliation with Turkish Cypriots. By March
1968, all restrictions on Turkish Cypriots had been lifted. Intercolnmunal talks,
sponsored by the UN, commenced in June. By the end of 1968, the UN Secretary-
General reported that, "at last the emphasis seems to be shifting from military
confrontation to negotiation. ,,45
The Road to Partition: 1968-1974
Makarios appointed Glatkos Clerides as the Greek Cypriot negotiator at the
intercommunal talks. The Turkish Cypriots selected RaufDenktash to represent their
position. By most accounts the talks revealed the potential for compromise between the
two communities. According to Kitromilides and Couloumbis:
... substantive disagreement over the issue of local government was
narrowed--the Greek side conceded that considerable decentralization was
desirable but also insisted that the jurisdiction and functions of local
government should not be such as to create essentially the infrastructure of
a communal state within the unitary state of Cyprus.46
43 Markides, p. 134.
44 Kyle, p. 13.
45 Nancy Crawshaw, "Cyprus: The Political Background," in John T.A. Koumoulides, ed., Cyprus in
Transition, 1960-1985, (London: Trigraph, 1986): p. 7.
46 Kitromilides and Couloumbis, pp. 184-85.
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For their part, the Turkish Cypriots agreed to reduce their representation in the
governlnent from the Zurich-London standard of 30 percent to 20 percent, a figure in line
with their percentage of the population.47 They also agreed to limit the Vice-President's
veto power to matters directly related to Turkish Cypriot interests.
Despite these positive signs, the two communities remained divided on two key
issues: local autonomy for Turkish Cypriots and the question of external guarantees.
Both issues reflected the anarchic character of the cOlnmunal system. Tllrkish Cypriots
argued that their safety depended on the maintenance of self-regulated enclaves and
Turkey's right to intervene on their behalf. The Greek Cypriots believed that the
enclaves represented the first step towards partition of the island. More importantly, they
feared that maintaining external guarantees diminished Cyprus's sovereignty and
infringed on the rights of the majority.
Throughout the intercommunal negotiations the Greek Cypriot position was
undermined by the Greek regime's harassment of Makarios. The junta's tactics included
an assassination attempt in 1970.48 The colonels also allowed General Grivas to 'escape'
to Cyprus and form EOKA-B, a paramilitary organization dedicated to enosis. EOKA-B
targeted Makarios supporters and members of the Greek Cypriot Communist and
Socialist parties. 49 At the political level, Athens funded the activities ofESEA (Co-
ordination Committee for the Enosis Struggle). ESEA challenged Makarios' s nationalist
47 Bahcheli, p. 79.
48 Markides, 136.
49 Hitchens, p. 71.
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credentials, forcing him to make periodic references to enosis which, in tum, heightened
Turkish Cypriot mistrust. In February 1972, Athens blocked Makarios' attempt to buy
arms from Czechoslovakia. Papadopoulos called for the dismissal of Cypriot Foreign
Minister Spyros Kyprianou and other cabinet members hostile to the Greek regime. 50 He
also ordered Makarios to create a government of national unity which would respect the
dictates of the "National Centre.,,51 Makarios rejected the colonels' ultimatum and
retaliated by ordering police raids on EOKA-B hideouts. The raids uncovered documents
which established clear links between the junta and EOKA-B. 52
The United States' support of the Greek military dictatorship has been examined
at length in several excellent studies. 53 What is important to note for the purpose of the
thesis is that American support for the junta was based on strategic considerations. The
United States appreciated the junta's commitment to NATO and its staunch anti-
communist ideology. In return, the Nixon administration lent credibility to a government
that had been expelled from the Council of Europe and condemned by human rights
50 Kyle, p. 14.
51 The government of 'national unity' would exclude members of the Cypriot Communist (AKEL) and
Socialist (EDEK) parties. The two parties enjoyed the support of nearly 50 percent of the Greek Cypriot
electorate. See Markides, p. 137.
52 Hitchens, p. 72.
53 See Thomas Anthem, "The Greek Colonels and the U.S.A.," Contemporary Review 216 (April 1970): pp.
178-183; Phyllis R. Craig, "The U.S. and the Greek Dictatorship: A Summary of Support," Journal of the
Hellenic Diaspora 3 (Winter 1976): pp. 5-15; Van Coufoudakis, "United States Foreign Policy and the
Cyprus Question: A Case Study in Cold War Diplomacy," in Theodore Couloumbis and Sally M. Hicks,
eds. U.S. Foreign Policy Towards Greece and Cyprus: The Clash ofPrinciple and Pragmatism,
(Washington: The Center for Mediterranean Studies, American University, 1975): pp. 106-138; Theodore
Couloumbis, John A. Petropoulos and Harry J. Psomiades, Foreign Interference in Greek Politics: A
Historical Perspective, (New York: Pella Publishing, 1976); Hitchens, Cyprus; Stern, The Wrong Horse.
Transcripts of Congressional hearings on the Nixon administration's relationship with the colonels are also
revealing; see United States Subcommittee on Europe, Greece, Spain and the Southern NATO Strategy.
Hearings, July 12-September 15, 1971, (Washington, D.C., 1971); United States Subcommittee on the
Near East, The Decision to Homeport in Greece, (Washington, D.C., 1972).
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groups for its use of prison camps and torture. 54 The relationship culminated in the
decision to establish homeport facilities for the American Sixth Fleet in Athens. The
decision to homeport in Greece tied American interests to the survival of the Greek junta.
In the words of Christopher Hitchens:
By homeporting its fleet under junta auspices, the United States became
almost as dependent on the dictators as the dictators were already on the
United States. A vested American interest in the survival of the junta had
now been created. The description of affairs which now became current--
that the United States was 'in bed' with the Greek despots--was crude but
unhappily accurate.
The United States' marriage of convenience with the Greek regime would have
important consequences for Cyprus. On November 21, 1973, Colonel Papadopoulos was
toppled by Brigadier Dimitrios Ioannides, head of the Greek military police. Ioannides, a
staunch advocate of enosis, intensified terrorist activities against President Makarios.
Following Grivas' death in January 1974, Ioannides assumed responsibility for the
activities ofEOKA-B. By June 1974, evidence of an impending coup against Makarios
was mounting. On July 3, Makarios issued an open letter to Greece's President, Phaedon
Gizikis. In the letter, Makarios accused the junta of supporting terrorist activities
directed against his government and conspiring to kill him.55 Makarios ended the letter
by calling for the immediate withdrawal of Greek officers from Cyprus. On July 15,
1974, Ioannides replied by ordering the Cypriot National Guard to overthrow Makarios.
54 C.M. Woodhouse, The Rise and Fall of the Greek Colonels, (London: Granada, 1975): p. 52.
55 Hitchens, p. 81. In the letter, Makarios stated that, "I have more than once so far felt, and in some cases I
have touched, a hand invisibly extending from Athens and seeking to liquidate my human existence."
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Despite demolishing part of the presidential palace, the plotters failed to kill Makarios,
who fled to Paphos and was rescued by British military personnel. In the meantime,
Ioannides installed Nicos Sampson as the new President of Cyprus, a decision that
frightened Turkish Cypriots and provided an invitation for Turkish intervention. As one
Turkish diplomat put it, "The Greeks committed the unbelievably stupid move of
appointing Sampson, giving us the opportunity to solve our problems once and for all. ,,56
It was at this critical moment that the convergence of regional and global interests
resulted in the transformation of the Cyprus problem. Rather than condemning the coup
and reaffirming Makarios' status as head of the Cypriot government, the United States
toyed with the idea of recognizing Sampson. A leak to the New York times indicated
that, "the Nixon administration was leaning more towards Nikos Sampson...than toward
Archbishop Makarios.,,57 When confronted with the story, Press Secretary Robert
Anderson failed to deny its accuracy. Given the United States' support of the Greek
regime, it would have been difficult to condemn either Ioannides or Sampson. The
American government had placed its interests in the hands of a group of gangsters. To
admit as much would threaten the maintenance of those interests.
Turkey issued an ultimatum on July 18 calling for the resignation of Sampson, the
withdrawal of Greek officers, and the upholding of Cyprus' independence. 58 Ioannides,
confident that the United States would intervene, ignored the threat. In doing so, he
committed a fatal error. As was noted earlier in the chapter, Turkey had begun to mend
56 Stem, p. 117.
57 Ibid., p. 113.
58 1Kye, p. 14.
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its fences with the Soviet Union in 1964. By 1974, the fear of Soviet retaliation no
longer threatened Ankara. According to Alemdar:
Within the climate of detente, Turkish-Soviet relations began to improve
and the perceived threat from the Soviets declined, which permitted more
flexibility for Ankara on the Cyprus issue. It was becoming more difficult
to prevent Turkish actions by using the Soviet bogeyman. 59
Shortly after issuing its ultimatum Turkey consulted with Britain as to the possibility of a
joint intervention. After the British declined, Turkey initiated its 'peace operation', code
named Attila.
Invasion, Partition and the Transformation of Communal Relations
Turkish troops landed on Cyprus on July 20, 1974, prompting the UN Security
Council's Resolution 353. The Resolution demanded an immediate end to foreign
military intervention, the withdrawal of all foreign military personnel and negotiations
between Greece, Turkey , and Great Britain for the restoration of peace and
constitutional government in Cyprus.60 In an effort to minimize the threat of a Greco-
Turkish war, the United States convinced Turkey to halt the invasion. In Athens the
Greek Chiefs of Staff rejected Ioannides' call for war and accepted the terms of the
American cease-fire.61 By July 22 both the Ioannides and Sampson regimes had
collapsed and been replaced by civilian governments.62
59 Alemdar, p. 88.
60 Evriades, p. 39.
61 Laurence Stern, "Bitter Lessons: How We Failed in Cyprus," Foreign Policy 2 (Summer 1974): p. 68.
62 See Stern, The Wrong Horse, pp. 124-125.
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Buoyed by Turkey' strategic advantage in the wake of the July invasion, Prime
Minister Ecevit noted that, "no one should aSSUlne think or speak as if nothing new has
happened in Cyprus, as if nothing has changed there. A lot has changed irrevocably in
Cyprus since the morning of 20th July. ,,63 During negotiations in Geneva, Turkey and the
Turkish Cypriot leadership pressed for a solution based on the separation of the two
communities and the creation of two autonomous units within a federal system. The
Turkish Cypriot unit would include 34 percent of Cyprus's total territory and required a
substantial transfer of populations.64 According to Evriades, "The Greek Cypriots
responded with proposals that conceded administrative autonomy, with a cantonal
arrangement that excluded a geographical area or compulsory movelnent of
population. ,,65 Turkey ignored these modifications and demanded an answer to its
original proposal. Turkey resumed military operations after rejecting the Greek Cypriots'
request for an additional thirty-six hours to consider the plan.
Turkey's decision was due in part to the absence of any credible deterrent.
Greece was still reeling from recent events and was therefore unable to retaliate. This, in
turn, eased American fears of a possible Greco-Turkish war. Thus, the United States
could afford to "tilt" in favor of the Turkish position.66 Improved Turkish-Soviet
63 Bahcheli, p. 100.
64 Camp, p. 59.
65 Evriades, p. 40.
66 Stearn, "Bitter Lessons," p. 72. Also see Ellen B. Laipson, "Cyprus: A Quarter Century ofU.S. Policy,"
in John T.A. Koumoulides, ed., Cyprus in Transition: 1960-1985, (London: Trigraph, 1986): p. 67.
According to Laipson, the American reaction to the 1974 crisis was in line with the Nixon administration's
foreign policy philosophy which called for greater regional responsibility and reduced American
involvement in small scale conflicts.
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relations precluded a strong Soviet reaction.67 In essence, Turkey capitalized on
favorable conditions in the international system. In the words of Duygu Bazoglu Sezer:
...whereas Turkey could obediently yield in the 1960s, before detente, she
did not yield in the 1970s when she felt less threatened by the Soviet Union.
That neither the U.S. Sixth Fleet nor the Soviet Eskadra would move
against her are likely to have figured in Turkish calculations when the
decision was taken to intervene in Cyprus in 1974.68
The second Turkish offensive began on August 16 and lasted two days. Cyprus
was partitioned by the Attila Line, which ran from Xeros through Nicosia, to
Famagusta.69 Turkish troops overran the northern region of the island, occupying thirty-
eight percent of the republic's territory and forcing approximately 160,000 Greek
Cypriots to flee to the south. This ensured that a bi-zonal federation could be
established.70 Turkish Cypriots assumed possession of the rich Messaoria plains and the
leading holiday resorts ofKyrenia, Varosha, and Famagusta. In all, the Turkish zone
encompassed territory responsible for approximately 70 percent of Cyprus' pre-invasion
. 71
economIC output.
The international response to the invasion was swift if not effective. In
November 1974, the UN General Assembly unanimously adopted Resolution 3212,
67 The Soviets did not raise the matter in the Security Council, even after the second phase of the invasion.
See Norton, in Salem, ed., Cyprus: A Regional Conflict, p. 106.
68 Duygu Bazoglu Sezer, Turkey's Security Policies, (London: The International Institute for Strategic
Studies, 1981): p. 29.
69 Nancy Crawshaw, "Cyprus: The Political Background," in Koumoulides, ed. Cyprus in Transition, p. 10.
70 Evriades, p. 40.
71 Republic of Cyprus, The Cyprus Problem: Historical Review and Analysis ofLatest Developments,
(Nicosia, Cyprus, 1982): p. 12.
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calling for the respect of the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and non-
alignment of the Republic of Cyprus. It also demanded the withdrawal of all foreign
troops from Cyprus, the cessation of all foreign interference, and the return of the
refugees to their homes in safety.72 The resolution was endorsed by the Security Council
in December 1974, through Resolution 361/1974. UN resolutions had little impact on
either Turkey or the Turkish Cypriot leadership. Turkish troops remained on the island
and the Turkish Cypriots announced the establishment of the Turkish Federated State of
Cyprus on February 13, 1975.73 The Greek Cypriot administration, internationally
recognized as the legitimate government of Cyprus, retaliated by implementing an
economic embargo against the north. International air, m~ritime, postal, and
telecommunication authorities have respected the embargo, thus forcing these services to
be routed through Turkey to the Turkish Cypriots. 74
Initial talks chaired by UN" Secretary General Kurt Waldheim were unproductive.
However, during the third round of negotiations an agreement regarding the fate of
Tllrkish Cypriots in the south was reached. Under the terms of the settlement,
approximately 8000 Turkish Cypriots were returned to the north on the condition that
Greek Cypriots in the Turkish zone would allowed to remain if they wished. The
agreement provided for freedom of movement and facilities for education in Greek and
for the practice of the Orthodox religion. 75 Unfortunately, the Turkish Cypriot leadership
72 Ibid., p.13.
73 Crawshaw, Cyprus in Transition, p. 11.
74 Macdonald, The Problem of Cyprus, p. 22.
75 Ibid., p. 20.
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did not honor its side of the bargain. According to a 1976 Staff Report by the United
States Senate Subcommittee on Refugees:
Life among Cypriot Greeks in the north has not only not improved, it has
deteriorated since the Cypriot-Turkish administration solemnly pledged in
Vienna to take steps to normalize and protect their lives...In no respect has
the Turkish administration fulfilled its obligation entered into at the third
round of intercommunal talks. 76
By the time the Subcommittee's report had been released, the number of Greek Cypriots
in the Turkish zone dropped from 20,000 to 3,600.77 The ethnic cleansing of the north
was accompanied by the settlement of thousands of mainland Turks in the occupied
territories, transforming Cyprus' demography.78
Confronting New Realities: Intercommunal Talks, 1977-1990
The results of the invasion were perceived differently by Greek and Turkish
Cypriots. As anthropologists Russell King and Sarah Ladbury have pointed out:
The Turkish action in 1974 produced a situation which, for the Turkish
government in Ankara and for the Turkish Cypriot administration, was in
many respects satisfactory...the Turks were victors, both psychologically
76 Cited in Hitchens, p. 108.
77 Macdonald, 20. By 1988 652 Greek Cypriots remained in the north.
78 By 1990, approximately 80,000 mainland Turks had been settled in northern Cypnls. See Adamantia Pollis, "The
Missing ofCyprus--A Distinctive Case," Journal of Modem Greek Studies Vol. 9 (1991): p. 47. There has been
tension between the settlers and indigenous Turkish Cypriots. According to Sarah Ladbury, "the mainlander, for the
most part is thought of as an economic parasite--as having come, not with the intent to work, but to cash in on the
economic potential of post-war Cyprus. The fact that mainlanders received benefits for which many Turkish Cypriots
were not eligible...made them an object of considerable resentment." Russell King and Sarah Ladbury, "The
Cultural Reconstruction of Political Reality: Greek and Turkish Cyprus Since 1974," Anthropological
Quarterly 1 (1982): p. 12.
59
and materially, and from the beginning their logical aim was, we suggest, to
maintain the de facto situation and to convince others of its permanency.79
Conversely, for the Greek Cypriots, "the situation since 1974 has been totally
unacceptable and it is in their interests to reflect its impermanence and to stress its
illegality."SO The two sides' divergent perceptions would define their approach to
negotiations throughout the late 1970s and 1980s.
Greek and Turkish Cypriot representatives met sporadically between 1974-1976.
In January 1977, RaufDenktash and Archbishop Makarios established a set of principles
aimed at guiding further negotiations. They agreed that Cyprus would be an independent,
non-aligned, bi-communal federal republic, with territory to be administered by each
community in light of economic viability, productivity and land ownership.81 Questions
such as freedom of movement, settlement, and property rights were to be discussed with
respect to practical difficulties faced by the Turkish Cypriots. Subsequent talks based on
the Makarios-Denktash guidelines revealed a divergence of views regarding the scope
and power of the central government. The Greek Cypriots preferred a strong central
government. Conversely, the Turkish Cypriots envisioned a confederation of two
sovereign and equal states with a weak central government. S2 Archbishop Makarios's
death in August 1977 delayed the resumption of talks for two years.
79 Ibid., p. 4.
80 Ibid.
81 See United Nations, Secretariat, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 6 of Security
Council Resolution 401 (1976),30 April, 1977, p. 2.
82 Camp, p. 63.
60
Negotiations resumed in 1979 and continued throughout the 1980s.83 A ten point
agreement was reached by Denktash and Makarios' successor, Spyros Kyprianou, in May
1979.84 Under the accord, the two sides agreed to negotiate along the guidelines set forth
in 1977 and to give priority to the resettlement of Varosha under the auspices of the UN.
The agreement also reiterated past statements regarding guarantees against union with
any other country. Point six noted that both sides should, "abstain from any action which
might jeopardize the outcome of the talks. ,,85 Special importance was to be given to,
"initial practical measures by both sides to promote good will, mutual confidence and the
return to normal conditions. ,,86 Turkish Cypriots argued that point six required the lifting
of the economic embargo. The Greek Cypriots objected to this, noting that the embargo
was their sole means of pressuring the Turkish side into making concessions. The
Turkish Cypriots also demanded that the Greek Cypriots accept the notion of a bizonal
state despite the fact that the 1977 guidelines envisioned a bicommunal federal system.
Based on these and other disagreements, the talks faltered after only four sessions.
Following the 1974 invasion, the Greek Cypriots sought to censure Turkey and
the Turkish Cypriots by obtaining favorable resolutions from the UN General Assembly,
the Commonwealth, and various summits of the Non-Aligned nations. 87
83 There are several excellent summaries of the intercommunal negotiations. See James H. Wolfe, "The
United Nations and the Cyprus Question," in Salem, ed., Cyprus: A Regional Conflict, pp. 244-255;
A.J.R. Groom, "The Process ofNegotiation: 1974-1993," in Dodd, ed., The Political and Social, pp. 15-
46; Kjell Skjellsbaek, ed., The Cyprus Conflict and the Role of the United Nations, (Oslo: Norwegian
Institute of International Affairs, 1988).
84 For the full text of the IO-point agreement, see The Cyprus Problem, op cit p. 41.
85 Ibid.
86 Ibid.
87 Coughlan, p. 47.
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Internationalization "had the effect of buttressing Greek-Cypriot authority as the
legitimate government of the island. ,,88 The policy was relaxed between 1979-1983 as a
gesture of goodwill based on point six of the 1979 Denktash-Kyprianou agreement.
However, the frustrating pace of intercommunal talks led to the resumption of the
internationalization policy in Spring 1983. The Greek Cypriots' decision was endorsed
by Greek Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou who argued that any solution to the Cyprus
problelTI required the withdrawal of Turkish troops. 89
On May 13 1983, the UN General Assembly passed Resolution 37/253, calling for
the withdrawal of Turkish troops, repatriation of mainland colonists, and respect for
human rights in Cyprus. 90 The Turkish Cypriots retaliated in November through a
unilateral declaration of independence (UDI) and the creation of the Turkish Republic of
Northern Cyprus (TRNC). The Turkish Cypriot action was denounced by the UN
Security Council through Resolution 541/1983.91 Other international bodies such as the
Commonwealth Heads of Government, the Council ofEurope, and the European
Parliament also condemned the UDI. Despite this, Turkey immediately recognized the
TRNC and established formal diplomatic relations, including an exchange of
ambassadors in 1984.
88 Macdonald, p. 26.
89 Nancy Crawshaw, "Cyprus: A Failure in Western Diplomacy," The World Today 2 (February 1984): p. 73
90 According to Coufoudakis: "In meetings of the European Community, NATO, and the United Nations,
Papandreou presented the Cyprus problem as one of invasion and occupation...He called for a solution of
the Cyprus problem based on the resolutions of the United Nations, the demilitarization of the island
republic, and the expansion of the United Nations peacekeeping force in Cyprus..." Van Coufoudakis,
"PASOK on Greco-Turkish Relations and Cyprus, 1981-1989: Ideology, Pragmatism, Deadlock," in
Theodore C. Kariotis, ed., The Greek Socialist Experiment: Papandreou's Greece, 1981-1989, (New
York: Pella Publishing, 1992): p. 169.
91 For the full text ofResolution 541/1983, see International Condemnation of the Turkish Cypriot
Pseudostate, (Nicosia: Ministry of the Interior, Republic of Cyprus, 1984): p. 23.
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The Greek demand for the withdrawal of Turkish troops, and the Turkish
Cypriots' sharp reaction against it, highlighted the relevance of security for both regional
and communal actors. The stationing of over 35,000 Turkish troops in Cyprus following
the 1974 invasion ensured the Turkish Cypriots' safety and improved Turkey's defensive
posture in the Eastern Mediterranean. Conversely, Greece and the Greek Cypriots
regarded the Turkish troops as a threat to their security. The resulting security dilemma
had a damaging effect on relations at the communal and regional levels. Greece stated
that Turkey's military presence in Cyprus was indicative of its expansionist designs. 92 As
a result, Greek security policy was redesigned to meet the threat from the East. This
included the fortification of several Aegean islands close to the Turkish coast. 93 At the
communal level, the Greek Cypriots viewed the presence of Turkish troops as a
confirmation ofAnkara's desire to dictate the terms of any future settlement. Rightly or
wrongly they concluded that the Turkish Cypriots were being manipulated by Turkey
during the intercommunal talks. All in all, although Turkey's military commitment to
the Turkish Cypriots allowed them to continue living in relative safety and isolation, it
did not alter the anarchic nature of the communal system. If nothing else, it reinforced
the bipolar structure of the system, thereby minimizing either side's ability to make
concessions at the bargaining table.
92 Greek policymakers also cite the presence of the Turkish Fourth Army--the Army of the Aegean--to
defend their argument. The Turkish force is within easy striking distance of Greece's Aegean islands and
is equipped with a panoply of amphibious landing craft. Turkey claims that the Army ofthe Aegean is
intended to protect against Greek aggression. For more on this subject see Robert Macdonald, "Alliance
Problems in the Eastern Mediterranean--Greece, Turkey and Cyprus: Part II," in Robert O'Neill, ed.,
Prospects for Security in the Mediterranean, (London: Macmillan Press, 1988): p. 74.
93 S. Victor Papacosma, "Greece and NATO," in Lawrence S. Kaplan, Robert W. Clawson and Raimondo
Luraghi, eds., NATO and the Mediterranean, (Wilmington, Delaware: Scholarly Resources Inc., 1985): p.
199.
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Intercommunal talks resumed in September 1984 under the auspices of the new
UN Secretary General, Javier Perez de Cuellar. The Turkish Cypriots insisted on a
bizonal federation with complete equality between the two sides. Preliminary
discussions, otherwise known as the Proximity Talks, led to a high level meeting in
January 1985. At the meeting, the Secretary General presented both sides with a detailed
Draft Agreement based on the 1977 and 1979 guidelines. The plan had lnuch in common
with a 1978 proposal drafted by Matthew Nimetz, a high ranking American State
Department officer. 94 The Draft Agreement called for a bi-communal federal
constitution and a bizonal territorial arrangement. The Greek Cypriots' demand for
freedom of movement, property ownership, and settlement were to be addressed by
working groups following the acceptance of the plan. Details regarding territorial
adjustments and the question of foreign troops would also be dealt with in future
negotiations. 95 Disagreements arose after the Greek Cypriots indicated that they regarded
the Draft Agreelnent as a basis for further negotiations and not as a comprehensive
solution. The Turkish Cypriots were prepared to accept the plan as it stood. This was
not surprising, given that their major demands were dealt with substantively while the
Greek Cypriots' key concerns were left unresolved. A hastily revised draft aimed at
addressing SOlne ofKyprianou's key concerns was submitted to both sides in April 1985.
94 The Nimetz Plan, also known as the ABC (American-British-Canadian) Plan was rejected by both sides in 1978. See
Van Coufoudakis, "American Foreign Policy and the Cyprus Problem: The 'Theory of Continuity'
Revisited," in Theodore A. Couloumbis and John O. Iatrides, eds., Greek-American Relations: A Critical
Review, (New York: Pella Publishing, 1980): pp. 107-130.
95 CougWan, p. 48. It should be noted that the Turkish Cypriots had indicated that they were willing to
contemplate the reduction of their zone from 38 to 29% of Cyprus' total territory. Kyprianou and the
Greek Cypriots preferred that this was formally recognized in the Draft Agreement.
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The Greek Cypriots accepted the new proposal but it was immediately rejected by the
Turkish Cypriots.
Undaunted, de Cuellar presented a second Draft Agreement to the two parties in
March 1986.96 Despite its complexity, the new plan failed to satisfy the Greek Cypriots'
concerns regarding the scope of territorial adjustments, ratification of the three freedoms,
and the withdrawal of Turkish troops. While the Greek Cypriots agreed to a Turkish
province encompassing 29 percent of Cyprus, the Turkish Cypriots countered with a
demand for 30-31 percent. Denktash also insisted on maintaining Turkey's right to
intervene militarily on behalf of the of the Turkish Cypriots. 97 Moreover, the Turkish
Cypriots stated that they were only prepared to accept the plan on the condition that the
Greek Cypriots lift the economic embargo. Not surprisingly then, the 1986 Draft
Agreement was rejected by the Greek Cypriot negotiators.
Intercommunal talks resumed in August 1988 following the election of George
Vassiliou as president of the Republic of Cyprus. Vassiliou, an independent candidate,
campaigned on a pledge to solve the Cyprus problem rapidly. A preliminary round of
talks lasted until November 1988. A second series of discussions occurred between
December 1988 and Apri11989. In May 1989, the Secretary General assigned aides to
assist the Cypriot negotiators in drafting their respective proposals. The Secretary
96 See United Nations, Report by the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Cyprus 10
December 1985--11 June 1986, S/18102 Add. 1 (UN Security Council: New York, 11 June 1986). For a
detailed analysis of the proposal see Van Coufoudakis, "Law, Politics and Force: The Search for a
Solution in Cyprus," United States Foreign Policy Regarding Greece, Turkey and Cyprus: The Rule of
Law and American Interests, (Washington, D.C.: American Hellenic Institute, 1989): pp. 65-75.
97 United Nations, Report by the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Cyprus 10
December 1985--11 June 1986, p. 21
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General submitted an "ideas paper" to ensure that both sides adhered to common criteria.
The negotiations revealed increased flexibility on the part of the Greek Cypriots:
...concessions included a willingness to phase in the three freedoms,
beginning with the freedom of movement and holding freedom of
settlement and property in abeyance. New thinking and flexibility on the
territorial issue were displayed, with a range of options presented to the
Turkish Cypriot side.... They were more flexible than in the past on the
issue of the presidency, offering alternatives such as rotating the position
between the two communities or having joint elections, with Turkish votes
. h d 98welg te .
During more than one hundred hours of meetings the two sides explored a vast
range of issues. Buoyed by the recent turn of events, the Secretary General arranged a
summit to take place between 26 February and 2 March 1990 in New York. During the
New York meetings, Denktash objected to the "ideas paper" and shocked Vassiliou by
insisting on the right of self-determination for both communities. This demand was
explicitly denounced by the Secretary General who conceded that the two sides were still
far apart. 99 Despite Perez de Cuellar's stem admonition, the Security Council failed to
censure the Turkish Cypriots, preferring instead to renew the Secretary General's role in
the intercommunal talks through Resolution 649/1990.
The Triumph of Violence?
As was noted in Chapter One, the anarchic nature of the global system impacts on
regional and COffilTIUnal systelTIS and conditions the actions of actors at all three levels.
98 Cyprus: A Country Study, p. 182.
99 Groom, The Political Social and Economic Development ofNorthem Cyprus, p. 29.
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According to George Modelski, the international system influences states to either ally
themselves with communal antagonists, isolate the cOlnbatants and supress the conflict,
or, encourage reconciliation. 100 In a similar sense, Stephen Ryan has argued that global
powers react to ethnic conflicts in order to secure geopolitical advantage, maintain access
to vital resources, and preserve alliances. lol According to Ryan, global powers protect
these interests through active engagement in conflict resolution, military intervention, or
acceptance of the status quo. In the post-1974 period, both the United States and the
Soviet Union accepted the consequences of the Turkish invasion of Cyprus, thus
weakening the UN's efforts to negotiate a settlement acceptable to both communities.
Neither Superpower regarded the division of the island into ethnically homogeneous
zones as itnportant in terms of its strategic interests; in essence, partition settled the
problem. Both Superpowers relied on UNFICYP to keep the two communities apart and
the UN Secretary General to keep them talking. 102
Once more, the failure of the intercomtnunal talks reflected the UN's impotence
in the face of a determined regional power. The triumph of the Turkish position was
reflected in the Greek Cypriots' grudging acceptance of the principles ofbizonality and
100 George Modelski, "The International Relations of Intemal War," in James N. Roseneau, ed.,
International Aspects of Civil Strife, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1964): p. 31.
101 Ryan, p. 95.
102 Cold War thinking dictated US policy during the 1974-1990 period. Writing in 1984, former State
Department Special Cyprus Coordinator Richard Haas noted that, "Attempts to pressure local parties and
their mainland patrons towards compromise would merely damage existing relationships; moreover,
neutralist sentiments are sufficiently strong in both Greece and Turkey that, under the right circumstances,
political figures in each country could meet with considerable success by proposing a new foreign policy
inimical to Western interests. The best course in these circumstances is to eschew jor the present an))
major diplomatic rush. Rather, the US and its European allies would do better to jocus their energies on
maintaining in Cyprus the 2,OOO-strong UNpeacekeepingjorce..." (emphasis added) Dr. Richard Haas,
"Alliance Problems in the Eastern Mediterranean--Greece, Turkey and Cyprus: Part I," in Robert O'Neill,
ed., Prospects for Security in the Mediterranean, pp. 67-68.
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equality of the two communities. It also revealed the utility of force in anarchic political
systems. UN resolutions calling for the withdrawal of foreign troops and respect for
fundamental human rights were meaningless without the weight of the Superpowers
behind them. The Soviets' indifference to the Cyprus problelTI and the United States'
vocal support of Turkey from 1974 and through the 1980s reflected the futility of the
UN's position in Cyprus. 103 To make matters worse, the deterioration of Greek-Turkish
relations in the post-1974 period precluded regional cooperation in solving the dispute. 104
Thus, as the 1980s drew to a close and the world witnessed the end of the Cold
War, a solution to the Cyprus problem appeared as remote as it had been in 1964.
Unfortunately, the situation would not improve in immediate the post-Cold War era.
103 Some may object to this assertion by citing the American Arms Embargo against Turkey between 1974-
1978 and the Soviet Union's request for an international conference to solve the Cyprus problem in 1986.
In reply, one may counter by noting that the American embargo was imposed by Congress over the stem
objections of the Ford and Carter administrations. The effect of the embargo was also questionable. As
Bruce R. Kuniholm has noted, "the United States provided Turkey with considerable military assistance
throughout the embargo years: $95 million in 1975... $125 million in 1976, $125 million in 1977, and $175
million in 1978." Bruce R. Kuniholm, "Turkey and NATO," in Kaplan et aI, eds., NATO and the
Mediterranean, pp. 23 1-232. The Soviets call for an international summit dedicated to solving the Cyprus
problem was not followed up after its initial rejection by the United States, Britain, France, and Turkey. By
most accounts, the Soviets accepted the islands partition and were not prepared to challenge the Western
allies on this issue. See Norton, in Salem, ed., Cyprus: A Regional Conflict, p. 110.
104 The regional conflict between Greece and Turkey reached crisis proportions in the late 1970s and 1980s.
Greek military spending averaged 7% ofGDP, while Turkey averaged 5%. According to Kourvetaris,
"By 1982, with the exception of the United States, Greece and Turkey had the highest defense
expenditures as measured by percentages of gross national product among the sixteen members ofNATO
(6.7% and 5.2% respectively)." War over drilling rights in the Aegean was narrowly averted in 1975 and
1987. Following the 1987 crisis Greek Prime Minister Papandreou met with his Turkish counterpart
Turgut Ozal in Davos Switzerland. The meetings led to a short detente in Greco-Turkish relations. By
1990, however, the "Spirit ofDavos" had given way to mutually antagonistic positions on Cyprus, and the
Aegean. See Kourvetaris, East European Quarterly 4 (January 1988): p. 443. Also see Andrew Wilson,
The Aegean Dispute, (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1979/80); Mehmet Ali
Birand, "A Turkish View of Greek-Turkish Relations," Journal ofPolitical and Military Sociology Vol. 16
(Fall 1988): pp. 173-183; and Duygu Sezer, "The Strategic Matrix of the SEM: A Turkish Perspective,"
in Constas, ed., pp. 109-128.
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Chapter Three
The Cyprus Problem in the Emerging
International System
All this for peace. Yet, when the wars are waged, there are new calamities brewing.
St. Augustine: The City of God
Introduction
The end of the Cold War produced profolInd changes in the global political
system. The disbanding of the Warsa\v Treaty Organization and the breakup of the
Soviet Union ushered in a new era in international relations; an era bereft of the familiar
features which characterized the bipolar global system. 1 This chapter shall examine the
Cyprus problem in the years between 1990-1995 in order to understand how change in
the global system has affected the evolution of Cypriot communal relations. After
outlining some major features of the emerging international system, the chapter will
explore how the end of global bipolarity has exacerbated tensions between Greece and
Turkey, leading both states to maintain irreconcilable positions on several bilateral issues
including Cyprus. A brief examination of UN initiatives in Cyprus between 1990-1995
will reveal that the impediments to a negotiated settlelnent have also outlasted the Cold
War order. Moreover, the marginalization of the Cyprus problem in terms of global
1 See John Lewis Gaddis, "The Long Peace: Elements of Stability in the Postwar International System,"
International Security 4 (Spring 1986): pp. 99-142.
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politics continues. The proliferation of conflicts throughout the world has absorbed the
attention and resources of the UN and the Great Powers. Ironically, the relative stability
bred by the current state of affairs threatens to make the division of Cyprus permanent.
Barring any dramatic changes, communal relations will continue to develop along the
lines set out following the partition of the island in Allgust 1974.
The Emerging International System
Although a substantive appraisal of post-Cold War international relations is
beyond the scope of this study, a brief examination of the emerging international system
is necessary in order to place developments in Cyprus into greater perspective.
Two schools of thought have come to dominate the debate over the form and
character of the emerging international system. Realists continue to emphasize the
anarchic nature of international relations, while their critics argue that the spread of
economic liberalism and political democracy has tempered Realist assumptions
concerning the inevitability of conflict between states. In his critique ofRealist
hypotheses, Richard Ned Lebow argues that relations among developed democratic states
of Asia, North America, Oceania, and Western Europe can no longer be characterized as
anarchic. According to Lebow:
The allegedly inescapable conseqllences of anarchy have been largely
overcome by a complex web of institutions that govern interstate relations
and provide mechanisms for solving disputes. These institutions reflect and
help sustain a consensus in favor of consultation and compromise that mute
the consequences of power imbalances among states...a community of
nations has evolved that is bound together by the realization that national
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security and economic well-being require close cooperation and
coordination with other democratic and democratizing states. 2
Lebow's position is qualified by James M. Goldgier and Michael McFalll, who
differentiate between relations between advanced industrial "core" states and their
weaker counterparts residing at the "periphery" of the international system. 3 Goldgeir
and McFaul note that anarchy and cOlnpetition still determine relations between
developing, peripheral states. However, they attribute this to a paucity of shared norms
and political instability--features that may be alleviated over time. Thus, one may
conclude that even peripheral states have the capacity to evolve into Inelnbers of the
core, thereby escaping their uncertain future. In the meantime, however, peripheral states
must contend with anarchy within their particular regional subsystem.4 Core states, on
the other hand, no longer need to concern themselves with the vagaries of maintaining
military superiority. Goldgeir and McFaul argue that for the Great Powers, ensuring
survival has become a relatively easy task, "survival within the core system of states will
be relegated to a perfunctory national objective, and hence the security dilemma will not
dominate relations between the great powers.,,5
2 Richard Ned Lebow, "The Long Peace, the End of the Cold War, and the Failure ofRealism,"
International Organization 2 (Spring 1994): p. 209.
3 See James M. Goldgeir and Michael McFaul, "A Tale of Two Worlds: Core and Periphery in the Post-Cold
War Era," International Organization 2 (Spring 1992): pp. 467-491.
4 The end of the Cold War has also altered the scope of Great Power interest in regional conflicts.
According to Zbigniew Brzezinski, "regional conflicts are now decoupled from the earlier linkage with
Superpower rivalry. Regional conflicts may now be globally less critical but, conversely, they may be
freer to escalate to higher levels ofviolence." See Zbigniew Brzezinski, "The Consequences of the End of
the Cold War for International Security," Adelphi Paper 265, (London: International Institute for
Strategic Studies, 1992): p. 4.
5 Goldgeir and McFaul, p. 478.
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Realist theorists contend that the demise of the global system's bipolar structure
has not altered the anarchic context of international politics. Anarchy, they argue, is a
permanent feature of the global system regardless of its structure. In marked contrast to
their critics, Realists contend that the end of the Cold War order has led to even greater
uncertainty and instability. In a controversial article published in 1990, John
Mearsheimer noted that the optimism generated by the end of the Cold War was
prematllre. Mearsheimer argued that bipolarity, with its attendant military balance
between Superpowers, fostered peace in Europe for forty-five years. 6 Conversely, the
demise of the Cold War order increased the chances of war and major crises occurring in
Europe.7 Mearsheimer warned that the emerging international system had the potential
to breed malevolent forms of hyper-nationalism. This is an important, if often neglected
argument, in that it links change at the global level to the emergence of atavistic
tendencies within individual states. According to Mearsheimer:
...nation states exist in an anarchic world, under constant threat from other
states. In such a situation people who love their own nation and state can
develop an attitude of contempt and loathing toward the nations who
inhabit opposing states. The problem is exacerbated by the fact that
political elites often feel compelled to portray adversary nations in the most
negative way so as to mobilize public support for national security policies.8
6 John 1. Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War," International
Security 1 (Summer 1990): pp. 5-56.
7 Ibid., p. 52.
8 Ibid., p. 21.
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In other words, disorder at the global level alters the context of communal politics.
Political systems which were sustained in part by the divisions of the Cold War have
been directly affected by the reordering of the global system. If one takes Mearsheimer's
argument a step further, the connection between global change and local disorder
becomes apparent. Nationalism and ethnic conflict may be attributed in part to the
collapse of order within regional and communal political systems, which are affected by
shifts in the global system.9 Where order gives way to anarchy, conflict is inevitable. In
the words ofMichael Ignatieff, "there is one type of fear more devastating in its impact
than any other: the systemic fear that arises when a state begins to collapse. Ethnic
hatred is the result of terror that arises when legitimate authority disintegrates. ,,10
Although it is too early to draw firm conclusions regarding the character of
international politics in the post-Cold War period, one may refer to recent events for
evidence that the world has not passed into an era of peace and harmony. 11 Thus far,
security and defense structures founded during the Cold War have not formed the basis of
a "security community", as many predicted they would. 12 Rather, the international
9 As Pierre Hassner has aptly observed, "States have never been able to control the international
environment. What is new is, first, that they control it less and less, while being more constrained by it;
second, that they are less and less capable of controlling their domestic environment, the social groups, or
the national minorities that are supposed to be subject to their authority..." Pierre Hassner, "Beyond
Nationalism and Internationalism: Ethnicity and World Order," in Brown, ed., Ethnic Conflict and
International Security, p. 132.
10 Michael Ignatie£I: Blood and Belonging: Journeys Into the New Nationalism, (Toronto: Penguin Books,
1993): p. 24.
11 Kenneth N. Waltz wryly noted that, "The thawing of the Cold War led to an expectation that the
springtime buds ofpeace will blossom. Instead it has permitted latent conflicts to bloom in the Balkans
and elsewhere in eastern Europe, in what was part ofgreater Russia and later the Soviet Union, and in the
Middle East." Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Emerging Structure of International Politics," International
Security 2 (Fall 1993): p. 78.
12 See Hans-Henrik Holm and Georg Sorensen, "A New World Order: The Withering Away of Anarchy and
the Triumph of Individualism? Consequences for IR-Theory," Cooperation and Conflict 3 (1993): pp.
265-301.
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community's disjointed response to conflicts in Bosnia, Somalia, and Chechnya reveals
that national interests continue to drive states' foreign policies. 13 While the threat of
thermonuclear holocaust has receded, conflicts persist, often in places where they
previously had not. If nothing else, one may conclude that uncertainty and violence have
maintained their position in global politics, despite the end of the Cold War. The
flourishing of anarchy in the emerging international system has ensured that relations
between states continue to be based on considerations of power and relative advantage.
Greek-Turkish Relations After the Cold War
According to the framework established in Chapter One, shifts in the global
system influence relations between actors in regional subsystems. Based on this premise,
one may conclude that the transformation of the global system will have had a profound
impact on relations between regional actors. This has certainly been the case in relations
between Greece and Turkey. The deterioration of bilateral relations which followed
Turkey's invasion and occupation of Cyprus in 1974 continued unabated in the post-Cold
War era. As Tozun Bahcheli has noted, changes in the security environment of these
traditional adversaries has brought new possibilities for disagreement and mutual
suspicion that may have an indirect effect on Cyprus. The following is a brief summary
of key factors underlying the present Greco-Turkish rivalry.
13 See Joseph Fitchett, "Bosnia Fighting Rages as Allies Point Fingers," International Herald Tribune,
November 29, 1994; Anthony Lewis, "NATO Discredited by its Members," The New York Times,
November 28, 1994. Also see James B. Steinberg, "The Response of International Institutions to the
Yugoslavia Conflict: Implications and Lessons," in Larrabee, ed., The Volatile Powder Keg, pp. 233-274;
and Ted Galen Carpenter, "Conflicting Agendas and the Future ofNATO," The Journal of Strategic
Studies 4 (December 1994): pp. 143-164.
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As Nikolaos A. Stavrou has noted, the dissolution of the Soviet Union and
Warsaw Pact allowed Turkey to pursue a more assertive foreign policy. 14 Turkey
emerged as a formidable actor in the Balkans, Central Asia, and the Middle East.,,15 The
late President of Turkey, Turgut Ozal, worked diligently to take advantage of Turkey's
position in the emerging international system. Ozal secured Turkey's participation as
part of the UN coalition during the 1991 Persian Gulf War, foregoing Turkey's
traditional neutrality in Middle Eastern affairs. I6 In doing so, he gave notice that Turkey
was intent on asserting itself as a regional power:
Whereas Ankara traditionally would have maintained strict neutrality
toward conflict in the Middle East, on this occasion, Turkey, under the
strong prodding of Ozal, came down four-square on the side of the allies
and the UN Security Council, committed its own troops to the conflict, and
pennitted Turkish airbases to be used by the allied forces in offensive air-
strikes against Iraq...Ankara did not shrink from hostile relations with Iraq
given its interests in increasing Turkish leverage with the United States,
NATO, and throughout the region. I?
In the aftermath of the Gulf War, Ozal pressed for Turkish involvement in the
Balkans, arguing that over nine million Moslems in the former Yugoslavia, Albania, and
Bulgaria, looked to Turkey for leadership. Soon after the collapse of Albania's
14 Nikolaos A. Stavrou, "The Dismantling of the Balkan Security System: Consequences for Greece,
Europe, and NATO," Mediterranean Quarterly 1 (Winter 1995): p. 47.
15 Graham E. Fuller, "Conclusion: The Growing Role of Turkey in the World," in Graham E. Fuller and Ian
O. Lesser, eds., Turkey's New Geopolitics, (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1993): p. 163.
16 See William Hale, "Turkey, the Middle East and the Gulf Crisis," International Affairs 4 (Fall 1992): pp.
683-692; and Lally Weymouth, "Turkey: Facing the High Costs of Being America's Ally," The
Washington Post, May 19, 1991.
17 Graham E. Fuller, "Turkey in the New International Security Environment," in F. Stephen Larrabee, ed.,
The Volatile Powder Keg: Balkan Security After the Cold War, (Washington, D.C.: The American
University Press, 1994): p 144.
75
Communist regime, Turkey extended financial aid to Tirana and offered military
cooperation, including the training of Albanian officers in Turkey. 18 Turkey also
recognized the Fonner Yugoslav Republic ofMacedonia over stem Greek objections and
emerged as the most active provider of military aid to the Bosnian Moslem government. 19
Greece, unlike Turkey, gained very little from the demise of the bipolar global
system. The ideological divisions of the Cold War had worked towards Greece's
advantage. According to John O. Iatrides, the Cold War:
...preserved on the international arena a degree of order and predictability in
the behavior of states and especially of the superpowers. In their effort to
Inaintain their respective blocs, Moscow and Washington felt obligated to
extend to their lesser partners substantial amounts of military, technical, and
economic assistance and, whenever feasible, diplomatic support...as
traditional Cold War perceptions become irrelevant, the value of Greece to
the Atlantic alliance becomes less and less obvious. 20
The dissolution of the Balkan security system and Turkey's growing presence in the area
exacerbated Greek insecurity. The decision by six European Union (EU) countries and
the United States to recognize and establish diplomatic relations with the Former
Yugoslav Republic ofMacedonia shattered Greece's hopes for improved security through
a common ED foreign policy.21 The possibility of a Moslem Axis composed of Turkey,
18 Andrew Mango, Turkey: The Challenge of a New Role, (Washington, D.C.: The Center for Strategic and Intenlational
Studies, 1994): p. 119.
19 "Turkey offered to place at least 1000 troops at the disposal of a combined expeditionary force and urged
the bombing of Serbian targets." IF. Brown, "Turkey: Back to the Balkans?" in Fuller and Lesser, eds.,
Turkey's New Geopolitics, p. 154.
20 John O. Iatrides, "Greece in the Cold War and Beyond," Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora 2 (1993): p. 25-
26.
21 Zahariadis, "Nationalism and Small-State Foreign Policy," p. 665.
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Bosnia, and Albania reinforced fears in Athens of the emergence of an 'Islamic Arc'
forming along Greece's northern border. 22 Greece responded to Turkey's Balkan forays
by improving its relations with Bulgaria and maintaining close ties with Serbia, which it
regards as a bulwark against the expansion of Turkish influence in the region. 23 Greece
also campaigned fiercely to exclude Turkish troops from UN peacekeeping operations in
Bosnia.24 These policies have often led to disagreements with Greece's NATO and
European Union allies. Viewed from Athens, these squabbles are indicative of the
West's failure to appreciate Greek security concerns. 25
Greece has repeatedly stated that it is not interested in redrawing borders or
expanding its territory. Rather, Greece has responded to recent events in a reactive
fashion which belies its discomfort with the pace of change in the Balkans. Greece's
continuing membership in NATO and the West European Union, among other
multilateral organizations, clearly illustrate Athens' preference for strong regional
security organizations. However, the failure of these organizations to adequately address
22 Thanos Veremis, "Greece: The Dilemmas of Change," in Larrabee, ed., The Volatile Powder Keg, p. 132.
Veremis sums up the Greek position by noting that, "since 1989 Turkey has been making inroads into the
Balkan peninsula via Islamic outposts. More than 5.5 million Muslims ofBulgarian, Turkish, Serbian,
Croat, and Albanian origin reside in a geographic wedge that extends from the Black Sea to the Adriatic,
separating Greece from its Slavic Christian neighbors. Turkey is trying to become the champion of the
Balkan Muslims and extend its influence in the region in order to enhance its strategic importance in the
post-Cold War era." Also see Town Bahcheli, "The Cyprus Issue in the post-Cold War Environment,"
Paper presented at Cyprus and Its People: New Interdisciplinary Perspectives, a conference at Harvard
University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, December 2, 1994.
23 Greece, Bulgaria Optimistic About Defense Cooperation, XpOV1KU (Toronto), February 28, 1995, p. 3.
Also see F. Stephen Larrabee, "Washington, Moscow, and the Balkans: Strategic Retreat or
Reengagement," in Larrabee, ed., The Volatile Powder Keg, p. 212-213.
24 Greece lost this battle after the United Nations allowed 1,500 Turkish peacekeepers to serve in Moslem-
held areas ofBosnia. The Turkish troops were to monitor the Bosnian cease-fire, which has been
consistently violated by government troops as well as Bosnian Serb and Croat paramilitary units. See Ian
Mather, "Turkey Breaks Balkan Taboo," The European, June 17-23, 1994.
25 See StavfOU, p. 35.
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Greek concerns has led Athens to act unilaterally when and where it believes its interests
are threatened. The clearest example of this was Greece's decision to close its borders
with the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia on February 16, 1994, over the
objections of its European Union allies and the United States. Greece's robust reaction
to the mistreatment of ethnic Greeks in Albania is another clear example of this
phenomena.26
The expansion of the Greco-Turkish rivalry into the Balkans exacerbated tensions
between the two countries, accentuating their bipolar relationship.27 The creation of
regional alliances based on historical and religious ties reinforced the prevailing security
dilemma. As a result, the bilateral disputes which dOlninated Greco-Turkish relations in
the 1970s and 80s continued to fester in the post-Cold War era. While Cyprus is the most
serious of these problems, four others are worth noting: i) the delimitation of territorial
waters; ii) the delimitation of air space; iii) the fortification of several Greek islands in
the eastern Mediterranean; and iv) the treatment of respective Ininorities in Western
Thrace and Istanbul.28 The prospect of undersea oil deposits has made the question of
26 See James Pettifer, "Albania, Greece and the Vorio Epirus Question," The World Today 8/9
(August/September 1994): pp. 147-149.
27 This is reflected in the huge sums both countries have spent modernizing their military forces. In 1992
alone, Greece spent $2 billion on weapons while Turkey spent $1.5 billion. Greece and Turkey also
received large quantities of heavy offensive weapons free of charge under the conditions of the
Conventional Forces in Europe(CFE) treaty. See F. Stephen Larrabee, "Introduction," in Larrabee, ed.,
The Volatile Powder Keg, p. xviii; William Drozdiak, "Greece, Turkey Amassing Arms," The Washington
Post, September 30, 1993; and "Fueling Balkan Fires," Basic Report 93-3, (Washington, D.C.: British-
American Security Information Council, September 1993).
28 Mango, p. 124-125 and Bahcheli, p. 9. According to Bahcheli, members of the Turkish community in
Westerm Thrace have regularly complained of discriminatory treatment pertaining to their educational
needs, their right to elect religious leaders or mUftiS and a lack of employment opportunities. Conversely,
Greeks in Istanbul have also complained about the treatment they have recieved from Turkish officials.
Large scale emmigration of Greeks from Istanbul followed officially inspired anti-Greek riots in 1956.
From a community of about 100,000 in 1923, the number of Greeks in Istanbul has decreased to
approximately 3000 today. Greece has periodically complained of harassment and excessive curbs on the
Greek Orthodox Patriarch in Istanbul.
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territorial waters the most volatile of the four issues. Throughout the 1990s, Turkey
consistently warned that it would not tolerate the extension of Greek territorial waters
from six to twelve miles, despite Greece's right to do so under international law. 29 For
their part, Greek officials have stated that they reserve the right to extend Greece's
territorial waters despite Turkish objections.
Ankara has indicated that it prefers a package deal which would settle the
question of territorial waters along with a host of other bilateral issues, excluding the
Cyprus problem.30 Greece has consistently argued that there will be no progress on these
issues until the Cyprus problem is solved. In 1990, former Greek Prime Minister
Constantinos Mitsotakis stated that "The Turks must be made to understand that it will
be impossible to make progress in Greek-Turkish relations, as well as Turkey's
attachment to the European Community if they do not solve the Cyprus issue first, and
then address Greek-Turkish differences.,,31 This seems unlikely, as Turkey plans to build
a pipeline to carry oil from Azerbaijan and Central Asia to the southern Turkish bay of
Iskenderun. This has increased the strategic value ofNorthern Cyprus. Thus, "It is
unlikely that Turkey would allow the relegation of the Turkish Cypriots from a position
of partner to one of minority.... This could leave the Greek Cypriots in a position to pose
a threat for [sic] Turkey's new and important oil route.,,32 In the absence ofa
comprehensive settlement, both states continue to press their claims in the Aegean. This
29 Mango., p. 124.
30 Suha Bolukbasi, "The Greco-Turkish Dispute," in C.H. Dodd, ed., Turkish Foreign Policy: New
Prospects, (Huntingdon, England: The Eothen Press, 1992): p. 49.
31 Ibid., p. 48.
32 Alemdar, p. 99.
79
has led to provocative military exercises and violations of Greek airspace by Turkish
jets. 33
Greece has tried to temper Ankara's stance on Cyprus by making Turkey's
accession to the European Union(EU--formerly the European Community) contingent on
the resolution of the Cyprus problem.34 Greece consistently vetoed the release of over
$800 million in EC financial assistance earmarked for Turkey in 1986, pending
movement toward the withdrawal of Turkish troops from northern CypruS. 35 Greek
members of the European Parliament have also spearheaded the enactment of several
resolutions condemning Turkey's continued presence on the island. Based on this and
other evidence, Constantine Stephanou and Charalambos Tsardanides have noted that
Turkey's occupation of northern Cyprus has served as serious obstacle to Turkish
membership.36 While this may be true, closer examination reveals that the EC-EU has
failed to pressure Turkey into making concessions on Cyprus.
Since the European Commission rejected Turkey's application in December
1989, the EC-EU has maintained good relations with Ankara while not raising Turkish
hopes for full membership.3? Turkey's perception that it may never be accepted into the
33 "Aegean War Games Provoke Dispute," International Herlad Tribune, November 19-20, 1994; rtCOpyo
Llf;(J1t01:tOll, "KptO"l1 L1:0 Atyato(Crisis in the Aegean)", The Greek Press(Toronto), November 24, 1994.
34 Turkey submitted its formal application to the European Community in April 1987. It has been an
Associate member since 1963. See Michael Cendrowicz, "The European Community and Turkey:
Looking Backwards, Looking Forwards," in Dodd, ed., Turkish Foreign Policy, pp. 9-26.
35 Ian O. Lesser, "Bridge or Barrier? Turkey and the West After the Cold War," in Fuller and Lesser, eds.,
Turkey's New Geopolitics, p. 113.
36 Constantine Stephanou and Charalambos Tsardanides, "The EC Factor in the Greece-Turkey-Cyprus
Triangle," in Salem, ed., Cyprus: A Regional Conflict, p. 217.
37 Officially, the Commision based its decision on Turkey's low level of economic development, high rate of
population growth, massive debt, and low tax revenues. However, scholars have noted that the political
consequences of extending Europe's borders to the Middle East also played an important role in the
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elite European club has restricted the EC-ED's leverage. 38 Consequently, EC-ED efforts
to pressure Ankara over Cyprus have been futile. This was particularly evident in March
1995, following the conclusion of a customs union agreement between Turkey and the
ED. The agreement aimed at increasing trade with Turkey and propping-up its sagging
economy with a large infusion of economic aid. 39 The decision was defended by Inany as
a way of stemming the meteoric rise of the Islamic Refah(Welfare) Party.40 Greece
agreed not to veto the agreement on the condition that the ED open negotiations on
membership with the government of Cyprus in 1996.41 However, only a day after the
agreement was reached, Turkey's Foreign Minister Murat Karayalcin stated that Ankara
would not allow the ED to start membership talks with Cyprus prior to settling the
Cyprus problem. 42 Karayalcin warned that Turkey would annex the TRNC if the island
joined the ED. Greece responded to Karayalcin's comments by pleading with its ED
partners to censure Turkey.
Ankara's policy towards its large Kurdish minority has also revealed Europe's
impotence in the face of perceived Turkish national interests. Turkey has pursued an
aggressive policy in combating the separatist Kurdish Worker's Party(PKK). Turkey's
southeastern provinces have been under a state of emergency since 1987 and over
Commission's decision. See Ian O. Lesser, "Bridge or Barrier? Turkey and the West After the Cold
War," in Fuller and Lesser, eds., Turkey's New Geopolitics, p. 104.
38 Ibid., p. 107.
39 "ED Link to Turkey is Final," International Herald Tribune, March 7, 1995.
40 In the words ofBritish Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd, "It is hugely in our interests that Turkey draws
closer to Europe...Turkey should not be tempted or induced to go off in some other direction." See
"Trade Doors Open to Turks: Europe Sets Up Islamic Buffer," The Globe and Mail, March 7, 1995.
41 Lionel Barber, "Greece Lifts Turkey Customs Union Veto," Financial Times, March 4, 1995.
42 "Athens Wants Ankara Censured," International Herald Tribune, March 8, 1995.
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400,000 Turkish soldiers, police, intelligence officers, and village guards have been
mobilized to combat PKK guerrillas. 43 The war against the PKK has led to the burning
of over 1000 Kurdish villages and the arrest of scores ofjournalists, politicians and
writers who have protested against the government's actions. 44 Turkey's recent foray
into northern Iraq represented a dramatic escalation in the war and drew the ire of several
European governments. Their protests did not temper the Turkish government's position.
This was evident in Turkey's decision to boycott the Council ofEurope following the
Council's request that Turkey withdraw from northern Iraq, implement deluocratic
reforms, and end human rights abuses.45 The United States' continuing support for
Turkey has helped Ankara resist calls to end the war against the Kurds. So long as
Tllrkey enjoys American support, the EU will be in no position to influence Turkish
policy, either in Cyprus or elsewhere. 46
Recent UN Initiatives
In July 1991, only a few months after the Gulf War, former American President
George Bush declared that the United States would work closely with Greece, Turkey
and the United Nations to solve the Cyprus problem before the end of the year. Bush
stated that, "In the new world I have discussed, none of us should accept the status quo in
CypruS.,,47 President Bush's apparent commitment to solving the Cyprus problem was
43 See Jeri Laber, "The Hidden War in Turkey," The New York Review ofBooks, 12 (June 23, 1994): p.
49.
44 John Damton, "Rights Abuses in Turkey Said to Rise," The New York Times, March 6, 1995.
45 "Turks Break With Council ofEurope," International Herald Tribune, April 28, 1995.
46 Turkey is the third largest recipient of American aid after Israel and Egypt.
47 Maureen Dowd, "Bush Names the Next Challenge: Cyprus," The New York Times, July 19, 1991.
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shared by the new United Nations Secretary General, Boutros Boutros Ghali. The
Secretary General stated that a solution to the problem was required in order to free UN
peacekeeping resources. His recommendations were presented in a one-hundred
paragraph document dubbed the "Set of Ideas", sanctioned by Security Council
Resolution 750/1992.
The Set of Ideas was modeled after the comprehensive Draft Agreements of 1986,
and included suggestions for territorial adjustments and the return of Varosha, Morphou
and thirty-four other villages to the Greek Cypriots. 48 The Set of Ideas called for a
federal republic with a single international personality and sovereignty and a single
citizenship.49 The two states would enjoy equal status, with the federal government
controlling foreign affairs, defense, police matters, international trade, and taxation. 50
The federated states would have responsibilities in all other matters, including education,
religion, and cultural affairs. 51 The federal civil service would be divided along a 70:30
ratio and any amendment to the constitution would require the consent of both
communities. The Set of Ideas called for a bicalnerallegislature, with the lower house
split on a ratio of 70 Greek Cypriot representatives to 30 Turkish Cypriots; the upper
house would be based on a 50:50 ratio. The federal executive would consist of a
president and vice-president symbolizing the unity of the country and equality of the two
communities. The Set of Ideas also addressed the issues of freedom ofmovelnent,
48 For a the full text of the Set of Ideas see United Nations, Secretary-General's Report to the Security
Council, 21 August 1992, (S/24472).
49 Robert Macdonald, "Cyprus: A Peacekeeping Paradigm," The World Today, 10 (October 1993): p. 182.
50 Groom, in Dodd, ed., The Political, Social, and Economic Development ofNorthern Cyprus, pp. 31-32.
51 Macdonald, The World Today, p. 182.
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settlement, and ownership of property. Territorial adjustments under the plan would
have allowed approximately 80,000 Greek Cypriots to return to their homes. Where
relocation was impossible, compensation would be offered.
While the Set of Ideas was accepted by the Greek Cypriots; the Turkish Cypriots
disagreed with the Secretary General's proposals regarding the form of federation, the
question of displaced persons, and the issue of territorial adjustments. 52 They also
refused to negotiate the return of the fertile Morphou district, which generates
approximately 40 percent of the TRNC's foreign exchange earnings. 53 Moreover,
Turkish Cypriot negotiators placed severe restrictions on the Greek Cypriots' ability to
travel freely in the north, thereby denying the Secretary General's call for the realization
of the three freedoms. 54 Boutros Ghali was clearly dismayed by the Turkish Cypriot
position, noting that:
...while one cannot ignore the practical difficulties involved in resolving the
issue of displaced persons, the manner in which these are addressed must
not deny the principles of the right to property. The Set of Ideas offers
reasonable arrangements that address the practical difficulties in a manner
that takes into account the legitimate rights and interests of both sides. 55
The Secretary General added that:
52 The Turkish Cypriots rejected the Secretary General's suggestion that their territory be reduced to 28% of
the island's total, claiming that they were entitled to 29% or more of the territory.
53 Ibid. According to Peter Loizos, approximately half the Greek Cypriot population could return to their
former homes ifFamagusta and a section of the Morphou district were returned to Greek control.
54 Even this concession was challenged by Prime Minister Dervis Eroglu, who opposed any return of
property to Greek Cypriots. See C.H. Dodd, "The Political Ascendancy of the Right: 1985-1993," in
Dodd, ed., The Political, Social, and Economic Development ofNorthern Cyprus, p. 160.
55 "New York Proved Denktash's Intransigence," Cyprus: The Newspaper of the Cypriot Students
Association of Toronto, October, 1992, p. 4.
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The continuation of the status quo is not a viable option, I believe that,
should an agreement not emerge from the talks that will reconvene in
October, it would be necessary for the Security Council to give serious
consideration to alternative courses of action for resolving the Cyprus
problem.56
Boutros Ghali' s reprimand was not heeded by the Turkish Cypriots. During
subsequent negotiations in October and November 1992, RaufDenktash demanded prior
recognition of the TRNC, the institution of a rotating presidency, and communal
elections for the President and Vice-President in order to recognize the full equality of
the two communities. The Secretary General and the Security Council rejected the
Turkish Cypriot delnands, arguing that they were fundamentally at variance with the Set
of Ideas. 57
Shortly after the November talks, the Secretary General noted that there existed a
deep crisis of confidence between the two sides. He therefore introduced a set of
confidence-building measures to facilitate further negotiations. The confidence-building
measures included calls for a reduction in the number of foreign troops in Cyprus; the
extension of the area under UNFICYP's control to include Varosha; the promotion of
increased contact between the two communities; fewer restrictions to the free movement
of persons across the Green Line; bicommunal projects funded by international
institutions; and the reopening of the Nicosia airport, with separate terminals to service
56 Ibid.
57 "Status Quo 'not acceptable'," UN Chronicle, (March 1993): p. 69.
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each community. 58 Experts from the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank
reported that the confidence-building measures would produce significant benefits for
both communities.59 The Secretary General appointed former Canadian Prime Minister
Joe Clark to promote the measures. While both sides grudgingly accepted the
confidence-building measures in principle, negotiations failed to break any new ground
and were abandoned in late March, 1994.60
Communal Perceptions
Given the UN's financial difficulties and burgeoning agenda, it is doubtful that
Cyprus will continue to receive the attention it has in the past. The proliferation of
violent conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and elsewhere has strained the UN's resources,
leading to a substantial reduction in UNFICYP's numbers. 61 Finland, Ireland, Sweden,
Denmark, Canada, and Austria have all pulled their forces out of Cyprus and there is
speculation that other countries will follow suit.62 This does not augur well for the Greek
Cypriots. Unlike their Turkish Cypriot counterparts, they do not relish the continuation
of the status quo. Although they have succeeded in transforming their state into an
affluent center of tourism and commerce, the political pressure exerted by thousands of
refugees from the north has not waned. In the words ofRoger Zetter, "Political solidarity
among the representative fora of the refugees has remained remarkably firm on the issue
58 See Patrick Martin, "Gradually, Cautiously, Hope Comes to Cyprus," The Globe and Mail, February 5,
1994.
59 See Nancy Crawshaw, "Cyprus: A Crisis of Confidence," The World Today (April 1994): p. 70.
60 Jay Bushinsky, "Cyprus Deal Slips Away," The Toronto Sun, March 28, 1994.
61 UNFICYP's standing force was reduced from 2,141 peacekeepers in May 1992 to 1,513 in March 1993.
See Groom, p. 41.
62 Macdonald, p. 184.
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of return for nearly two decades; there is implacable opposition to any solution which
compromises territorial restoration or political rights. ,,63
The defeat of George Vassiliou by Glatkos Clerides in the February 1993
Presidential elections has been cited as evidence that the mood among Greek Cypriots is
changing. Clerides drew lTIuch of his support from 'rejectionists' who oppose
concessions to the Turkish Cypriots.64 The fact that Clerides has agreed to bring Cyprus
within the Greek defense system is another clear sign that the Greek Cypriots are seeking
new ways to voice their disapproval of the current situation. While the Greek Cypriots'
decision to expand relations with Athens is potentially unsettling, it is indicative of their
growing sense of frustration.
For their part, the Turkish Cypriots have proceeded with the state building process
they began in the aftermath of the 1974 Turkish invasion. The TRNC continues to rely
on economic assistance from Turkey and has developed into an appendage of the Turkish
mainland. Although their economy has suffered in response to the Greek Cypriot
embargo and the absence of international recognition, the Turkish Cypriots continue to
prize the security afforded by the presence of Turkish troops. As Sambanis has aptly
observed, this security is not defined simply in terms of physical well-being; it also
entails a degree of political power.65 It is apparent that the Turkish Cypriots are not
prepared to give that power up in order to placate the UN. According to Bolukbasi, "the
63 Roger Zetter, "The Greek-Cypriot Refugees: Perceptions ofReturn Under Conditions of Protracted
Exile," International Migration Review 2 (Summer 1994): p. 311.
64 Crawshaw, p. 71.
65 Sambanis, "Ancient Affections," p. 136.
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Turkish Cypriots believe that a full implementation of the three freedoms would make
bizonality meaningless because the Turkish zone would soon become Hellenized and the
Turks would again become second-class citizens, as they were in 1974.,,66
Although there is evidence that growing numbers of Turkish Cypriots are
dissatisfied with the present state of affairs, they have yet to mount a serious challenge to
President Denktash and Prime Minister Eroglu. Based on the political trends of the past
twenty years there is ample reason to believe that the status quo will continue to be
preferred by a majority of Turkish Cypriots. Barring a solution which recognizes their
desire for full equality and limited contact with Greek Cypriots, the Turkish Cypriots
may prefer absorption into Turkey as a way around the current economic embargo.67
However, ending negotiations with the Greek Cypriots may lead to renewed conflict.
Thus far, the Greek Cypriots have placed their faith in a negotiated settlelnent which
would allow them some access to their former homes and businesses. To slam the door
on their aspirations would produce lasting resentment, which could lead to the adoption
ofviolence as a means of pressuring the Turkish Cypriots into making territorial
concessions. This, in tum, may provide the spark to ignite a wider Greco-Turkish war.
66 Bolukbasi, p. 51.
67 According to a recent report, "Denktash has shown some sympathy for the suggestion by the veteran
Turkish left-wing nationalist politician Bulent Ecevit (who, as prime minister, had ordered Turkish troops
to land in Cyprus in 1974) that negotiations on Cyprus should be broken off and that northern Cyprus
should accept 'Channel Islands status' vis-a-vis Turkey." See "Early Agreement on Cyprus Unlikely,"
The Globe and Mail, February 7, 1995.
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Conclusion
The end of the Cold War has not improved the odds of solving the Cyprus
probleln. If nothing else, the demise of the global bipolar system has added new barriers
to the realization of a negotiated settlement. As this chapter has noted, the disorder
which accompanied the emerging international system has exacerbated relations between
Greece and Turkey. Unrest in the Balkans has provided opportunities and threats that
had been absent since the end of the Second World War. Turkey's desire to gain a
foothold in the region heightened fears in Athens~ as a result, bilateral disputes including
the tense stand-off in the Aegean have persisted. Given the poor quality of Greek-
Turkish relations, it is not likely that either side will be willing to back down from its
stance in Cyprus.
The emerging international system has been marked by the breakup of states and
the proliferation of violent conflicts. As a result, the Cyprus problem no longer
commands the attention it once did~ the dwindling number of UN peacekeepers on the
island is a testament to this fact. The UN's failure to broker a settlement between Greek
and Turkish Cypriots has led to frustration and threats to walk away from the dispute.
However genuine these sentiments are, they reveal a tragic misunderstanding of the
Cyprus question. One cannot expect intercommunal negotiations alone to solve what is a
much wider problem. The Turkish Cypriots have repeatedly demonstrated that they
consider the status quo an acceptable state of affairs. Turkey's support for their cause,
both in terms of a security guarantee and economic aid, has allowed them this luxury.
Thus far, neither the UN, the United States, nor the European Union has adequately
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challenged the Turkish position. The United States, in particular, has demonstrated that
it is prepared to support Turkey despite its occupation of Cyprus. This is not surprising;
American policy is based on strategic interests, which in tum are shaped by the formation
of the emerging international system.68 Clearly, the framework advanced in Chapter One
of the thesis holds true in the post-Cold War era: the quest for security and power in the
global and regional systems influences political life within communal systetns. One tnay
add that the conduct of global and regional powers also affects the UN's role in
mediating disputes between rival groups in strategically sensitive parts of the world.
The end of the Cold War has illustrated that the analytical division between
communal conflict and international politics is still a false one. Great Powers continue to
base their policies on the maintenance of interests, as do regional powers. In Cyprus, this
has translated into a reinforcement of the status quo and by extension the sanctioning of
Turkey's 1974 invasion and partition of the island.
68 According to Van Coufoudakis, the implementation of United Nations Security Council resolutions
concerning Cyprus would have required political, diplomatic, and economic actions against Turkey, an
important US ally. In Coufoudakis words, "Washington appeared unwilling to pressure Turkey over
Cyprus because of Turkey's newly defined politico-strategic role. Moreover, Washington continued its
selective support of certain United Nations resolutions on Cyprus because they met Turkish and American
objectives in that dispute." Van Coufoudakis, "Greece, Turkey, Cyprus and the United States in the
Changing International order," in Harry 1. Psomiades and Stavros B. Thomadakis, eds., Greece, the New
Europe, and the Changing International Order, (New York: Pella Publishing, 1993): p. 403.
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Conclusion
Communal Conflicts and International Order:
The Case of Cyprus
Introduction
This chapter shall reiterate the thesis' principal arguments and summarize the
work's findings. Having met this objective, the study's analytical framework will be
related to some recent analyses of communal conflict which share similar hypotheses and
conclusions. In closing, the chapter will identify elements of the study that require
refinement and related questions worthy of further research. It shall also emphasize the
importance of exploring ethnic conflicts through an integrative framework which
recognizes the international and domestic dimensions of communal strife.
Summary and Findings
The thesis has argued that relations between Greek and Turkish Cypriots have
been adversely influenced by international factors. These have included British
colonialism, the rivalry between Greece and Turkey, and Great Power politics in the
southeastern Mediterranean. The study also argued that the end of the Cold War has not
improved the odds of solving the Cyprus problem. These arguments are founded on a
belief that the causes of ethnic conflict often extend beyond the community itself and
include the influence of other countries as well as pressures created by the international
system. While the thesis focused exclusively on the Cyprus problem, the author believes
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that the study's findings may be useful to scholars and policymakers interested in
questions posed by ethnic conflicts in other parts of the world.
The roots of ethnic rivalry in Cyprus were briefly explored in the thesis's
introduction. The study noted three main factor that contributed to the formation of a
plural society in Cyprus: i) British colonial practices; ii) the traditional rivalry between
Greece and Turkey; and, iii) the Cypriot Orthodox Church's advocacy of enosis as a
means to maintain its ascendant position in Greek Cypriot society. Throughout its
administration, Britain adhered to a policy of divide and rule, which tended to emphasize
differences between colonial subjects. The British government's insistence on
recognizing each community in terms of ethnicity rather than religious faith led to the
reform of the Cypriot educational and political systems. The communal school systems
became important sources of Greek and Turkish nationalist doctrines. This contributed
to each community's growing identification with its respective mother country. The
introduction of the Legislative Council exacerbated communal competition by pitting
Greek and Turkish Cypriots against each other. Reforms in education and representative
government ensured the ascent of Greek and Turkish nationalism among Christian and
Moslem Cypriots.
The emergence of Greek nationalism which culminated in the establishment of
the Kingdom of Greece in 1832 began a long period of strife between Greeks and Turks
which led to a legacy of mistrust and bitter memories. The notion of union with Greece
captured the imagination of some Greek Cypriots and was eventually seized upon by the
Cypriot Orthodox Church as a means of combating the secularizing influence of British
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colonial rule. Turkish Cypriots feared the possibility of union with Greece and therefore
advocated the maintenance of British rule or the absorption of Cyprus into Turkey.
The thesis's analytical framework was advanced in Chapter One. The framework
linked communal relations in Cyprus to international factors by arguing that the Cyprus
problem is made up of three anarchic political systems. The chapter argued that the
concepts of anarchy and bipolarity could be used to describe regional and communal
political systems as well as the global political system. As international relations
theorists have noted, cooperation in anarchic political systems is tenuOllS because the
absence of a sovereign authority makes individual actors responsible for their own
security. Anarchic communal systems are often violent because groups within the system
believe that they alone are responsible for their well-being; politics is reduced to the
struggle for security and relative advantage. In such systems, links based on ethnicity are
more pronounced because allegiances to the state are weak. The fear of domination by
other groups within the system acts as a motivating force for the acquisition of power as
an end. This often leads to instability and conflict, which perpetuates ethnic stereotypes. 1
The thesis's analytical framework rests on the following hypotheses: a) In
unranked/anarchic communal systems, each group will do all it can to compete
successfully with rival groups. Overtures to regional actors with interests in the dispute
will therefore be common; b) The quest for security and power in regional systems leads
1 In the words of Ted Robert Gurr, "The greater the competition and inequalities among groups in
heterogeneous societies, the greater the salience of ethnic identities and the greater the likelihood of open
conflict. When open conflict does occur it is likely to intensify, or reify, both perceptions of difference
among contending groups and perceptions of common interest within each group." Gurr, "People Against
States," p. 348.
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regional actors to intervene in ethnic conflicts in order to extend or maintain their
interests; c) If the dispute impacts on relations between states at the global level, outside
influence will extend beyond regional actors and include that of global powers; d)
Incidence of violence in unranked communal systems is likely to increase at times of
transition, when any of the three systems is subject to profound change. Violent ethnic
conflicts will often coincide with transitions in regional and global politics.
The interaction of communal, regional, and global systems led to a multiplicity of
competeing interests in Cyprus. Global powers, namely Great Britain, the United States,
and the Soviet Union sought the maintenance and extension of their geostrategic
interests, while regional powers--Greece and Turkey--pursued their own interests on the
island. The first chapter's analysis of the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus found
that the interests of global and regional powers played an important part in the decision
to grant Cyprus independent statehood. Granting Cyprus independence was intended to
diffuse tensions between Greece and Turkey, maintain British strategic interests in the
Eastern Mediterranean, and bolster NATO's southern flank. The fusion of Greek and
Turkish interests with Cypriot political concerns halted the development of an
indigenous, Cypriot consciousness. The political system set forth in the Zurich-London
agreements entrenched ethnic divisions by encouraging both communities to look to their
mother countries as advocates of their respective positions. The agreements hardened
existing divisions and granted them formal standing in the Republic's constitution.
Based on these observations, the chapter concluded that Cyprus' descent into civil
war in 1963 was not simply the result of bitter memories, as some have argued. The
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political system embodied by the Zurich-London Agreements aimed at satisfying foreign
interests at the expense of effective government in Cyprus. The ascendancy of
paramilitary organizations and the outburst ofviolence in December 1963 reaffirmed the
fact that communal relations in Cyprus were guided by insecurity and struggle. The
constitution designed to calm relations between Greece and Turkey and ensure the
maintenance ofBritish and NATO interests failed miserably. The convergence of global
and regional interests exacerbated existing divisions in Cypriot society which contributed
to the breakdown of order and the beginnings of physical separation.
Chapter Two dealt with international politics and the evolution of the Cyprus
problem between 1964-1990. The chapter noted that the roles of the United States and
Soviet Union were critical in terms of influencing the policies of Greece and Turkey in
Cyprus. During the period of acute Superpower confrontation between 1964-1967, the
United States pursued an aggressive policy aimed at avoiding a war between its NATO
allies, Greece and Turkey. Conversely, the Soviet Union sought to weaken the Western
alliance by driving a wedge between Greece, Turkey and the U.S.A. Ironically, while
Superpower intervention did not improve relations at the communal level, it did deter
Turkey from invading Cyprus in 1964 and again in 1967.
The Superpowers' consent to the creation of the United Nations peacekeeping
force in Cyprus also reflected their strategic interests. The United States agreed to the
force only after its own suggestion for mediation through NATO was rejected by
President Makarios. Conversely, the Soviets sanctioned a UN presence in order to
prevent the stationing ofNATO troops on the island. The study noted that UNFICYP's
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success was limited by the operations of Cypriot paramilitary groups, aided by Greece
and Turkey.
Throughout the 1964-1967 period, the two communities continued to engage in
violent clashes. As a result, the Turkish Cypriots withdrew into several enclaves which
were supported militarily and economically by Turkey. The Greek Cypriots were
supported by Athens, which stationed over 10,000 Greek troops on the island in defiance
of the Zurich-London Agreements. Greek penetration in Cypriot affairs increased
following the establishment of the Colonels regime in April 1967. The Greek junta, with
Washington's implicit support, undermined Archbishop Makarios in order to force a
settlement of the Cyprus problem which would protect NATO interests and improve its
standing with Washington. The colonels' covert policies eroded Makarios' authority and
encouraged the proliferation of extremist paramilitary organizations such as EOKA-B.
Events reached crisis proportions in 1967, after Athens ordered a violent assault against
Turkish Cypriot positions without President Makarios' authorization. War between
Greece and Turkey was only narrowly averted.
The chapter found that Superpower policies between 1967-1974 had a further
impact on the development of the Cyprus problem. The Nixon administration's support
of the Greek military regime encouraged its reckless behavior in Cyprus. Makarios was
regarded by Athens and Washington as an irritant and was treated accordingly.
Meanwhile, Turkey's growing sense of alienation from the Western alliance led Ankara
to accept Soviet offers for improved relations. Friendlier relations with the Soviets
allowed Turkey greater leeway in Cyprus. Consequently, Ankara could afford to take a
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more assertive stance in its support of the Turkish Cypriots. Thus, as was noted, the
junta's ill-conceived coup which toppled Archbishop Makarios in July 1974 was met by a
swift and violent response from Turkey.
Turkey's invasion and partition of Cyprus was not condemned by either
Superpower. The United States and the Soviet Union recognized and accepted the
Turkish position following the collapse of the Greek military regime in August 1974.
Turkey capitalized on favorable conditions in the international system and transformed
Cyprus in the process. Over 160,000 Greek Cypriots were forced to flee territory overrun
by Turkish troops. Thousands died and many others went missing, never to be seen
again. The international outcry which came in the wake of the Turkish invasion was
marked by the conspicuous absence of the Superpower's voices. The satisfaction of
geostrategic interests proved to be much more important than the moral implications
surrounding Turkey's conduct in Cyprus.
Chapter Two also analyzed the role of the UN in post-invasion Cyprus. Based on
a brief examination of several failed rounds of UN sponsored intercommunal talks, the
study found that negotiations foundered on three key points. First, the Greek and Turkish
Cypriots had very different perceptions of the new realities which defined post-invasion
Cyprus. The Turkish Cypriots felt that the separation of the two communities, stationing
of over 35,000 Turkish troops, and division of Cyprus' territory was in many respects a
satisfactory solution. Conversely, the Greek Cypriots condemned the Turkish invasion
noting that it allowed a minority of 18 percent of the population to control over 36
percent of the island's territory and over 70 percent of its economic potential. Moreover,
97
they resent that this was accomplished through means which directly challenged accepted
norms of international conduct. The Greek Cypriots rejected the legitimacy of successive
Turkish Cypriot administrations and enacted an economic embargo aimed at isolating the
Turkish Cypriots. They continue to reject the legitimacy of the Turkish Cypriot state and
have won international support for their position.
Secondly, negotiations were harmed by the deteriorating state of Greco-Turkish
relations. Greece regarded the 1974 invasion as proof of Turkey's threat to other Greek
islands in the Aegean. Thus, Athens fortified several islands close to the Turkish coast.
The introduction of other bilateral disputes following the invasion precluded Greek-
Turkish cooperation in solving the Cyprus problem. Ankara's insistence on maintaining
a formidable military presence on Cyprus allowed the Turkish Cypriots to negotiate from
a position of strength far exceeding their numbers. Turkey's military presence reinforced
the bipolar structure of the island's communal system, making it very difficult for either
side to make concessions at the bargaining table.
Finally, the chapter noted that the Superpowers did little to further the UN's
peacemaking efforts in Cyprus. Neither the United States nor the Soviet Union regarded
the division of the island into ethnically homogeneous zones as important in terms of
their wider interests. The Superpowers came to rely on UNFICYP to keep the two sides
apart and the Secretary General to keep them talking. Peacemaking was clearly
undermined by the Superpowers' decision not to uphold the implementation of several
UN Security Council resolutions calling for the withdrawal of Turkish troops and return
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of Greek Cypriot refugees to their homes. The United States continued to support Turkey
as an important NATO ally, while the Soviet Union simply ignored the problem.
Chapter Two's analysis of the Cyprus problem between 1964-1990 confirmed the
validity of the thesis's analytical framework. Throughout the period, the policies of
regional and global powers had a trelnendous impact on the evolution of Cypriot
communal relations. Regional, global, and communal actors struggled for security and
power in their respective systems The Greek Colonels' attempt to impose their will on
the island was met with further violence and the transformation of the communal system
through Turkey's violent separation of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities.
Chapter Three examined how the demise of the global system's bipolar structure
has affected the development of the Cyprus problem in the post-Cold War era. The
chapter began with a brief review of some recent material pertaining to the structure and
character of the emerging international system. The chapter noted that there are two
rather divergent views concerning international politics in the post-Cold War era. One
school of thought proclaims the emergence ofa community of developed core states
existing within a rapidly developing security community. In opposition to this view,
Realist scholars argue that the end of bipolarity has not altered the anarchic character of
international politics. Because of recent events in Bosnia and elsewhere, the notion of an
emerging security community led by a powerful United Nations has lost much of its aura.
The dissolution of the Cold War order has seemingly made the global system even more
unpredictable and violent. Great Powers such as the United States, Germany and Russia
continue to base their foreign policies on the maintenance of national interests, just as
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Great Powers always have. One may therefore conclude that the end of global bipolarity
has not altered the basis of the thesis's analytical framework or the core contentions of
Realist theory. The quest for security and power in anarchic systems at all three levels of
analysis persists in the post-Cold War era. The proliferation of potentially explosive
communal conflicts in the Balkans, Central Asia, and Eastern Europe is a testament to
this fact.
Chapter Three also examined Greek-Turkish relations in the post-Cold War
period and found that the dismantling of the Balkan security system had enlarged the
scope of Greece and Turkey's rivalry. Turkey began to assert itself as an important
regional power following the fall of communist regimes in Albania and the former
Yugoslavia. Turkey's growing presence in the Balkans was not welcomed by Greece.
The study noted that the expansion of the Greco-Turkish rivalry beyond the southeastern
Mediterranean was detrimental in terms of pre-existing bilateral disputes. Neither
Greece nor Turkey has softened its position over disputes regarding the delimitation of
territorial waters or the fate of Cyprus. On the contrary, the heated rhetoric emerging
from Athens and Ankara has illustrated the gulf which separates the two countries. One
may note with certainty that the deterioration of Greco-Turkish relations will continue to
play an important role in the future of the Cyprus problem. As Tozun Bahcheli has
correctly observed, "Greek-Turkish disputes in other spheres make a Cyprus
rapprochement on the part of the two metropolitan states all the more problematic.
Whereas in theory a Cypriot agreement can be reached by Greek and Turkish-Cypriots, in
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practice it is difficult to envisage such an outcome without the supportive involvement of
Athens and Ankara.,,2
Chapter Three reviewed recent UN initiatives in Cyprus and found that the
impediments to a negotiated settlement had survived the end of the Cold War. At the
communal level, the Turkish Cypriots rejected the Secretary General's Set of Ideas and
confidence building measures because they called for the withdrawal of Turkish troops
and implementation of the three freedoms. Conversely, the Greek Cypriots continued to
demand a settlement which would guarantee their right to travel, own property, and
reside in the north. The two sides also differed in their position regarding the scope of
territorial adjustments, the powers of the central government, and the fate of the 35,000
Turkish troops in northern Cyprus.
The future of the UN in Cyprus is not entirely clear. Several nations have
withdrawn their troops from UNFICYP, leaving only 1,513 peacekeepers in Cyprus as of
March 1993. The Secretary General himself has openly stated that the UN cannot afford
to remain on the island indefinitely.3 However, the UN has repeatedly demonstrated that
it is not prepared to implement Security Council resolutions aimed at removing Turkish
troops from the island. In truth, the Secretary General has no choice but to continue with
the arduous process of intercommunal negotiations. To quit Cyprus after having invested
so much time, money, and prestige would be a difficult pill for the UN to swallow. The
repercussions in terms of the organization's reputation would be extremely damaging.
2 Bahcheli, "The Cyprus Issue in the Post-Cold War Environment," p. 9.
3 Macdonald, "Cyprus a Peacekeeping Paradigm," p. 182.
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Practically speaking, the UN cannot afford to abandon Cyprus, as much as it may want
to.
For its part, Turkey has demonstrated that it is not prepared to recall its troops,
especially in light of deteriorating relations with Greece. Moreover, Turkey's role in
securing American strategic interests in the Middle East, Central Asia, the Caucasus, and
the Balkans has tempered Washington's desire to pressure the Ankara over Cyprus.4
Consequently, Turkey is under no pressure to leave. Greece's recent decision to extend
its security umbrella to include the Republic of Cyprus represents an important shift in
the Greek side's strategy. It appears to be based on the realization that the UN alone
cannot force Ankara's hand.5 The Greek Cypriots and Greece may be pressuring the
United States into recognizing the latent volatility of the present situation. The
deployment of Greek troops to Cyprus would certainly raise the stakes considerably.
According to Misha Glenny, there is evidence that the Greek strategy may be working:
Fresh mediation by representative Richard Beattie on the divisive Cyprus
issue is just getting under way. President Clinton...has given special
attention to the war-threatening controversy between Greece and Turkey
over Greek territorial claims in the Aegean Sea. He has sent letters to the
4 Writing on Turkey'S place in American global strategy, Glenny notes that, "The central focus ofD.S.
policy is Turkey, which Washington recognizes as the major regional power with considerable potential
for expansion. America's policy is explained by its strategic and economic interests in the Mediterranean
and Middle East--from now on, the Turks are the key nation in the region."(emphasis added) Misha
Glenny, The Fall of Yugoslavia: The Third Balkan War, (New York: Penguin, 1993): p. 241.
5 The Greek strategy was neatly summarized in a report published in the Greek-Canadian journal Patrides;
"In light of Turkey's threats of annexation and further aggression, Cyprus continues its cooperation on
defense matters with Greece, a development strengthened by the recent visit of Greek Defense Minister
Yerasimos Arsenis to Nicosia. By limiting Ankara's ability to intimidate its neighbors, the defense
doctrine may also force the Turkish side to realize that negotiations offer the only way to reach a lasting
settlement." "Agreement on Key Issues Needed: Turkey Must be Pressed to Show Flexibility," Patrides,
April 1995, p. 29.
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prime ministers of both countries and dispatched a U.S. battle cruiser to the
scene.
6
One may conclude that international power politics continues to influence the
development of the Cyprus problem. It is important to note that change in the structure
of the global system did not alter the fundamental interests of Greece, Turkey, or the
United States. Unless the situation deteriorates rapidly, as it would if Greece increased
its military presence on the island, communal relations in Cyprus will likely continue to
develop along the lines established in July/August 1974. Relations between Greek and
Turkish Cypriots will remain strained and each side will continue to regard communal
relations in terms of a zero-sum game.
The Lessons of Cyprus: The Role of International Politics in Ethnic Conflicts
The analytical framework advanced in Chapter One noted that the quest for
security and power among global and regional actors influences life within unranked
communal systems. This proposition was confirmed through an analysis of the Cyprus
problem between 1960-1995. In the post-Cold War era, the dissolution of multiethnic
states has resulted in a proliferation of ethnic conflicts. In the words of Ted Gurr and
Barbara Harff:
The world of the 1990s mirrors in some respects the period following
World War I, in which the collapse of the old order was followed by the
birth of many new states, upsurges of ethnic violence and oppression, and
the ascendancy of dictators and ideologies of exclusive nationalism. The
6 Misha Glenny, "Heading OffWar in the Southern Balkans," Foreign Affairs 3 (May/June 1995): p. 107.
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pattern of conflicts in Bosnia, Serbia, the Caucasus, and Central Asia fits
this scenario and signifies the beginning of challenging times. 7
Contemporary ethnic conflicts share features similar to those of the Cyprus problem; that
is, the groups in question usually reside in unranked communal systems located in
strategically sensitive locations. Several scholars have analyzed these conflicts in order
to understand their causes and implications. The following will be a brief review of
some of these studies with reference to the arguments advanced in the thesis. We will
note that the effects of anarchy in unranked communal systems and the influence of
external actors in communal disputes are being recognized by scholars as important
elements in the emergence of contemporary ethnic conflicts.
The thesis has consistently argued that unranked/anarchic communal systems are
more likely to experience conflict between ethnic groups. This argument downplays the
significance of purely ethnic differences. As was noted in the study's introduction, Greek
and Turkish Cypriots lived together peaceably for over four centuries, despite differences
in their religion, language, and ethnicity. The two groups began to see each other as
rivals only when the island's political fate was in question. The breakdown of rules
governing communal relations contributed to the emergence of rival nationalism's. The
role of external actors deepened these divisions by introducing regional and global
rivalries into the communal system.
7 Ted Robert Gurr and Barbara Harft: Ethnic Conflict in World Politics, (Boulder, Colorado: Westview
Press, 1994): p. 14.
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The importance of anarchy in relations between ethnic groups has been
recognized in several recent studies of nationalism and ethnic conflict. In his book Blood
and Belonging, Michael Ignatieff claims that nationalism is best understood as a reaction
to uncertainty and fear:
When nationalists claim that national belonging is the overwhelmingly
important form of all belonging, they mean that there is no other form of
belonging...that is secure if you do not have a 'nation to protect you. That is
what warrants sacrifice on the nation's behalf. Without a nation's
protection, every thing that an individual values can be rendered worthless.
Belonging, on this account, is the first and foremost protection from
violence. Where you belong is where you are safe; where you are safe is
where you belong. If nationalism is persuasive because it warrants
violence, it is also persuasive because it offers protection from violence.
The warlord is his people's protector: if he kills, he does so in defense of
the noblest cause: the protection of the innocent.8
Ignatieffs position is shared by Renee de Nevers, who notes that the key to avoiding
confrontation in plural societies is creating an environment in which political moderation
prevails. 9 This requires a framework of laws and effective political institutions which
allow citizens to feel secure.
Nurturing moderation in unranked communal systems' is often made more
difficult when the dispute involves external actors. In chapters one and two we noted
that the role of regional and global actors tends to exacerbate communal tensions by
impeding the development of stable political institutions. This is especially true where
the government of a plural society does not command the respect of its citizens and is
8 Ignatiefl: p. 10.
9 Renee de Nevers, "Democratization and Ethnic Conflict," Survival 2 (Summer 1993): p. 32.
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challenged by paramilitary organizations supported by foreign countries. This was
certainly the case in Cyprus between 1963-1974 and more recently in Croatia, Bosnia
Herzegovina, and the Former Yugoslav Republic ofMacedonia (FYROM). In all three of
these newly independent states, the government's authority has been tested by ethnic
challengers. In all three cases, ethnic challengers have enjoyed the support of external
allies: in Croatia the Krajina Serbs were aided by Serbia, as were the Bosnian Serbs in
Bosnia; in the FYROM ethnic Albanians have looked to Tirana for support while some
members the Slav Macedonian majority identify with Bulgaria. 10 In cases where the
interests of ethnic challengers coincide with those of regional powers, stability within the
communal system is tenuous. Communal relations often become mired in neighboring
states' rivalries, which, in tum, exacerbates relations at the communal level.
Once order breaks down completely, the opportunity for further external
involvement increases. As we noted, direct intervention by regional actors has the
potential to alter the context of communal relations. A similar argument has been
advanced by Stephen Ryan. According to Ryan, foreign intervention, "increases the scale
of the conflict. .. introduces into the conflict new issues and expands the number of
parties. It directs attention away from the core issue of how to create good
intercommunal relations."ll This was certainly the case in Cyprus following the
Sampson coup in July 1974. The Greek government's installation of the Sampson
10 See Stephen R. Bowers, "Ethnic Politics in Eastern Europe," in Peter Janke, ed., Ethnic and Religious
Conflicts: Europe and Asia, (Aldershot, England: Dartmouth, 1994): pp. 43-44. Also see Nicholas X.
Rizopoulos, "A Third Balkan War?" World Policy Journal 2 (Summer 1993): p. 3; and Misha Glenny,
"Heading OffWar in the Southern Balkans," p. 106.
11 Ryan, p. 38.
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regime allowed Turkey to argue with some justification that it was invading Cyprus to
protect its embattled kin. Once on Cypriot soil, however, the Turkish Army went far
beyond its stated mandate. Turkey's invasion and partition of Cyprus divided the island
into ethnically homogeneous zones, allowing for either the implementation of a
confederal political system or the absorption of northern Cyprus into Turkey; options that
had hitherto been unavailable because of the intermingling of the islands ethnic groups.
As a means of comparison, it is worthwhile to note that Serbia's support of ethnic
Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina allowed these groups to challenge the
legitimacy of the newly anointed governments in Sarajevo and Zagreb. Serbs in Bosnia
and the Krajina were motivated by an intense fear of domination by the majority
communities in their respective republics. 12 The Yugoslav National Army's assistance
allowed Serb insurgents to wrest control of significant portions of Bosnian and Croatian
territory, fundamentally altering communal relations in the process. While Serbian
intervention was defended on the grounds of protecting besieged kin, scholars have
argued persuasively that the Milosevic regime was also intent on expanding Serbian
territory and power. 13 In essence, the convergence of communal insecurity and a regional
12 The Serb minorities' fears were usually well founded. According to Misha Glenny, conflicts between
ethnic Serbs and Croats were provoked by Croatian authorities, "President Tudjman and the government
of his Croatian Democratic Union were determined to create a new state identified exclusively with the
,Croat nation, and the new regime in Croatia took steps to discriminate against the Serbs, who make up
between 12 to 20 percent ofCroatia's population...Serbs were stripped of their status as an constituent
(drzavotvoran) nation within Croatia...Tudjman also refused to offer the Serb population of at least
600,000 cultural autonomy...He ordered Serb police to be replaced by Croats, and Serbs in key positions
in the local administration were dismissed." Misha Glenny, "The Massacre of Yugoslavia," The New
York Review ofBooks 3 (January 30, 1992): p. 31. Also see Carl G. Jacobsen, "Yugoslavia's Wars of
Secession and Succession: Media Manipulation, Historical Amnesia, and Subjective Morality,"
Mediterranean Quarterly 3 (Summer 1994): pp. 24-41.
13 See Norman Cigar, "The Serbo-Croatian War, 1991: Political and Military Dimensions," The Journal of
Strategic Studies 3 (September 1993): pp. 297-3383
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power's territorial ambitions led to open conflict and a reordering of relations among
ethnic groups.
The partition of Cyprus allowed the Turkish Cypriots to assume a position of
strength in negotiations with their Greek Cypriot counterparts. The stationing of Turkish
troops in Cyprus deepened the bipolar nature of communal relations and allowed the
Turkish Cypriots to maintain an intransigent position during UN sponsored talks. The
study noted that the United States' reliance on Turkey as an important ally allowed
Ankara to ignore UN resolutions calling for the withdrawal of Turkish troops from the
island. 14 Based on the Cypriot experience, the thesis asserts that the success of third
party peacemaking efforts hinges on the cooperation of regional and global powers.
Cooperation, in tum, is usually determined by whether or not it furthers regional and
global powers' interests. 15 Clearly, Ankara does not consider the demilitarization of
Cyprus to be in its best interests; Washington too has placed good relations with Turkey
ahead of cooperation with the United Nations. This, in tum, has undermined the UN's
credibility and effectiveness in Cyprus.
The inconsistent positions adopted by global and regional powers in Cyprus and
countless other locales confirms that, by and large, states continue to base their foreign
14 In the words of Jenonne Walker, "Turkish-Cypriot leader RaufDenktash has been able to reject the UN's
ideas for a settlement because substantial Turkish military force protects Turkey's gains on the island, and
the West is loath to press Ankara on the point, in part lest Turkey stop providing bases from which the
Iraqui Kurds are supplied." Jenonne Walker, International Mediation ofEthnic Conflicts," Survival 1
(Spring 1993): p. 116.
15 This point is echoed by Saadia Touval, who notes that, "States make the primary decisions about
mediation. They decide whether to exert efforts to help settle a conflict and, if so, whether to act alone or
through the United Nations. A state external to a dispute typically initiates mediation for self-interested
reasons." Saadia Touval, "Why the U.N. Fails," Foreign Affairs 5 (September/October 1994): p. 46.
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policies on the maintenance and extension of national interests. As Adam Roberts
correctly asserts, differences in interests among states are complemented by differences
in perceptions about the fundamental nature of world politics. Thus, "One should not
necessarily expect relations among major powers to be good, and there may be perfectly
valid reasons why countries perceive major security problems differently.,,16 Competing
interests at the global and regional levels will continue to influence relations between
rival groups in unranked communal systems. It is important that scholars and
policymakers accept this fact in order both to understand and deal with ethnic conflicts in
an effective, realistic fashion. All too often one is confronted with legitimate analyses
that conclude with faulty prescriptions. For example, according to Sambanis:
Greece and Turkey, the two 'guarantor' powers of Cypriot independence,
have both helped create and perpetuate the conflict. Since the partition
their mediation efforts have been mostly self-serving and unproductive,
which suggests that both countries should be removed from the settlement
process.... Other larger powers have had primarily geostrategic, balance-of-
power reasons for their involvement in Cyprus and have opted for
expedient, unstable solutions. Defining an appropriate role for third-party
intervention should be a primary objective for future negotiations. 17
Sambanis is open to challenge on two points. First, who is responsible for removing
Greece and Turkey from the settlement process? Second, who shall define an appropriate
role for third-party intervention? Clearly, no one is capable of doing what Sambanis has
in mind because states themselves decide on the role they play in perpetuating or settling
communal conflicts. They base their policies on the maintenance and extension of their
16 Adam Roberts, "The United Nations and International Security," Survival 2 (Summer 1993): p. 12.
17 Sarnbanis, "Ancient Affections," p. 127.
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national interests. Therefore, the challenge posed by Cyprus and similar conflicts lies in
framing solutions that are appealing to communal, regional, and global actors. A far
more difficult challenge to be sure.
Presently, there is no universally recognized authority charged with determining
how states ought to behave. When there is consensus regarding the use of force or
enforcement of intemationallaw, as during the 1990-91 Gulf War, interests are the
determining factor, not allegiance to elaborate codes of conduct. In the absence of a true
international community, management of ethnic conflicts by external actors will be
difficult. As John Chipman has noted, "Durable solutions require the type of
comprehensive approach that can rarely be undertaken by outsiders, who have short
attention spans and limited powers of (and political will for) enforcement.,,18 In the final
analysis, the future of Cyprus and similar communal conflicts is bleak. While there is
every reason to desire the emergence of accepted rules of international conduct, there are
fewer reasons to believe that they will arrive soon.
Conclusion
While scholars are beginning to recognize links between communal conflict and
international politics, much of the recent literature deals exclusively with the impact of
ethnic conflict on international security. Such studies usually advance schemes aimed at
managing ethnic disputes to prevent them from escalating into regional or ultimately
global problems. Although this is a laudable objective, it tends to reinforce the
18 See John Chipman, "Managing the Politics ofParochialism," in Brown, ed., Ethnic Conflict and
International Security, pp. 237-264.
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intellectual division between high and low politics. This thesis has approached the
problem from the opposite direction; that is, it examined the affect of international
politics on relations between Greek and Turkish Cypriots to gain some understanding of
how external forces affect communal relations in plural societies. According to the
position taken by the study, there is a direct link between international politics and
relations between ethnic groups in unranked communal systems. Indeed, in Cyprus an
ethnic balance which by most external standards was ranked, became unranked as a
result of external forces. Therefore, the distinction between international and domestic
politics is blurred and proper analysis requires a study of both dimensions of the dispute.
Clearly, the insights advanced by this study require further refinement and
additional research. In particular, the role of external actors in ethnic conflicts must be
reconsidered given the dramatic changes which accompanied the end of the Cold War.
We need to understand why regional actors continue to intervene in communal disputes
and how their objectives resemble or differ from those of the past. Moreover, the
relationship between communal conflict and regime transformation needs to be assessed
with greater vigor. According to the thesis's findings, democratization in unranked
communal systems may be hindered by regional rivals. It would be worthwhile to test
this hypothesis through further case studies of plural states in strategically sensitive parts
of the world. The Former Yugoslav Republic ofMacedonia(FYROM) is a particularly
worthy case study because it resembles Cyprus in several ways. The FYROM is a new,
ethnically bipolar state in a particularly volatile region. Ethnic Albanians who make up
20-35 percent of the republic's total population have indicated that they would prefer
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closer ties to Albania. The disintegration of basic cultural, educational, and medical
facilities in Albanian-dominated areas of western FYROM has strengthened the hand of
radical elements who openly challenge the legitimacy of the government in Skopje. 19
This in tum has raised the ire of ultranationalist Slav Macedonians who have responded
by denying the Albanians the right to an Albanian-language university in Tetovo, the
centre of Albanian politics in the FYROM.2o The fact that a significant percentage of
Slav-Macedonians support eventual absorption into Bulgaria adds yet another dimension
to this potential conflict. 21 The United States and European Union fear that violence
. between ethnic Albanians and the Slav majority could lead to intervention by Albania,
thus setting off a wider Balkan war, possibly involving Greece, Turkey, Bulgaria, and
Serbia. As a result, the United States has contributed over 500 Marines as part of a UN
force charged with preserving peace in the republic. How these factors have affected the
FYROM's democratization efforts is not clear. Hence, further research structured along
the lines set forth in this study would be of definite interest to scholars and policymakers
alike.
In closing, it is worth emphasizing that the study of ethnic conflict requires an
interdisciplinary approach. Students of comparative politics, international relations, and
political philosophy need to combine their insights to appreciate the diverse causes
underlying communal strife. In short, the era of theoretical solitudes should be put to rest
along with the distinction between high and low politics. The importance of
19 James Pettifer, "Macedonia: Still the Apple ofDiscord," The World Today (May 1995): p. 57.
20 Glenny, "Heading OffWar in the Southern Balkans," p. 108.
21 Rizopoulos, "A Third Balkan War?" p. 3.
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understanding the multidimensional character of communal conflict is doubly important
in today's world. Building effective political systems in the post-Cold War era has
proven to be exceptionally challenging, as the convergence of communal, regional, and
global politics is a common feature of the emerging international system. The challenges
faced by newly emerging states share many of the features of the Cyprus problem and
therefore need to be addressed in a comprehensive manner. If nothing else, this study
hopes to have provided a modest example of the benefits inherent in analyzing communal
conflicts through an integrative methodology.
113
Bibliography
Abramovitz, Morton I. "Dateline Ankara: Turkey After Ozal." Foreign Policy
Vol. 91 (Summer 1993), pp. 164-181.
Adams, Thomas W. AKEL: The Communist Party of Cyprus.
Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, Stanford University, 1971.
Alford, Jonathan., ed. Greece and Turkey: Adversity in Alliance.
London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1983.
Anthem, T. "Greek Colonels and the U.S.A." Contemporary Review
216 (April 1970), pp. 178-83.
Attalides, Michael A. Cyprus: Nationalism and InternationalPolitics.
Edinburgh: QPress, 1979.
Bahcheli, Tozun. Greek-Turkish Relations Since 1950.
Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1990.
__. "The Cyprus Issue in the Post-Cold War Environment." Paper presented at
Cyprus and Its People: New Interdisciplinary Perspectives, a conference at
Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusettes, December 2, 1994.
Benjamin, Daniel. "The Dangers of Uprooting. " Time August 26,1991, p. 7.
Birand, Mehmet Ali. "A Turkish View of Greek Turkish Relations. "
Journal ofPolitical and MilitarySociology._16 (Fall 1988), pp. 175-83.
Bolukbasi, Suha. The Superpowers and the Third World: Turkish-American
Relations and Cyprus. Lanham: University Press of America, 1988.
Brands, H.W. "America Enters the Cyprus Tangle, 1964."
Middle Eastern Studies 3 (July 1987), pp. 348-362.
Brecher, Michael. "International Relations and Asian Studies: The Subordinate
State System of Southeastern Asia." World Politics
XV (January 1963): pp. 221-235.
Brown, Michael E., ed. Ethnic Conflict and International Security.
Priceton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1994.
Bull, Hedley. The Anarchical Society. London: Macmillan,1977.
114
., ed. Intervention In World Politics. London: Clarendon, 1984.
Camp, Glen D. "Greek-Turkish Conflict Over Cyprus."
Political Science Quarterly 1 (Spring 1980), pp. 43-70.
Christodoulides, Theodore. "The European Security Order: A Greek
View." NATO Review (December 1992), pp. 19-23.
Cigar, Norman. "The Serbo Croatian War, 1991: Political and Military
Dimensions." The Journal of Strategic Studies 3 (September 1993):
pp. 297-338.
Ciller, Tansu. "Modem Turkey Is Part ofEurope, and Increasingly So."
International Herald Tribune, April 17, 1995.
Conference on Cyprus: Documents Signed and Initialed at Lancaster
House on February 19;> 1959. London: Her Majesty's Stationery
Office, 1959.
Clogg, Richard. A Concise History of Greece. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1992.
Constas, Dimitri., ed. The Greek Turkish Conflict in the 1990s:
Domestic and External Influences. London: Maclnillan, 1991.
Coufoudakis, Van. "Cyprus: Acheson's Failure, Kissinger's Success."
Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora 1 (Winter 1974), pp. 35-42.
__., ed. Essays On the Cyprus Conflict. New York: Pella
Publishing Company, 1976.
Couloumbis, T. The United States;> Greece and Turkey:
The Troubled Triangle. New York: Praeger Publishing,1983.
and John o. Iatrides., eds. Greek-American Relations:
A Critical Review. New York: Pella Publishing, 1980.
__ John A. Petropoulos and Harry J. Psomiades. Foreign
Interference in Greek Politics: A Historical Perspective. New York:
Pella Publishing, 1976.
Crawshaw, Nancy. "Cyprus: A Crisis of Confidence."
The World Today (April 1994), pp. 70-73.
115
__. "Cyprus: A Failure in Western Diplomacy."
The World Today (January 1984), pp. 73-79.
__. The Cyprus Revolt: An Account of the Struggle for Union
with Greece. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1978.
Craig, Ph.R. "The U.S. and the Greek Dictatorship: A Sumlnary
of Support." Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora
3 (Winter 1976), pp. 5-15.
Cyprus: A Country Study. Wahington, D.C.: Federal Research
Division of the Library of Congress, 1991.
Danopoulos, Constantine. "The Greek Military Regime (1967-1974)
and the Cyprus Question--Origins and Goals." Journal ofMilitary
Sociology 2 (Fall 1982), pp. 257-273.
De Nevers, Renee. "Democratization and Ethnic Conflict." Survival
2 (Summer 1993): pp. 31-48.
De Silva, K.M. and S.W.R. de A. Samarasinghe., eds. Peace
Accords and Ethnic Conflict. New York: Pinter Publishers, 1993.
Dodd, C.H., ed. The Political;> Social;> and Economic Development of
Northern Cyprus. Huntingdon, London: The Eothen Press, 1993.
__. Turkish Foreign Policy: New Prospects. Huntingdon, England:
The Eothen Press, 1992.
Durch, William J., ed. The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping.
New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993.
Erlich, Thomas. Cyprus 1958-1967: International Crisis and the Role
of Law. New York and London: Oxford University Press, 1974.
Evrivades, Mario L. "Greek Policy on Cyprus: An Interpretation."
Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora 3&4 (Fall/Winter 1987), pp. 25-49.
Fuller, Graham E. and Ian O. Lesser., eds. Turkey's New Geopolitics.
Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1993.
Gaddis, John Lewis. "The Long Peace: Elements of Stability in the
Postwar International System." International Security
4 (Spring 1986), pp. 99-142.
116
Glenny, Misha. "Heading Off War in the Balkans." Foreign Affairs
3 (May/June 1995): pp. 98-108.
__. The Fall of Yugoslavia: The Third Balkan War.
New York: Penguin, 1993.
__. "The Massacre of Yugoslavia." The New York Review ofBooks
3 (January 30, 1992): pp. 30-35.
Goldgeir, James M., and Michael McFaul. "A Tale of Two Worlds:
Core and Periphery in the Post-Cold War Era."
International Organization 2 (Spring 1994), pp. 467-491.
"Greece Refuses to Play Turkish Game of Artificial Tensions in Relations."
The Free Press (Toronto) October 27,1994.
GUIT, Ted Robert. "People Against States: Ethnopolitical Conflict and the
Changing World System." International Studies Quarterly
4 (Fall/Winter 1994), 347-377.
and Barbara Harff. Ethnic Conflict in World Politics.
Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1994.
Haas, Michael. "International Subsystems: Stability and Polarity."
American Political Science Review 2 (March 1970): pp. 98-115.
Hadjipavlou-Trigeorgis, Maria and Lenos Trigeorgis. "Cyprus: An
Evolutionary Approach to Conflict Resolution." Journal of
Conflict Resolution 2 (June 1993), pp. 340-360.
Hale, William. "Turkey, the Middle East and the Gulf Crisis."
International Affars 4 (1992), pp. 679-692.
Hart, Parker T. Two NATO Allies at the Threshold of War,
Cyprus: A Firsthand Account of Crisis Management;> 1965-1968.
Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1990.
Hatzivassiliou, Evanthis. "Security and the European Option: Greek Foreign
Policy, 1952-62." Journal of Contemporary History
Vol. 30 (1995), pp. 187-202.
Hill, Sir George. A History of Cyprus Vol. IV. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1952.
117
Hitchens, Christopher. Hostage to History: Cyprus From the
Ottomans to Kissinger. New York: The Noonday Press, 1989.
Horowitz, Donald L. Ethnic Groups in Conflict. Berkely: University
of California Press, 1985.
Huntington, Samuel P. "The Clash of Civilizations?" Foreign Affairs
3 (Summer 1993),pp. 22-49.
Iatrides, John O. "Greece in the Cold War, and Beyond."
Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora 2 (1993), pp. 11-30.
Ignatieff, Michael. Blood and Belonging: Journeys into the New
Nationalism. Toronto: Penguin Books, 1993.
Jacobsen, Carl G. "Yugoslavia's Wars of Seccession and Succession:
Media Manipulation, Historical Amnesia, and Subjective Morality."
Mediterranean Quarterly 3 (Summer 1994): pp. 24-41.
Jalali, Rita and Seymour Martin Lipset. "Racial and Ethnic Conflicts:
A Global Perspective." Political Science Quarterly
4 (November 1992/93), pp. 585-606.
Jervis, Robert. "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma."
World Politics 2 (January 1978): pp. 167-213.
Joseph, J.S. Cyprus: Ethnic Conflict and International Concern.
New York: Peter Lang, 1985.
Kaplan, Morton A. "Balance ofPower, Bipolarity, and Other
Models of International Systems." American Political Science Review
51 (September 1957): pp. 684-695.
Kaplan, Robert A., Robert W. Clawson and Raimondo Luraghi., eds.
NATO and the Mediterranean. London: Macmillan Press, 1985.
Kariotis, Theodore C., ed. The Greek Socialist Experiment.
New York: Pella Publishing Company, 1992.
Kelling, George Horton. Countdown to Rebellion: British Policy in
Cyprus~ 1939-1955. Westport: Greenwood Press, 1990.
Keohane, Robert 0., ed. Neorealism and Its Critics.
New York: Columbia University Press, 1986.
118
King, Russell and Sarah Ladbury. "The Cultural Reconstruction of
Political Reality: Greek and Turkish Cyprus Since 1974."
Anthropological Quarterly 1 (1982), pp. ?
Koslowski, Rey and Friedrich V. Kratochwil. "Understanding
Change in International Politics: The Soviet Empire's Demise and
the International System." International Organization
2 (Spring 1994), pp. 215-47.
Koumoulides, John T.A., ed. Cyprus in Transition. London: Trigraph, 1986.
Kourvetaris, Yorgos A. "The Southern Flank ofNato: Political Dimensions
of the Greco-Turkish Conflict Since 1974." East European Quarterly
4 (January 1988), pp. 431-446.
Kyle, Keith. Cyprus. London: Minority Rights Group, 1984.
Kyriakides, Stanley. Cyprus: Constitutionalism and Crisis
Government. Philedelphia: University of Pennsylvania
Press, 1968.
Laber, Jeri. "The Hidden War in Turkey." The New York Review ofBooks
12 (June 23, 1994), pp. 47-50.
Lafreniere, Francois and Robert Mitchell. Cyprus--Visions for the Future:
A Summary of Conference and Workshop Proceedings November
1988 to June 1989. Ottawa: Canadian Institute for International Peace
and Security, 1990.
Larrabee, F. Stephen., ed. The Volatile Powder Keg: Balkan Security
After the Cold War. Washington, D.C.: The American University
Press, 1994.
Lebow, Richard Ned. "The Long Peace, the End of the Cold War, and the
Failure of Realsim." International Organization 2 (Spring 1994), pp. 249-177.
Mango, Andrew. Turkey: The Challenge of a New Role. Washington, D.C.:
The Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1994.
Markides, Kyriacos C. The Rise and Fall of the Cyprus Republic.
New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977.
Martin, Patrick. "Gradually, Cautiously, Hope Comes to Cyprus."
The Globe and Mail, February 5, 1994.
119
__. "The Empire Strikes Back: Islam's Threat to Turkey."
The Globe and Mail, May 23,1995.
Mayes, S. Makarios: A Biography. London: The Macmillan Ltd.,
1981.
McCaskill, C. "Cyprus Twenty-Five Years Later: An American
Diplomat Looks Back." Journal ofModern Greek Studies
9 (May 1991), pp. 23-42.
McDonald, Robert. The Problem of Cyprus. Adelphi Papers 234
London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, Winter 1988-89.
__. "Cyprus: A Peacekeeping Paradigm." The World Today
(October 1993), pp. 182-184.
Mearsheimer, John J. "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After
the Cold War." International Security 1 (Summer 1990), pp. 5-56.
Milne, R. S. Politics in Ethnically Bipolar States. Vancouver and London:
University ofBritish Columbia Press, 1981.
Minority Rights Groups. Cyprus. London: 1976.
Neuman, Stephanie., ed. Small States and Segmented Societies:
National Political Integration in a Global Environment.
New York: Praeger Publishers, 1976.
Orvik, Nils., ed. Semialignment and Western Security. London: Croom Helm, 1986.
O'Neill, Robert., ed. Prospects for Security in the Eastern Mediterranean.
London: Macmillan Press, 1988.
Papadakis, Yiannis. "The National Struggle Museums of a Divided City."
Ethnic and Racial Studies 3 (July 1994), pp. 404-429.
Papandreou, Andreas. Democracy At Gunpoint: The Greek Front.
New York: Doubleday and Co., 1970.
Patrick, Richard A. Political Geography and the Cyprus Conflict: 1963-1971.
Waterloo, Ontario: Department of Geography Publication Series, No.4, 1976.
Pollis, Adamantia. "The Missing of Cyprus--A Distinctive Case."
Journal ofModem Greek Studies Vol. 19 (1991), pp. ?
120
__. "Intergroup Conflict and British Colonial Policy."
Comparative Politics 5 (July 1973), pp. 575-599.
Pomfret, John. "In Fiery Debates Turkey Starts to Question Its Course in the World."
International Herald Tribune, April 17, 1995.
Posen, Barry R. "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict."
Survival 1 (Spring 1993): pp. 27-47.
Psomiades, Harry J., and Stavros B. Thomadakis., eds. Greece,
the New Europe ll and the Changing International Order.
New York: Pella Publishing Company, 1993.
Ra'anan, Uri. Ethnic Resurgence in Modem Democratic States:
A Multidisciplinary Approach to Human Resources and Conflict.
New York: Pergamon Press, 1980.
Reddaway, John. Burdened With Cyprus: The British Connection.
London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1986.
Rizvi, Gowher. "Ethnic Conflict and Political Accomodation in Plural Societies:
Cyprus and Other Cases." The Journal of Commonwealth and
Comparative Politics 1 (March 1993): pp. 57-83.
Roberts, Adam. "The United Nations and International Security."
Survival 2 (Summer 1993): pp. 3-30.
Ryan, Stephen. Ethnic Conflict and International Relations. Brookfield, 1990.
Said, A.A., ed. Ethnicity and U.S. Foreign Policy. New York:
Praeger Publishers, 1981.
Said, Abdul and Luiz R. Simmons., eds. Ethnicity in an International Context.
New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Books, 1976.
Salem, Norma., ed. Cyprus: A Regional Conflict and Its Resolution.
New York: St. Martins Press Inc., 1992.
Salih, Halil Ibrahim. Cyprus: An Analysis of Cypriot Political Discord.
New York: Theo. Gaus' Sons, Inc., 1968.
__. Cyprus: The Impact ofDiverse Nationalism on a State.
Alabama: University of Alabama Press, 1978.
121
Sambanis, Nicholas. "Ancient Affections: Standing in the Way
of a Resolution in Cyprus?" SAIS Review 2 (SummerlFall 1994),
pp. 125-140.
Sezer, Duygu Bazoglu. Turkey's Security Policies. London:
The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1981.
Shou, August and Arne Olav Brundtland, eds. Small States in International
Relations. Stockholm, Sweden: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1971.
Skjellsbaek, Kjell., ed. The Cyprus Conflict and the Role of the United Nations.
Oslo, Norway: Norwegian Institute of Intemational Affairs, 1988.
Smith, Paul., ed. Ethnic Groups in International Relations: Comparative
Studies on Government and Non-Dominant Ethnic Groups in
Europe~ 1850-1940. New York: New York University Press, 1991.
Statesman's Year-book: Statistical and Historical Annual of the
World for the Year 1993-1994. London: Macmillan, 1994.
Stavrou, Nikolaos A. "The Dismantling of the Balkan Security System:
Consequences for Greece, Europe, and NATO."
Mediterranean Quarterly 1 (Winter 1995), pp. 27-48.
Stem, L. "Bitter Lessons: How We Failed In Cyprus."
Foreign Policy (Summer 1974), pp. 34-78.
. __. The Wrong Horse: The Policies of Intervention and the
Failure of American Diplomacy. New York: Times Books,
1977.
Steams, Monteagle, Entangled Allies: U.S. Policy TowardGreece~ Turkey~
and Cyprus. New York: Council On Foreign Relations Press, 1992.
Stuart, Douglas T., ed. Politics and Security in the Southern Region
of the Atlantic Alliance. London: Macmillan, 1988.
Taylor, Bill. "The World's Last Divided Capital." The Toronto Star,
March 12, 1994.
TEAAOyAOy, T. "TEcrEpa LEVapta yta ~11 LXEcrll Kunpou-E. Evrocrtcr."
(Four Scenarios for Cypriot-European Union Relations) H Ka8UllEptVU,
(Athens) April 16, 1995.
122
They Make a Desert and They Call It Peace. Nicosia, Union
of the Municipalities of Cyprus, 1991.
Touval, Saadia. "Why the UN Fails." Foreign Affairs 5 (September/
October 1994): pp. 44-57.
United States. Congress House. Committee on Foreign Affairs.
Controlling the Damage: U.S. Policy Options For Greece,
January 18 to 21~ 1974, pursuant to H.R. 267. 93rd Cong.,
2nd session. Washington D.C.: U.S. Govt. Print Office,
1974.
__. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Greece and Turkey:
Some Military Implications Related to NATO and the
MiddleEast. February 28, 1975.
__. Senate. Senate Commission on Foreign Relations,
Greece and Cyprus~ 1975. Report by Senator
Clairborne Pell, Washington, 1976.
__. Department of State. Secretary of State Kissinger
Discusses Cyprus~ Greece and Turkey in Informal News
Conference. Washington, 1974.
United Nations. "Status Quo Not Acceptable: Joint Meetings Held
in New York." UN Chronicle (March 1993), p. 69.
__. "Talks Continue, UNFICYP Funding Changed."
UN Chronicle (September 1993), pp. 46-47.
Vlanton, Elias and Diane Alicia. "The 1959 Cyprus Agreement: Oracle
of Disaster." Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora 4 (Winter 1984), pp. 5-31.
Wagner, R. Harrison. "What was Bipolarity?" International Organization
1 (Winter 1993), pp. 77-106.
Waltz, Kenneth. Man~ the State~ and War. New York: Columbia University
Press, 1959.
__. "The Emerging Structure of International Politics. "
International Security 2 (Fall 1993), pp. 44-79.
__. "The Stability of a Bipolar World." Daedalus 93 (Summer 1964),
pp. 881-909.
123
__. Theory of International Politics. Reading, Massachusetts:
Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1979.
Weiss, Thomas G. "Intervention: Whither the United Nations."
The Washington Quarterly Vol. 17: 1 (1993), pp. 109-128.
White, Jenny B. "Islam and Democracy: The Turkish Experience."
Current History (January 1995), pp. 7-12.
Yilmaz, Bahri. "Turkey's New Role in International Politics." Aussenpolitik
1 (January 1994), pp. 90-98.
Woodhouse, C.M. The Rise and Fall of the Greek Colonels.
London: Granada, 1985.
Zahariadis, Nikolaos. "Nationalism and Small-State Foreign Policy:
The Greek Response to the Macedonian Issue. "
Political Science Quarterly 4 (1994), pp. 647-667.
Zetter, Roger. "The Greek-Cypriot Refugees: Perceptions of Return
Under Conditions ofProtracted Exile." International Migration Review
2 (Summer 1994), pp. 307-322.
124
